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Abstract 
The current trend to economically exploit deepwater hydrocarbon reserves is to reduce 
the capital expenditure; accomplished by deploying subsea equipment.  The financial 
benefit afforded is offset by the risk of high operational costs associated with failure.  
Recognition of the life cycle cost implications of subsea reliability have led to the 
development of the reliability strategy.  This strategy adopts a risk based approach to 
design for reliability where only analyses (and their subsequent recommended actions) 
perceived to add to whole project value are implemented.  While life cycle costing has 
been developed to address through life cost, analyses are traditionally considered a 
source of cost accumulation rather than value creation.   
 
This thesis proposes a potential reliability value decision making framework to assist in 
the design for reliability planning process.  The framework draws on the existing 
concepts of life cycle costing to explicitly consider the through life value of investing in 
reliability analyses.  Fundamental to the framework are the potential reliability value 
index and an associated value breakdown structure intended as central decision support 
for decentralised decision making.   
 
Implementation of the framework is reliant on synergies within the project organization; 
including relationships between organizations and project functions.  To enhance 
synergy between functions and dismantle some of the recognised barriers to 
implementing the reliability strategy an organizational structure, for projects, guided 
centrally by the reliability value framework is proposed.  This structure requires the 
broadening of each project functions’ skill set to enable the value added implementation 
of the strategy’s activities.  By widening the scope of application, the reliability analysis 
toolkit becomes the central guidance of the design process and awareness of the causes 
of unreliability and how they can be avoided increases.  As this capability improves so 
the cost-efficiency with which reliability is managed in design (introduced as the 
reliability efficiency frontier) also increases. 
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1. Introduction 
Demand for oil and gas is driving exploration and production (E&P) companies to more 
remote and technically challenging environments.  Exploration and production first ventured 
offshore in 1897 when a drilling derrick was placed on a pier reaching 250ft offshore.  By 
1961 the first subsea Christmas tree was installed and before the turn of the century the 
industry had achieved the milestone of completing 1000 subsea wells.  This rapid growth of 
the subsea industry is due to both technological and economic drivers.  As oil reserves are 
discovered in deeper waters, conventional technology solutions deployed in shallower waters 
become financially infeasible due to escalating capital expenditure (CAPEX).  Deployment of 
subsea technology reduces the required size of topsides and their support structures (a 
significant CAPEX item), but the immediate financial benefit afforded by installing subsea 
equipment is offset by the potential cost of failure during operations. 
 
Considering the trade-off between capital expenditure and operating expenditure (OPEX) is 
not new.  The principles of life cycle costing were developed in the early 1960s, around the 
time the first subsea tree was installed.  However, while the subsea industry embraces these 
concepts, CAPEX reduction is often the focus of life cycle costing; Hanrahan and Chitwood 
(2005) point out that any CAPEX item that can be deferred to incur a reasonable OPEX 
increase is favourable for project economics.  At the same time, it is accepted that 
unreliability can unfavourably escalate OPEX (and whole life cycle costs) and that high 
reliability can be a source of enhance project value and competitive advantage.  In 
recognition of this, the industry is recommending the best practises of technical risk 
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management through its standardisation bodies.  Subsequently, organizations are customising 
these practises to align them with existing project management policy. 
 
Despite the introduction of technical risk management strategies the relationship between 
design for reliability effort, the achieved system reliability and life cycle cost is not fully 
appreciated.  The reliability engineers’ toolkit (reliability activities such as failure modes and 
effects analysis and system availability analysis) is too often reserved for ad hoc and belated 
implementation or compliance to contractual specification.  Rather, they should influence 
design decisions through understanding what system reliability is required to satisfy a 
project’s financial objectives. 
 
Any investment of time and effort into design for reliability should be commensurate with the 
perceived level of risk within a project.  The recommended practises applicable to the 
petroleum industry stipulate that design for reliability activities should only be performed if 
they add value to the project (ISO 20815, 2007; API RP17N, 2007).  Aside from stating that 
the required effort increases with increased technical risk and providing rule of thumb 
implementation criteria, there is no guidance relating to how any design for reliability activity 
is qualified ‘value added’.  This research addresses the need for a rational methodology and 
appropriate tools to define the level of reliability that will meet corporate requirements and to 
provide evidence to decision makers, early in design decision making process, of the value of 
investing time and management effort in design for reliability activities during the design life 
cycle.   
 
This thesis assumes four basic parts.  Part one (chapters 2 and 3) introduces the underlying 
principles of technical risk management and addresses existing organizational constraints to 
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the effective implementation of such a strategy.  These chapters demonstrate the implicit 
links between the corporate objectives of an operator organization and the key processes that 
drive a reliability strategy, and highlight where barriers to implementing a pro-active value 
driven reliability strategy exist.  Part two (chapters 4, 5 and 6) reviews the existing literature 
central to the construction of a decision making process that focuses on the value of 
reliability.  These chapters explore the applications required to accurately model cost and 
reliability over a project lifecycle and their formulation within an economics of reliability 
model.  Part three (chapters 7 and 8) constructs a ‘potential reliability value framework’ and 
demonstrates its application through a number of case studies.  The framework incorporates 
key aspects of the technical risk management strategy (outlined in the industry’s 
recommended practice) and acknowledges that the potential value added through design for 
reliability is influenced by the cost-efficiency with which the reliability toolkit is applied; this 
feature is introduced through the concept of a reliability efficiency frontier.  Part four 
(chapter 9) extends the discussion of the case studies to explore how the framework can be 
incorporated to break down some of the barriers to strategy implementation and expand the 
reliability efficiency frontier.  The thesis concludes that the potential value from the 
implementation of a technical risk management strategy is enhanced through encouraging 
decentralized application of the reliability toolkit and decision making driven by a centralized 
decision process. 
 
Chapter 2 commences this study by introducing the fundamental aspects of technical risk 
management as presented in the upcoming recommended practice for the subsea industry.  
The approach is typified by the application of twelve key processes through a ‘define, plan, 
implement, feedback’ management loop.  These key processes are understood as the 
management practices required to deliver reliability on projects and have their conceptual 
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roots in design safety management.  Core to the application of the technical risk management 
practice is defining and planning reliability management activities that add to overall project 
value.  The definition of a scope of reliability work is a risk based decision.  While it is not 
appropriate for standards or recommended practices to dictate those activities that are value 
added (as they cannot assume organizational risk preference), they lack guidance on how to 
define if activities are in fact value added or the effort required to adequately manage the 
perceived risk. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the organizational barriers and constraints to the successful 
implementation of a reliability strategy.  Literature reveals barriers to implementation, in the 
subsea industry, relating to the perception of the reliability disciple, a business focus on 
CAPEX and a lack of knowledge of failure causation.  These barriers are symptomatic of the 
organizational structure.  Traditionally, reliability is managed through a central function, 
isolated from the project.  More recently decentralised reliability management has been 
suggested.  This has the benefit of increasing the exposure of the reliability disciple to the rest 
of the organization but decentralised decision making can result in conflicts of interest.  A 
central decision making framework is required to guide decentralised decision making.   
 
Chapter 4 reviews the current literature relating to life cycle costing as a basis for such a 
decentralised decision making process.  Fundamental to the application of life cycle costing is 
the definition of a decision metric and a cost breakdown structure.  Metrics quantify and 
qualify the acceptance criteria for the decision making process while the cost breakdown 
structure defines the scope of the decision making process by identifying cost elements that 
differentiate the decision options.  A reliability centred cost breakdown structure is proposed, 
which is used to model cost accumulation in either CAPEX or OPEX models and further 
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defines these costs according to the project stage in which they are accumulated.  The 
literature reveals that reliability centred CAPEX models tend to be reserved for product 
development instead of the project environment, addressing the ability to achieve target 
reliability at component level.  Reliability centred OPEX models have received more 
attention in the literature.  Combined, these models provide the basis of a life cycle cost 
model, but their application often focuses on differentiating existing options or reducing cost 
rather than identifying opportunities for and justifying value added reliability improvement in 
projects.  More specifically, the LCC models are not used to support the value added 
application of the reliability toolkit or justify the amount of reliability effort required to 
manage the inherent technical risks to reliability improvement.   
 
In order to justify the use of the reliability toolkit, decision makers need to understand the 
potential benefit that can result from its application.  Chapter 5 investigates the strengths and 
weaknesses of technical risk and reliability assessment techniques and considers how they 
can support the life cycle costing process.  Four techniques are identified as particularly 
applicable to this process; event tree analysis (ETA), failure modes and effects analysis 
(FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA) and RAM (reliability availability and maintainability) 
analysis.  RAM analysis naturally dovetails with the cost collection during the operational 
phase whilst the other techniques support decision making in the design and delivery phases.  
Combined with life cycle costing, these techniques can form the basis of a reliability centred 
life cycle costing framework designed to provide a centralised decision making criteria for 
assessing the value of reliability. 
 
The final component of the decision making framework is the joint presentation of reliability 
and cost data, most readily achieved through analogy with so called economics of quality 
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(EOQ) models.  Chapter 6 reviews the adoption EOQ models and their modification to 
economics of reliability (EOR).  These types of model are the subject of much discussion 
regarding the optimum quality and, by analogy, reliability.   The EOQ discussion is centred 
on whether or not the optimum quality exists at zero defects, but the same discussion is not 
immediately transferable to the field of reliability management as quality is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for reliability achievement.  Despite this, economics of reliability models form 
the basis of a powerful decision making tool for managers who are more responsive to 
financial metrics.  However, they are of less immediate use at project level as they do not 
reveal the direct value of implementing the reliability toolkit.  This chapter concludes that for 
cost-beneficial investments in reliability a decision framework is required to identify the 
effort required at project level that supports the objectives of the economics of reliability 
model. 
 
Chapter 7 constructs a potential reliability value framework that addresses the needs 
identified in the previous chapters.  The potential reliability value framework is constructed 
around a potential reliability value index, which addresses both investment cost and 
functional performance of the value drivers identified in a value breakdown structure.  This 
metric provides a central decision making criterion, which is applied to a model observing 
two distinct parts used to assess potential reliability centred CAPEX and OPEX.  The OPEX 
model applies the reliability value index to more conventional concepts already present in the 
literature while the CAPEX model is based on the ability to rectify potential failure modes 
that have been detected from specific sources known to cause unreliability (as identified in 
the industry recommended practices API RP 17N and ISO 20815). 
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Chapter 8 applies the component parts of the potential value framework to a collection of 
case studies, based on a hypothetical oil field development, to demonstrate their use and 
indicate its benefits over conventional life cycle costing.  The cases address the decisions of 
concept selection, optimum investment of reliability, the specification of a reliability budget 
and risk based planning of reliability activities.  The first two case studies compare decision 
making using the reliability value index and more conventional life cycle costing and 
economics of reliability decision making criteria, while the other cases address decisions not 
readily evaluated with such metrics.  The planning case study, importantly, introduces the 
concept of the reliability efficiency frontier, which acknowledges that the ability and 
efficiency with which organizations detect and rectify potential failure modes influences the 
decision to invest in design for reliability effort.  This case demonstrates that reliability 
capability and maturity affect value generation from design for reliability effort and 
concludes that the same decision to invest in design for reliability varies between 
organizations. 
 
Chapter 9 discusses the implementation of the potential reliability value framework and 
strategies to expand the reliability efficiency frontier.  The thesis proposes that the most 
effective strategy is the decentralised implementation of the reliability value framework 
guided by a central decision making criterion, namely the reliability value index.  Such an 
approach can be adopted at both organizational and project levels.  Decentralised reliability 
management requires that all organization and project functions are cognisant of how their 
specific actions influence the value of reliability.  While training can raise initial awareness 
of how reliability performance is affected by organizational or project decisions, relevant 
project functions must be involved with the appropriate applications of the reliability 
engineer’s toolkit.  This chapter concludes this thesis by recommending future scope for 
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research with specific regard to introducing the supply chain into the decision scenario 
through financial incentivisation.   
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2. Reliability and Technical Risk Management in the 
Subsea Industry 
2.1. Introduction 
System reliability is becoming an increasingly important facet of any company’s 
competitiveness.  As such, reliability and maintainability (R&M) strategies should be 
considered part of the corporate strategy (Madu, 2005).  This is especially true in the subsea 
oil and gas production industry as equipment failure can result in disproportionately long 
downtime compared to the dry (either topsides or land-based) equivalent.  Prolonged periods 
of unexpected downtime can a have significant impact on project value.  To manage such 
risks, the petroleum industry has provided guidance on reliability management strategies 
through various standardisation bodies.  ISO 20815 (Petroleum, petrochemical and natural 
gas industries – Production assurance and reliability management) provides guidance for the 
wider petroleum industry while the forthcoming API recommended practice 17N 
(Recommended Practice subsea production system reliability & technical risk management) 
provides subsea specific guidance to reliability and technical risk management (API, 2007; 
ISO, 2007). 
 
The API subsea strategy revolves around a four step reliability and technical risk 
management cycle as shown in Figure 2-1.  Activities within these stages are implemented 
through a number of key processes understood to be essential in the competent management 
of reliability throughout a project life cycle.  This chapter explains the fundamental aspects of 
the recommended practice and demonstrates how its underlying management processes 
support the corporate objectives of subsea operators.  Section 2.2 details the primary 
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activities associated with the management cycle and identifies the key processes that support 
the technical risk management strategy.  Section 2.3 demonstrates how these key processes 
are implicitly linked to the corporate objectives of operator organizations and section 2.4 
summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
 
Figure 2-1: API RP 17N Reliability and technical risk management cycle (API RP 17N, 2007). 
 
2.2. Overview of the Strategy 
The forthcoming American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice “subsea production 
system reliability & technical risk management” provides guidance on how subsea operator 
organizations manage risks to reliability achievement during field development projects.  It is 
a subsea specific implementation of ISO 20815.  The international standard mandates the 
implementation of a management tool to align design for reliability decisions to corporate 
objectives.  The management tool is recommended to include the following (ISO 20815, 
2007): 
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• systematic planning of production-assurance work within the scope of the 
programme; 
• definition of optimization criteria; 
• definition of performance objectives and requirements, if any; 
• description of the production-assurance activities necessary to fulfil the objectives, 
how they are carried out, by whom and when; 
• statements and considerations on interfaces of production assurance and reliability 
with other activities; 
• methods for verification and validation; and 
• a level of detail that facilitates easy updating and overall coordination. 
 
API RP 17N (2007) interprets these recommendations within the management framework 
indicated in Figure 2-1.  The management framework is guided by a four step feedback cycle 
of Define, Plan, Implement, and Feedback.  The following details the purpose of each of 
these steps. 
 
2.2.1. Define, Plan Implement and Feedback 
The first step, Define, specifies the objectives of the project, identifies the risk to achieving 
the objectives and defines a scope of work to manage the risks identified.  The objectives of a 
project are specified as either goals or requirements, which are differentiated by the level of 
evidence required to demonstrate conformance.  A requirement is an essential product 
characteristic for which evidence of conformance is also necessary whereas goals are 
desirable characteristics for which evidence of conformance is either unobtainable or is not 
necessary (BS 5760-4, 2003).  API RP 17N (2007) assesses risks to achieving these 
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objectives through identifying change by using a process of technical risk categorisation.  
These changes are identified as deviations from previous projects based on five factors; 
reliability, technology, architecture, environment and organization. 
 
The reliability factor considers if historical reliability is sufficient to meet the project goals 
and requirements.  The remaining factors can be considered as sources of risk to reliability 
achievement.  The technology factor aims to identify where changes to the basic equipment 
have occurred or if new technology is required.  Architecture addresses changes to system 
design and complexity.  Environment identifies changes to the internal and external operating 
conditions.  Organization considers changes to the project and organizational complexity and 
ability.  Each factor is allocated a technical risk category based on a four point scale as 
indicated in Table 2-1.  This ranking allows project engineers to prioritise the risks to 
reliability achievement. 
 
Identifying a scope of work is the bridge between the Define and Planning stages.  The scope 
of work defines the actions required to manage the changes/risks identified and achieve the 
project’s objectives.  To facilitate the application of technical risk management, the 
recommended practice defines a standard response to the changes observed during technical 
risk categorisation.  Table 2-2 indicates that, for example, risk and reliability analysis is not 
necessary for low risk repeat projects as, by definition, it has been completed before. 
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Table 2-1: Technical risk category summary (modified from API RP 17N, 2007). 
 Reliability Technology  
 
Architecture / 
Configuration 
 
Environment Organization  
 
A 
(Very 
high) 
Reliability 
improvements 
(technology 
change): 
Significant 
improvements 
requiring 
change to 
technology. 
Novel technology or 
new design 
concepts: 
Novel design or 
technology to be 
qualified during 
project. 
Novel 
application:  
Architecture, 
layout or 
configuration has 
not been 
previously 
applied by 
supplier. 
New 
environment:  
Pushing 
environmental 
boundaries such as, 
pressure or temp. 
Or a new 
geographic 
location. 
Whole new 
team: 
New project 
team, working 
with new 
suppliers in a 
new location. 
B 
(High) 
Reliability 
improvements 
(design 
change):   
Significant 
improvement 
requiring 
change to 
design but not 
technology. 
Major 
modifications:  
Known technology 
with major changes 
to manufacturing 
process, materials, or 
upgrades.  
Non mature for 
extended operating  
environments 
Orientation and 
capacity 
changes: 
Significant 
changes such as 
layout, size and 
orientation. 
Large scale, High 
complexity 
Significant 
environmental 
changes:  
Extended and / or 
aggressive 
operating 
environment.  
Significant team 
changes:  
New supplier or 
contractor;  
Changes in key 
personnel from 
previous project 
C 
(Medium) 
Minor 
Reliability 
improvements: 
Reliability 
Improvements 
requiring 
improved 
QA/QC. 
Minor 
modifications: 
Same supplier 
providing a copy of 
previous equipment 
with minor 
modifications such as 
dimensions, 
tolerances or design 
life. 
Interface 
changes: 
Interface 
changes, either 
with different 
equipment or 
control system. 
Small scale, low 
complexity. 
Similar 
environmental 
conditions:  
Same as a previous 
project or no major 
environmental 
risks have been 
identified   
Minor team 
changes:  
Minor changes in 
project team or 
supply chain 
D 
(Low) 
Unchanged 
reliability: 
Existing 
reliability and 
QA/QC is 
acceptable 
Field proven 
technology: 
Same equipment of 
identical 
specification, 
manufactured at same 
location. 
Unchanged: 
Identical to 
previous spec. 
No orientation, 
layout or 
interfaces 
modification 
Same 
environmental 
conditions:  
Same as recent 
project  
Same team as 
previous:  
Unchanged 
project team and 
supply chain. 
 
As the technical risk categorisation process is based on uncertainty or changes rather than risk 
(defined as the product of consequence and probability of occurrence), the standard response 
defined may be superfluous or insufficient.  In recognition of this fact the guidance indicates 
that all activities should add value to the project and be consistent with the project goals and 
strategy (API RP 17N, 2007).  However, there is no guidance to support this decision making 
process aside specify that the technical risk management framework should be applied in 
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conjunction with life cycle costing.  The absence of more detailed guidance is due to the fact 
that standardisation bodies cannot presume the risk preference of organizations.   
 
Table 2-2: Overview of the required activities based on technical risk and life cycle phase (API RP 17N, 2007). 
Life Cycle Phase 
Assurance Processes for Asset Development 
Pre 
contract 
award 
Post contract award 
L
o
w
 R
isk
 
P
ro
je
cts
 
M
ed
iu
m
 R
isk
 
P
ro
je
cts 
H
ig
h
 R
isk
 
P
ro
je
cts 
Main Processes 
F
easib
ility
 
C
o
n
cep
t S
electio
n
 
F
E
E
D
 
D
etailed
 D
esig
n
 
&
 M
an
u
factu
re 
S
IT
 T
estin
g
 
In
stallatio
n
 an
d
 
C
o
m
m
issio
n
in
g
 
O
p
eratio
n
 
 X X 
Definition of Availability 
Goals & Requirements 
X X X X    
X X X 
Organizing and Planning 
for Availability 
X X X X X X X 
X X X 
Design and Manufacture 
for Availability 
 X X X X   
X X X Reliability Assurance X X X X X X X 
 X X 
Risk and Reliability 
Analysis 
X X X X    
X X X Verification and Validation X X X X X X X 
X X X Project Risk Management X X X X X X X 
  X Qualification and Testing  X X X X   
X X X 
Performance Data Tracking 
and Analysis 
    X X X 
 X X Supply Chain Management   X X X X  
X X X Management of Change  X X X X X X 
X X X Organizational learning X X X X X X X 
 
The Plan step attempts to translate the scope of work into an ordered set of deliverables, 
activities and or tasks designed to assess the risks identified during the assessment of 
technical risk.  A plan should include sufficient detail such that the objectives of the scope of 
work can be satisfactorily achieved according to time and budgetary constraints, this detail 
can include (BS 6079-1, 2002): 
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1. task reference code; 
2. summary description of the requirement; 
3. name of the person accountable for completion of the task; 
4. list of key deliverables; 
5. timescales for the deliverables; 
6. schedule of task dependencies and subsidiary tasks; 
7. schedule of costs; 
8. an assessment of risks associated with the task; 
9. performance measurement and task completion criteria; 
10. description of the work content of the task; 
11. reporting requirements; and 
12. name of task owners.  
 
The Implement step is the actual doing stage, where the objectives of the scope of work are 
conducted according to the plan.  Implementation of the activities should include validation 
and verification to ensure that the correct techniques have been applied (validation) and that 
they have been applied correctly (verification).  During the implementation step, it is possible 
that either new risks are identified or it is recognised that known risks have been 
underestimated.  In these cases, a secondary Define, Plan, Implement and Feedback may be 
applied during Implement, drawing analogy from Deming’s PDCA cycle (Deming, 2000). 
 
The final step, Feedback, closes out the reliability and technical risk management cycle for a 
given project phase.  There are two component to the Feedback stage; assurance and lessons 
learnt.   Reliability assurance is presented in the form of a reliability assurance document to 
decision makers. This document provides a critical examination of the information collected 
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(during the Implement step) and indicates if the goals and requirements, set out in the Define 
step, have been or can be achieved.  It is important, therefore, that the project decision makers 
understand how potential risks can affect system reliability achievement.  Lessons learnt are 
the good and bad practices experienced during the project.  These experiences are recorded 
for the future benefit of the organization by allowing project managers to better understand 
where risks to reliability achievement are introduced and improve the application of the 
technical risk management strategy. 
 
2.2.2. Key technical risk management processes 
The reliability and technical risk management cycle is applied through twelve key processes.  
These key processes are understood to be essential for the competent management of 
reliability achievement and where originally identified to assess organizational capability in 
design safety management (Sharp et al. 2002; Strutt et al. 2006).  The key processes as 
defined by API RP 17N (2007) are: 
1. Definition of Availability Goals & Requirements; 
2. Organizing and Planning for Availability; 
3. Design and Manufacture for Availability; 
4. Reliability Assurance; 
5. Risk and Reliability Analysis; 
6. Verification and Validation; 
7. Project Risk Management; 
8. Qualification and Testing; 
9. Performance Data Tracking and Analysis; 
10. Supply Chain Management; 
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11. Management of Change; 
12. Organizational learning. 
 
These key processes are broadly grouped into core processes and supporting processes.  The 
first four key processes embody the Define, Plan Implement, Feedback management cycle, 
while Risk and Reliability Analysis provides specialist support to many of the first four key 
processes.  The remaining processes may be considered good management practice, which 
input to or receive output from the core key processes.  Each key process is discussed further 
in the following section. 
 
2.3. Relating Key Processes to Corporate Objectives 
The key processes, listed above, were derived from those originally defined to assess 
organizational capability in design safety management (Sharp et al. 2002; Strutt et al. 2006).  
This section explores if, by analogy, the same key processes are necessary and sufficient for 
reliability achievement in subsea developments by discussing the implicit link between 
corporate objectives and key processes.   
 
Observing a process similar to that of quality function deployment, a phased approach of 
relating key processes to corporate objectives is adopted.  The first phase of the assessment is 
used to identify project requirements that can support the corporate objectives.  As it is not 
proposed that technical risk and reliability management immediately satisfies all corporate 
requirements, some are excluded before considering how the strategy and its key processes 
link to the remaining project requirements.   
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2.3.1. Corporate objectives 
The corporate objectives are taken to be the voice of the customer.  Corporate objective have 
been compiled from numerous oil and gas operators’ literature, identifying their basic 
business principles, values and corporate social responsibilities.  Freely available information 
from the following corporations was reviewed to establish the oil and gas industry’s core 
business principles and values
1
: 
• BP (BP, 2007a); 
• Chevron (Chevron, 2006); 
• ConocoPhillips (ConocoPhillips, 2007); 
• ExxonMobil (ExxonMobil, 2004); 
• Anadarko (Anadarko, 2007); 
• Royal Dutch Shell (Shell, 2005); and 
• Total (Total, 2005). 
 
Corporate objectives can be broadly categorised according to the following stakeholder focal 
points and are summarised in Table 2-3; 
• Shareholders.  The overriding objective is to provide competitive long term returns 
on investment and create value. 
• Employees.  Maximise the opportunity for success of their employees by providing 
training, respecting human risks and maintaining personnel health and safety. 
• Customers. Gaining and retaining a market share through continually providing 
quality products at competitive prices to changing customer needs and preferences.  
One way to retain market share is to provide a reliable service.  Although this may be 
                                                 
1
 Corporate objects were also based on two pieces of Atkins Boreas work intentionally not cited here. 
19 
 
considered a solution to the gain/retain market share objective it is included here to 
provide an emphasis on reliability. 
• Environment. Maintaining environmentally responsible operations. 
• Local communities. Respect the local environment, laws, rules, regulations and 
cultures.  Contributing to the economical and social development, through ethical 
business practices, of the local community is continually emphasised. 
• Business partners. Generating long term and mutually beneficial relationships. 
 
Table 2-3: Voice of the stakeholder. 
Stakeholder focus Voice of the stakeholder 
Shareholder Maximise shareholder value 
 
Employee Maintain personnel Health and Safety 
 Maximise employee success opportunity 
 
Customer Gain/Retain Market Share 
 Gain reputation amongst customers for reliable service  
 
Environment Maintain environmentally responsible operations 
 
Community Respect local laws/cultures 
 Contribute to economic/social development 
 
Business partners Generate mutually beneficial business relationships 
 
2.3.2. Relating Project Requirements to Corporate Objectives 
The project requirements are attributes defined to satisfy the voice of the stakeholder.  For 
each of the corporate objectives, at least one project attribute was defined to satisfy each 
voice of the stakeholder.  Project attributes are defined to provide a solution neutral method 
of aligning the project objectives to the voice of the stakeholder.  The relationships between 
corporate objectives and project attributes are discussed below. 
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Maximise shareholder value 
Shareholder value can be defined as the financial returns afforded to the shareholder by the 
organization.  These returns are generated either from dividend payouts or enhanced market 
share prices.  Dividends afforded to the shareholder are determined from the net operating 
profit after tax and an estimation of the share prices can be determined from the ratio of the 
total business value of the company to the number of ordinary shares.  As with dividend 
payout, the total business value is a function of net operating profit after tax.  In order to 
provide dividends and increase share prices, the organization must optimise the profit margin.  
Share price is not entirely financial in its appraisal as although it is unlikely to fall below the 
ratio indicated above, the share price may be bolstered by operational practices, many of 
which are addressed below.   
 
Maintain personnel Health and Safety 
Offshore installations are hazardous environments and there have been a number of high 
profile incidents that have claimed many lives, which are severely damaging to an 
organization’s reputation.  In maintaining personnel health and safety the foremost 
requirement is to minimise health/safety risk exposure through the application of the relevant 
safety standards and legislation. 
 
Maximise employee success opportunity  
The management field of HR focuses on this specific corporate objective and is not the 
primary focus of this research.  Maximising the success opportunity, in terms of career 
enhancement can be achieved through providing training and coaching. 
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Gain/Retain market share 
As with maximising shareholder value, acquiring and retaining market share is not achieved 
by purely financial means.  Here, gaining and retaining market share is considered in terms of 
perceived product value.  It is important, therefore, to reliably provide quality products at low 
cost.  
 
Reputation for reliable service 
Gaining a reputation for a reliable service first requires that the company does have a reliable 
service (through maintaining high system availability), which can then be demonstrated.  It 
also requires that the service is initially available on time. 
 
Maintain environmentally responsible operations 
A suitable project requirement for this corporate objective can be simply stated as reduce 
hydrocarbon release, both in terms of the frequency and volume of hydrocarbons released.  
Growing awareness of an organizations carbon footprint should also be considered. 
 
Respect local laws/cultures  
Oil exploitation is a global industry; operators are exposed it countless local laws and 
regulations.  The field of corporate/local law is too broad for consideration and is therefore 
out of the scope of this study.  For completeness, it is assumed that adhering to local 
standards, at least, satisfies respecting local laws.   
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Contribute to economic/social development  
Recruitment of local labour/expertise or purchase of locally produced hardware can benefit 
the local economy.  However, the interaction of company practice and macroeconomics is 
considered beyond the scope to this study. 
 
Generate mutually beneficial business relationships  
There may be two primary ‘business partners’ to consider in a field development project; the 
supply chain (service and hardware) and the joint-investors of project (field development 
projects are usually joint ventures).  Operators therefore attempt to optimise their supply 
chain and should attempt to gain a reputation among other operators of being able to deliver, 
cost-effectively, high system availability. 
 
Project requirements in response to the corporate objectives are summarised in Table 2-4.  
These requirements immediately satisfy the corporate objective from which they were 
defined.  However, they also influence other corporate objectives; for example, shareholder 
value is affected by a company’s entire business practice, not just the ability to optimise its 
profit margin.  A more detailed assessment, such as that achieved through the use of QFD, 
would demonstrate the strength of the solutions (in this case the project requirements) to the 
needs (corporate requirement) but is considered superfluous to this discussion providing the 
project objectives are defined. 
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Table 2-4: Project requirements based on defined to satisfy corporate objectives. 
Corporate Objectives Project Requirements 
Maximise shareholder value Optimise profit margin 
 
Maintain personnel Health and Safety Adhere to relevant safety standards 
 
Maximise employee success opportunity Provide training and coaching 
opportunities 
 
Gain/Retain Market Share Provide a cost effective goods/services 
 
High system availability  Gain reputation amongst customers for 
reliable service  Demonstrate repeatable reliability 
 
Minimise carbon foot print Maintain environmentally responsible 
operations Minimise spills 
 
Respect local laws/cultures Adhere to local standards 
 
Contribute to economic/social 
development 
Provide employment opportunities 
 
 
Optimise the supply chain Generate mutually beneficial business 
relationships Get project right first time, on time 
 
The research objective addresses the need to understand the required reliability to meet 
corporate financial objectives and the effort necessary to achieve them.  ISO 20815 (2007) 
and API RP 17N (2007) also state that design for reliability effort should only be invested if 
it adds value.  To maintain this focus only the project requirements identified in Table 2-4 
that are directly related to financial parameters and reliability achievement are considered in 
the second phase of the assessment, these are: 
• Optimise profit margin; 
• Provide a cost effective goods/services; 
• High system availability; 
• Demonstrate repeatable reliability; 
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• Optimise the supply chain; and 
• Get project right first time, on time. 
 
2.3.3. Relating Key Processes to Project Requirements 
This section discusses how the key processes defined by API RP 17N (2007) and ISO 20815 
(2007) help achieve the requirements generated in the previous section.  The project 
requirements considered here are either financial in nature or relate to system reliability or 
availability performance.  It seems unnecessary to discuss how the key processes relate to 
reliability or availability achievement as the primary purpose of the strategy, and its 
constituent activities, is to deliver system reliability.  There is also a key process directly 
related to supply chain management.  The remaining project requirements relate to the 
financial success of the project and the relation to the key processes is not as explicit.  These 
are discussed further. 
 
KP1: Definition of Availability Goals & Requirements 
Defining goals and requirements initiates the application of technical risk management.  It is 
the process of identifying needs and specifying acceptance criteria.  Goals and requirements 
are differentiated by their acceptance criteria.  Requirements are essential characteristics of a 
system to which the supplier has to provide evidence of conformance.  A goal, however, is a 
desired feature, which the supplier either cannot or need not provide assurance (BS 5760-4, 
2003). 
 
Goals and requirements support the optimisation processes whereby operational performance 
is considered against an economic decision metric (ISO 20815, 2007).  This allows decision 
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makers to define the system availability required to meet the (economic) feasibility 
requirements.  Defining an optimal availability requires that overemphasis on CAPEX (or 
maximum exposure) be avoided (ISO 20815, 2007) and as such requires that a life cycle 
costing activity be incorporated.  API RP 17N (2007) phrases this as reliability value 
analysis, which directly incorporates reliability performance with life cycle costing (ISO 
20815 employs life cycle costing as a separate activity within its optimisation process).  The 
activity acknowledges that there is a trade-off between CAPEX and OPEX which is 
influenced by service life reliability and the cost necessary to achieve it.  This enables project 
managers to align the reliability strategy with the financial objective of the project and the 
organization.  Applying techniques, such as life cycle costing does have the potential to 
incorporate the value added from design for reliability effort, but there is no specific guidance 
on how this might be achieved and the petroleum industry’s standard for life cycle costing 
does not explicitly address reliability analyses as cost elements.  The application of reliability 
centred life cycle costing is addressed in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
KP2: Organizing and Planning for Availability 
Planning for availability schedules the technical risk management activities (identified during 
the Define stage) and allocates resource and expertise to each.  Organizing for availability is 
the process of establishing the roles and responsibilities within the (subsea) project delivery 
team and defining the relationship between specialist reliability expertise and the rest of the 
project organization.  Organizing for reliability is addressed further in Chapter 3. 
 
It is necessary to define the level of effort based on the financial returns required from the 
project whilst considering the level of inherent risk within the project; over emphasis on 
reliability could cause delays to project schedules and drive project costs up (especially if 
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these requirements are handed down to hardware suppliers, who would otherwise not 
implement such activities).  Underestimating the design for reliability effort required can 
equally inflate operational costs due to failure in operation.  ISO 20815 (2007) and API RP 
17N (2007) use technical risk categorisation as a rule of thumb for applying the key 
processes, as defined in Table 2-2.  However the specific activities are not addressed.  The 
belief that reliability and technical risk management should be tailored to the specific risks is 
echoed in other reliability management strategies.  Military Standard 785 (Department of 
Defense, 1988) states: 
 
“Effective reliability programs must be tailored to fit the program needs and constraints, 
including life cycle costs.  This document [Mil Std 785B] is intentionally structured to 
discourage blanket application.” 
 
Burns (1994) points out that there are no general rules to follow to deliver cost effective 
reliability and that each product should have a program that is appropriate to the technical 
risks associated with the product being developed.  This appears to contradict the sentiments 
of ISO 20815 (2007) and API RP 17N (2007) somewhat (i.e. Table 2-2) although it is noted 
that depending on the risk (i.e. the combined effect of change or uncertainty as defined by the 
technical risk categorisation and consequences of failure) the key processes may or may not 
be value added.  When considering product development the required reliability and technical 
risk management program may be specific to the product and its intended use.  However, for 
system design, and specifically subsea production system design, many of the component 
parts are common between projects and cost of failure is usually significant (i.e. intervention 
vessel charges and lost or deferred production).  Irrespective of this there could (and should) 
be a generic risk (or value) based framework to identify the design for reliability activities, 
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which ISO 20815 (2007) and API RP 17N (2007) begins to address with their guidance and 
the application of life cycle costing.  The traditional metric used during life cycle costing are 
not explicitly those defined to satisfy the corporate financial requirements although it is noted 
that these requirements are solution neutral; life cycle costing metrics could be adapted to 
suite the specific needs of a company.  The international standard IEC 60300-3-3 (2004) does 
identify design engineering, including reliability, maintainability and environmental 
protection activities as typical cost generating activities but does not discuss these in terms of 
planning design for reliability effort.  More importantly however, the petroleum industry’s 
life cycle costing standards (ISO 15663-1, 2000; ISO 15663-2, 2001; ISO 15663-3,2001), 
while identifying that life cycle costing can be use for “the alignment of engineering 
decisions with corporate and business objectives” (ISO 15663-1, 2000) does not include 
reliability analyses as a cost element.  That is, the industry does not employ life cycle costing 
as a planning tool for design for reliability and there is no evidence in the literature where life 
cycle costing justifies the use of reliability analyses.  Chapter 4 explores the application of 
life cycle costing in greater detail.   
 
KP3: Design and Manufacture for Availability 
Design and manufacture for availability represents the link between design reliability and 
quality in manufacture.  Design for reliability is the process of methodically identifying and 
removing system weaknesses until the required reliability is an inherent feature of the design.  
Manufacture for reliability is the application of concepts statistical process control and stress 
screening in order to ensure that the design reliability is achieved in operations.  
 
There is a close relationship between the project requirements and the design and 
manufacture for availability key process.  The engineering decisions that are made as part of 
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design for reliability have the potential to achieve the performance objectives (both in terms 
of reliability performance and financial performance).  Project design engineers are tasked 
with specifying the inherent characteristics of the system such that the project goals and 
requirements are achieved.  Manufacture for reliability, then, is the process of ensuring that 
the inherent characteristics designed into the system are delivered in the final product, 
ensuring that the design reliability is not compromised through the introduction of latent 
faults. 
 
KP4: Reliability Assurance 
Reliability assurance is the process of demonstrating the extent to which the (goals and) 
requirements have been or can be achieved.  The process, applied throughout the project, 
demonstrates that the risks identified have been adequately managed.  This information is 
presented to project decision makers in the form of a reliability assurance document to assist 
in stage gate decisions.  The reliability assurance document is created to generate confidence 
that the risks to reliability achievement have been identified and adequately managed such 
that the project objectives can be achieved.  
 
KP5: Risk and Reliability Analysis 
Risk and reliability analysis is the application of the reliability toolkit.  These are the 
(systems) reliability analysis techniques used to assess the inherent reliability characteristics.  
This process is address in more detail in Chapter 5.  Risk and reliability analyses tend to be 
considered as cost generating activities (IEC 60300-3-3, 2004) and may not therefore be 
considered in terms of achieving a project’s financial requirements.  Despite its label as a 
‘cost generating activity’, the application of reliability analyses can be used to support the 
design for reliability decisions, setting the reliability goals and requirements and 
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demonstrating that a design can achieve the project requirements.  However, in the subsea oil 
and gas industry, the application of reliability analyses tends to focus on conformance to 
specification and is often applied too late in the design process to have any significant 
influence. 
 
KP6: Verification and Validation 
Verification and validation addresses the application of all the tools, techniques and processes 
implemented as part of the technical risk management strategy.  Validation addresses if a 
tool, technique or process is the correct one for the intended result.  Verification addresses if 
the tool, technique or process has been applied correctly.  Verification and validation is an 
important aspect of reliability assurance and as such has similar links to the project objectives 
as the reliability assurance key process. 
 
KP7: Project Risk Management 
Project risk management ties in the technical risk management framework into the 
management of the field development project.  It is an extension of both the reliability 
management plan and the qualification plan to consider how they might introduce potential 
budget or schedule risks and how they are managed.  Likewise, it also considers how the 
project schedule and budget could introduce risks to reliability achievement. Project risk 
management practices, such as earned value analysis assess both time and budget 
performance against the scheduled consumption of resources, although it does not consider 
financial performance in operation. 
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KP8: Qualification and Testing 
Qualification and testing is the process of advancing the maturity of technology.  There are a 
number of assessment criteria for equipment qualification in the oil and gas industry; ISO 
20815 (2007) uses the approach proposed by DNV RP A203 (DNV, 2001), which considers 
the level of operating experience in a known or new application area.  API RP 17N (2007) 
adopts a technology readiness level approach, similar to that used by NASA (Shishko et al. 
2004).  Qualifying the reliability of new technology can incur significant cost and as such is 
not normally performed in the project environment.  However, the results of such an activity 
can be a source of significant confidence with regard to reliability achievement in the 
intended use conditions. 
 
KP9: Performance Data Tracking and Analysis 
Data management considers the acquisition of reliability data.  Its primary focus is collecting 
data in the field, which can be used to confirm reliability achievement in operations and 
support reliability analysis and decision making in future projects.  The acquisition of valid 
data is vital to the design for reliability decision making process.  The application of 
reliability analyses with poor quality or invalid data can undermine the confidence of 
reliability assurance and the decisions made during design for reliability. 
 
KP10:  Supply Chain Management 
Supply chain management addresses the communication of the goals and requirements to 
potential suppliers and considers the ability of the supply chain to meet these requirements.  
The latter is achieved through the assessment of reliability capability maturity, which 
measures an organization’s ability to influence and control reliability (Williams et al. 2003).  
In order for a project to achieve its objectives, it is important the supply chain is fully aligned 
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to these requirements.  The inherent reliability designed into a system can be undermined if 
the supply chain is not aware of, willing to meet or able to meet the reliability requirements.  
In many cases the effectiveness with which manufacture for reliability is implemented is 
dependent on the ability of certain organizations within the supply chain. 
 
KP11: Management of Change 
Management of change is introduced as a key process to ensure that changes introduced 
during the project do not adversely affect reliability achievement.  The primary tool for 
management of change used in technical risk management is technical risk categorisation, 
which is used to identify differences between the current project and previous experience.  
Changes that are unknowingly introduced can have a significant impact on the project’s 
ability to meet its objectives, especially if these changes are introduce with the intent to meet 
other objectives that may conflict with those of the project.  This is especially true for 
changes that occur in the supply chain, which might not be visible to the operator and 
potentially lead to costly common cause failures. 
 
KP12: Organizational Learning 
The final key process is organizational learning.  This is the process of continual 
improvement in terms of reliability performance but also in terms of the effectiveness with 
which the technical risk management strategy is applied.  The main tool for achieving this is 
lessons learnt, which serves as an input to all other key processes.  Organizational learning 
observes two main activities; lessons capture and lessons learnt review.  The former is used to 
identify experiences (e.g. best practice, failures or near misses) on the current project that are 
considered noteworthy enough to be recorded for the benefit of future projects.  As such this 
activity does not immediately satisfy the project objectives but does support the long term 
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achievement of the corporate objectives.  The second activity associated with organizational 
learning, does however, relate to the ways in which the project objectives might be achieved 
based on previous experience. 
 
2.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of the key aspects of the new wave of reliability and 
technical risk management standards and recommended practises that have been developed 
for the oil and gas industry and specifically the subsea industry (as is the case with API RP 
17N).  The strategy takes the key processes that originate from design safety management 
and structures them within a Define, Plan, Implement and Feedback cycle similar to that of a 
Deming (2000) PDCA (plan do check act) cycle observed in quality management.   
 
The strategy is governed by the principle that design for reliability effort should be 
commensurate with the level of risk inherent within the project and that this effort should add 
to the overall project value.  This sentiment is mirrored in standards that pre-date these newer 
publications but there appears to have been little progression in developing decision making 
criteria to support this objective.  Concepts such as life cycle costing (LCC) have been 
proposed to facilitate such decision making.  While the application of LCC has been used to 
support the decision as to what the optimum system reliability might be, there is no evidence 
that LCC has been used to plan the activities required to achieve the optimum reliability.  
This is especially the case when applying the reliability engineers toolkit (systems reliability 
analyses), which is normally considered a cost accumulating element of a life cycle costing 
model despite the reliance of the reliability and technical risk management strategy on the 
respective key process.  In order for decision makers to understand the value of investing in 
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such analyses it is necessary to define decision making criteria that enables them to identify 
when reliability analyses are value added.  Chapter 4 provides a more detailed review of life 
cycle costing; before that however, issues relating to the implementation of reliability and 
technical risk management are explored to consider some of the more organizational needs of 
a decision making framework. 
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3. Reliability and Technical Risk Management Strategy 
Implementation 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the reliability and technical risk management strategies 
being introduced across the oil and gas industry.  The approach requires a value based 
approach to planning for reliability achievement that attempts to front load the design for 
reliability effort.  The implementation of such a strategy requires a fundamental change to the 
way in which operators (and their supply chain) implement systems reliability analyses and 
design for reliability.  Such a change invariably encounters resistance embodied as barriers to 
implementation.  This chapter identifies these barriers and explores how a value based 
planning framework might be applied to accommodate some of these barriers. 
 
3.2. Barriers to implementation 
Identifying barriers to implementing a reliability strategy or culture has been the subject of 
some discussion in the literature (Roberts et al., 2001; Brall, 2001; Busby and Strutt, 2001; 
Strutt et al., 2007).  Five barriers to the implementation of a reliability strategy have been 
identified: 
1. Industrial perception of the reliability disciple; 
2. Business focus on CAPEX; 
3. Lack of knowledge of failure causation; 
4. Power of the reliability tools; and 
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5. Organizational structure. 
 
3.2.1. Industrial perception of the reliability discipline 
Perhaps the greatest barrier to the implementation of a reliability strategy lies with the basic 
understanding of what reliability is.  Many organizations believe that reliability is achieved 
through quality management (Roberts et al., 2001) or that reliability and quality are 
synonymous (Levin and Kalal, 2003).  There is however, an awkward relationship between 
quality and reliability as quality is not necessary for the achievement of target reliability and 
that reliability can mask poor quality (this is considered in greater detail in Chapter 6).  
However, there is synergy between the two practices and quality can support reliability 
improvement if targeted correctly.   
 
By defining quality as conformance to specification (Crosby, 1979), quality can only help in 
the achievement of reliability only if it has been correctly specified.  However, there is a 
perception that the function of reliability engineering is through measurement and analysis of 
reliability rather than achievement of improved reliability (Roberts et al., 2001).  The 
improvement of reliability is driven by the identification of goals and or requirements; if 
these reliability goals and requirement have not been specified correctly then the application 
of a quality management system only serves to guarantee poor reliability.   
 
3.2.2. Business focus on CAPEX 
The business model for the economic development of deepwater subsea installations tends to 
focus on CAPEX minimisation.  The shorter the field life the more important a low CAPEX 
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becomes (Chitwood et al. 2004) and deferment of CAPEX to incur a reasonable OPEX 
increase in the future should result in improved field economics (Hanraham and Chitwood, 
2005).  The underlying concept of (reliability centred) life cycle costing is in conflict with 
this basic goal of CAPEX minimisation; life cycle costing advocates an increase in CAPEX 
to observe a life cycle cost benefit.  In addition, reliability investments are inherently risk 
based; decision makers are averse to a certain CAPEX increase against uncertain future 
income and OPEX reduction.    
 
The CAPEX minimisation focus is supplemented with a desire to minimise the time to first 
oil; installations often stagger when production wells come on line in order to minimise the 
time taken to start generating revenue.  However, there is a perception that the activities and 
analyses recommended in a reliability strategy increase the lead time of projects (Roberts et 
al. 2001).  Furthermore, failures in operation are not viewed with the same priority than 
failures in the development stages as failure in operation do not obstruct the design process 
(Busby and Strutt, 2001).  
 
3.2.3. Lack of knowledge of failure causation 
Identifying the root cause of failure can only be achieved through the logical decomposition 
of information pertaining to a failure event.  This requires transparent presentation of all 
failure related data throughout the supply chain.  Root cause analysis, if performed 
incorrectly (or incompletely) can lead to the development of a blame culture (i.e. finger 
pointing at the first accountable person rather than understanding the organizational reasons 
for failure).  Fear of such a blame culture and of damaged reputations has stifled the feedback 
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of information through the supply chain (Roberts et al., 2001) resulting in poor understanding 
of why failures occur and hence how to improve the reliability. 
 
3.2.4. Power of support tools 
Support tools can be considered on two levels; analysis tools such as those used to predict 
reliability and decision support tools which usually combine multiple criteria to optimise the 
trade-off between them.   
 
Reliability prediction and analysis is both data intensive and potentially sensitive to model 
assumptions (in balancing the accuracy of the model and speed required to generate results).   
The data can take a long time to collect (Sandtorv et al., 1996) and is mostly historical.  
Predictions based on historical performance might not be representative of the expected 
environmental conditions (for example, predictions of subsea performance in deepwater Gulf 
of Mexico should not be based on reliability performance of equipment installed in The North 
Sea) or indeed reflect any changes in reliability performance that might have occurred 
through the supply chain.  Concerns over the quality of data have lead to a lack of trust in the 
analysis (i.e. garbage in, garbage out and or garbage in, gospel out), which is compounded by 
a belief that the recommendations from reliability analysis are often disjointed from what can 
be practically implemented. 
 
Decision support that combines both reliability performance and economic appraisal is most 
readily achieved through the application of so call economics of ‘X’ models (see Chapter 6 
for a more detailed review).  These models, usually presented in graphical form, show the life 
cycle cost as a function of system characteristic, such as reliability or quality with the intent 
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to identify the reliability (or quality) that minimises life cycle cost.  Cost of quality models 
provide a means to gain the commitment from top management to initiate improvement 
strategies as managers are more responsive to financial metrics rather than defect rates 
(Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996) but are of less value at the project level.  Plunkett and Dale 
(1988a) suggest that the economics of quality models were inaccurate despite a wealth of 
information.  It follows then, that an economics of reliability model is not best suited to drive 
implementation at the project level and throughout the supply chain. 
 
3.2.5. Organizational structure 
The whole life cycle of a subsea field development project involves a number of 
organizations (operators, suppliers and contractors) over a range of disciplines or divisions 
(for example, project management, engineering design, financial management, quality control 
and assurance, reliability management, environmental and safety management).  Barriers to 
the implementation of a reliability strategy, between the different organizations and 
disciplines are potentially vast.  These barriers can result from conflicts of interest and poor 
relations between divisions (Rubenstein, 2001) and organizations.  Rubenstein discussed 
these problems in terms of a single organization, but these issues are analogous to the makeup 
of a project organization observing interaction between operators, suppliers and contractors. 
 
In an industry where supply is struggling to meet demand (Pridden, 2007) there is little 
incentive for suppliers to improve subsea hardware reliability and lower reliability equals 
more spares or replacement parts.  Coupled with the operator’s preoccupation with CAPEX 
minimisation there appears to be an accepted sub-optimum (assuming that without a 
reliability strategy the optimum reliability cost has not been achieved) which is in conflict 
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with the LCC concept and potentially the wider corporate objectives of the supplier and or 
operator. 
 
This acceptable sub-optimum is partly related to the poor relationship between the economics 
division and design management.  Rubenstein (2001) suggests that the interaction between 
technology planning and financial planning is as follows; “tell me what you want to do and 
we’ll tell you when the time comes if we can afford it and it fits into our cash flow and 
investment planning”.  Without a joined-up and forward thinking approach to design for 
reliability and project economics, the drive for continual improvement is surely stifled.   
 
Figure 3-1 (Brall, 2001) indicates a typical hardware supplier organization that manages 
reliability through the employment of reliability specialists.  Any and all reliability tasks are 
implemented through a reliability division.  This organizational structure can be quite 
resource intensive and as such may not be sustainable by smaller companies (Brall, 2001).  
As reliability is sometimes considered a specialist field, the reliability expertise may also be 
outsourced to a separate organization.  Whilst this can reduce cost, the problems associated 
with a central reliability management function might be magnified.   
 
The barriers to implementation highlighted above (excluding the business focus on CAPEX) 
can be related to the organizational structure depicted in Figure 3-1.  Here, the reliability 
function is subordinate to quality and not engineering.  By adopting such a structure, the 
organization assumes reliability achievement is the responsibility of quality management, 
suggesting that reliability is a product of quality and does not necessarily allow fluent 
interaction with the product engineering and research and development.  This could lead to 
the enhanced scepticism of reliability analyses.  Such an organizational structure removes the 
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responsibility of reliability achievement from the engineers and product developers.  
Reliability should be specified as a primary requirement of a function, especially when the 
equipment is located in remote conditions (e.g. deepwater subsea) where the cost of failure is 
significant.  When reliability is not at the forefront of engineering decisions any data fed back 
to the reliability function may not reach the research and development group thus stifling the 
ability of an organization to improve the reliability of its equipment.  Clearly many of these 
potential issues could be mitigated through investing in a larger reliability function with 
interaction across the remaining functions, but such an investment would prove costly (Brall 
et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 3-1: Traditional organizational structure for the implementation of a reliability strategy (Brall, 2001). 
 
In contrast to the centralised approach to reliability management, Figure 3-2 (Brall, 2004) 
presents an integrated organizational structure for the implementation of a reliability strategy 
whereby the commitment to reliability is apparent throughout the organization and ownership 
of the reliability activity does not belong to a singular reliability division.  Clearly, a separate 
reliability function still exists in this structure, presumably to support the other groups in the 
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implementation of activities and to perform specific activities.  However, by incorporating 
the reliability strategy into more (all) business functions (through basic training, for example) 
the resource requirement for reliability specialists within the company is reduced.  While this 
has immediate appeal to smaller organizations that cannot afford the resources required to 
sustain a reliability division (such as that in Figure 3-1), there are clear benefits to larger 
organizations as well.  Many of the barriers discussed can be related back to organizations 
adopting a central reliability function.   
 
 
Figure 3-2: Non-traditional organizational structure for the implementation of a reliability strategy (Brall, 
2004). 
 
The activities described in Figure 3-2 reveal application of the risk and reliability analysis 
key process by the main functions of a firm.  It should be noted that this organizational 
structure is not representative of an operator, but does indicate how an organization could 
apply the risk and reliability analysis key process.  While reliability engineering still retains a 
separate (specialist) function it is no longer subordinate to quality management.  The fact that 
quality has been removed should not be interpreted as unimportance of the function.  Rather, 
this reliability centric organization presented appears to exclude the quality function 
deliberately to highlight the different treatment of reliability management.   
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Other key differences are that the definition of reliability requirements forms part of the sales 
and marketing division which recognises reliability as a source of competitive advantage.  In 
addition data collection is shared across multiple functions potentially allowing for wider 
collection of data.  With a wider source of data comes better understanding of the causes of 
failure and greater ability to improve the reliability, a responsibility that is shared across both 
the engineering and reliability engineering functions.   
 
3.3. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has addressed some of the barriers that might prevent an organization from 
implementing a reliability management strategy or establish a reliability culture.  Most of 
these barriers can be attributed to an organizational structure observing a centralised 
reliability function.  The literature has provided a model organizational structure for a 
supplier where responsibility for applying the reliability management key processes is shared 
across different functions within the organization.  Decentralising the reliability function, 
while offering potential benefit through removing some of the barriers identified in this 
chapter, is not without its own potential problems.  Decentralising a function such as 
reliability only works if all project functions assuming responsibility for reliability 
achievement are guided by the same objective.  It is not enough to cite guiding principles 
such as minimise life cycle cost or maximise value as these can be a source of conflict with 
other functions or be to the detriment to the organization as a whole.  Neither organizational 
model explicitly considers the interaction of the reliability division/function with financial 
management.     
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In order for project engineers to understand the potential value that can be generated from 
implementing design for reliability activities, such as those identified in Figure 3-2, they must 
be informed of what best suits their needs as well as those of the organization as a whole.  
This is true irrespective of the way in which an organization manages reliability, but it does 
appear that the decentralised approach offers greater benefits in the long term (with specific 
regard to the cost of sustaining a central reliability function).  The provision of a value based 
planning tool for design for reliability cannot stand alone; it must interact with the 
organizational structure through guiding decentralised decision making with a central 
decision making criteria.  
 
If the suppliers choose not to compete on reliability, then an operator could provide financial 
incentives in order to achieve the enhanced reliability goals.  Incentive schemes can be 
reflected by a tournament game theory model (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) as a compensation 
scheme which pays out based on rank order rather than output level.  Rank order tournaments 
are often applied in discussion regarding incentives for sales teams and salaries for directors 
and CEOs.  The argument for the latter is that large salaries afforded to directors and CEOs is 
compensation for the effort invested in the company prior to becoming director/CEO rather 
than in expectation of enhanced output once promoted.  Tournaments have also been applied 
to supplier selection, Deng and Elmaghraby (2005) modelled the supplier selection process of 
a firm given a period with which the firm observed the quality of a product concurrently 
supplied by two vendors.  A similar approach to reliability management could be adopted 
where suppliers are selected and rewarded based on their efforts to improve reliability 
performance and assurance.  There is, however, no relevant literature regarding the use of 
rank order tournaments to support reliability based supplier selection.   
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There are three potential solutions proposed to facilitate the implementation of a reliability 
and technical risk management strategy and establish a reliability culture.  The first is a 
decision making framework that supports decision makers in the defining the effort 
(specifically, application of the reliability engineers toolkit) required to managed the inherent 
risks that exist in a project and add value to the project.  Chapter 2 identified that whilst life 
cycle costing does include reliability analyses as a cost element, it is not used to identify 
which techniques should be applied and when they should be applied.  The second solution is 
through adopting a decentralised reliability function; while this has the benefit of removing 
some of the barriers to implementation discussed in this chapter it does introduce possible 
conflicts of interest between functions.  This can be managed through allowing decentralised 
decision making guided by a central decision making criteria.  Any kind of planning tool or 
decision making framework should have this objective; to support decision making at 
corporate and project level.  The economics of reliability tools, while capable of supporting 
management with decisions regarding the optimum reliability are lacking at the project level.  
The final solution proposed is through providing financial incentives to a supply chain that 
might otherwise choose not to improve reliability.  When considering a subsea development 
project, the suppliers (both hardware and service suppliers) could be considered part of the 
organizational structure.  In doing so, the decentralised approach to reliability management is 
expanded to these individual organizations.  A decision framework for investing in design for 
reliability effort would therefore have to include these incentives to the supply chain as part 
of the central decision making criteria.  This final requirement, while clearly important, is 
considered a refinement or addition to the basic need of a planning tool that supports decision 
making at project and corporate levels with regard to defining the level of reliability effort 
(specifically implementation of the reliability toolkit).  The following part of this research 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) explores the literature to identify existing knowledge and techniques to 
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support the attainment of this research objective.  The subject of providing financial 
incentives is revisited in the final part (Chapter 9) as a source of further research in the field.   
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4. Life Cycle Costing 
4.1. Introduction 
The major activities observed during a project may be characterised into a number of project 
life cycle stages.  Figure 4-1 (modified from Jahn et al., 2001) indicates a typical project life 
cycle for an oil field development.  Many of the earlier (design) project stages revolve around 
a set of decision making processes to manage project risk and provide confidence that the 
project can deliver value to the organization.  Iterative assessment against decision making 
criteria establishes a stage-gate project management structure whereby the project team may 
decide to proceed to the next project stage, continue development at the current stage or 
abandon the project.  As a risk management strategy the stage-gate approach provides the 
opportunity to abandon, or re-assess, the project at the minimum accumulated cost.  The 
number of iterations around this decision making process, therefore, depends on the scale of 
the project and the risk perception of the project organization. 
 
The operational stage observes a number of different phases, mainly attributed to the 
production rate of the system (Figure 4-2).  During the early life, there is often a production 
ramp up phase, where more production capacity is brought on-line.  The gradual introduction 
of extra production capacity enables the facility to start generating revenue, and hence 
repaying the capital expenditure, as soon possible.  After the ramp-up phase the project 
observes a period of constant production known as the production plateau, which is followed 
by the production decline.  One objective of the operational stage is to manage and control 
the operating expenditure (OPEX).  The reliability of the system, revealed during operations, 
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can represent a significant risk to the planned OPEX control.  For subsea systems, failure of 
equipment can result in prolonged down time as spare parts are located and support vessels 
mobilised.  During this time the system may be incapable of producing at full capacity and 
generating the expected revenue, increasing the total cost of failure.   
 
Implied by Figure 4-2, the total cost of failure is dependent on when a failure occurs.  Not 
only does the time value of money mean that expenditure today is greater than the same 
expenditure in the future, but the system’s production function also varies with time and 
hence the lost or deferred revenue also varies with time.  Early life failures have a higher 
present cost in terms maintenance but also extend the payback period, resulting in increased 
interest repayment.  Although wear-out failures have a lower present cost in terms of 
maintenance cost they can ultimately determine the economic life of the field, which is the 
point at which the OPEX exceeds the revenue generated.  The costs associated with 
operations can overshadow the procurement costs for a system depending on the 
consequences of failure (Goble and Tucker, 1993).   
 
Life cycle costing was developed by the US Department of Defence to increase the 
effectiveness of government procurement (Shields and Young, 1991) in recognition of the 
fact that up to 75% of the total cost was attributable to operations and support (Gupta, 1983).  
However, Figure 4-3 (Berliner and Brimson, 1988) suggests that commitment of cost occurs 
prior to procurement, during the design stage.  The increasing recognition of the life cycle 
cost implications has triggered the development of a variety of Design for ‘X’ methodologies, 
which, despite not necessarily using cost as the assessment criterion, were shown to reduce 
cost (Asiedu and Gu, 1998).   
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Figure 4-1: Generic project life cycle stages for subsea production system (Jahn et al., 2001). 
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Figure 4-2: Generic production rate phases observed during the operational stage with system bathtub curve. 
 
In order to support the premise that a higher initial investment in reliability can result in 
lower life cycle cost, decision makers rely on the acquisition of accurate data and the 
availability of valid decision support tools and techniques.  As a technique, life cycle costing 
provides a methodical approach to the analysis of the costs incurred throughout the project 
life cycle and support life cycle cost minimisation decisions during the project development 
stages.  The field of reliability engineering and technical risk management is also supported 
by a variety of techniques that can help support reliability based decisions during the design 
process.  It is the combination of these techniques, however, that can support risk based 
decision making in design whereby corporate and project value is maximized.   
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Figure 4-3: Cost commitment and actual spend over project life cycle (Berliner and Brimson, 1988). 
 
Life cycle costing is the economic analysis of the total cost of acquisition, ownership and 
disposal of a product (IEC 60300-3-3, 2004).  It is concerned with assessing competing 
options and establishing the option that best meets business objectives, which differentiates it 
from economic investment appraisal (ISO 15663-1, 2000).  Life cycle costing follows a life 
cycle engineering approach whereby the entire life cycle is considered and treated in each 
stage of the product’s life cycle (Keys, 1990).  As such life cycle costing can be implemented 
in any or all project stages to support the decisions indicated below (Blanchard, 1979; IEC 
60300-3-3, 2004; ISO 15663-1, 2000): 
• Allocation of funds; 
• Alternative design layout; 
• Alternative disposal or recycling; 
• Alternative maintenance strategies; 
• Alternative management policies; 
• Alternative procurement strategies; 
• Alternative product distribution; 
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• Alternative production strategies; 
• Alternative test strategies; 
• Equipment type; 
• Financial planning; 
• Identification of cost drivers; 
• Identify cost improvement options; and 
• System modifications. 
 
The application of life cycle costing to the assessment of reliability seems natural given the 
relationship of reliability to the operational cost.  Indeed, Asiedu and Gu (1998) rightly point 
out that reliable and easily serviced products lead to maximum availability and customer 
satisfaction.  The authors’ indicate, however, that this is justification for improvements in 
maintainability and maintenance resource minimisation rather than planning design for 
reliability effort.  Two international standards, ISO 15663 ‘Petroleum and natural gas 
industries – life cycle costing’ and IEC 60300-3-3 ‘Dependability management – Part 3-3: 
Application guide – Life cycle costing’, indicate relationship between life cycle cost, 
reliability and reliability analyses (ISO, 2000; ISO, 2001; IEC, 2004).  ISO 15663-2 (2001) 
suggest the use of reliability analyses as a “basis for establishing the cost of sustaining a 
function over its lifetime”.  IEC 60300-3-3 (2004) discusses the consideration of 
dependability as a combination of reliability, maintainability and maintenance support and 
states that “higher initial costs may result in improved reliability and or maintainability, and 
thus improved availability with resultant lower operating and maintenance costs.”  Again, 
neither of these standards considers the use of life cycle costing for planning reliability 
analyses. 
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The fundamental objective of life cycle costing techniques is to determine and compare the 
(relevant) total cost incurred by the product or project throughout its whole life cycle.  This is 
achieved by logically breaking down the costs into smaller constituent parts and formulating 
them within a model.  A life cycle costing model is intended to mimic, with suitable 
accuracy, the behaviour of how costs are accumulated throughout the product or project life 
cycle.  In doing so, not only can the model support the decision as to which option observes 
the lower life cycle cost but also identifies where the majority of cost is being accumulated, 
which in turn may provided a focal point for continual cost reduction.  However, this chapter 
is intended to review the current literature and consider existing practice that could be used to 
create a value based planning tool for reliability analyses. 
 
4.2. Cost breakdown structure 
Life cycle cost is made up of the costs to the manufacturer, user and society (Asiedu and Gu, 
1998).  These costs are often classified into one of three major cost drivers, namely; cost of 
acquisition, cost of operation and the cost of disposal.  Major cost drivers are logically 
decomposed further into individual cost elements, in doing so this cost decomposition 
(referred to as the cost breakdown structure, or CBS) defines the scope of the decision 
making process by identifying the smallest constituent parts of the cost drivers that 
differentiate the decision options.  As a project progresses through its life cycle, the cost 
breakdown structure expands to reflect the increasing detail and understanding of the system.   
 
A generic cost breakdown structure for an E&P project is presented in Figure 4-4 (modified 
from IEC 60300-3-3, 2004), which indicates the cost drivers defined in the industry as the 
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cost of acquisition (capital expenditure or CAPEX) and the cost of operation (operational 
expenditure or OPEX).  While the cost of disposal/decommissioning offers a significant input 
to the overall life cycle cost it has not been included in this review in order to concentrate on 
the reliability and maintainability aspects of the OPEX/CAPEX trade-off. 
 
In terms of a planning tool for reliability analyses, the cost breakdown structure highlights the 
necessary cost elements to be considered.  Cost elements within the CAPEX cost driver 
include the introduction, identification and mitigation of faults or potential failure modes.  
The related cost elements in the OPEX cost driver are the reactive costs of failure in 
operation, including spare part acquisition and interventions costs. 
54 
 
 
 
F
ig
u
re
 4
-4
: 
E
x
am
p
le
 c
o
st
 b
re
ak
d
o
w
n
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 (
m
o
d
if
ie
d
 f
ro
m
 I
E
C
 6
0
3
0
0
-3
-3
, 
2
0
0
4
).
 
N
o
te
: 
In
st
al
la
ti
o
n
, 
P
ro
cu
re
m
en
t 
an
d
 M
an
u
fa
ct
u
re
 a
ll
 e
x
h
ib
it
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
co
st
 e
le
m
en
ts
 a
s 
d
ef
in
ed
 f
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
. 
 
55 
 
4.3. Cost estimation 
Each cost element in a life cycle costing model is defined because its behaviour differentiates 
the competing options.  It is important therefore that the cost element is accurately estimated 
by a method appropriate to the behaviour of the cost element.  The definition of cost elements 
and their accurate estimation allows the designer to understand why a project accumulates the 
costs it does.  
 
4.3.1. Estimate accuracy and uncertainty 
Cost estimates need to be both accurate and within tolerable bounds of uncertainty.  Accuracy 
refers to the precision with which the estimate reflects the reality while tolerable uncertainty 
defines an acceptable deviation (i.e. horizontal deviation on Figure 4-5) about the mean 
estimate. 
 
The Freiman curve (Figure 4-5, modified from Daschblach and Apgar, 1988) describes the 
relationship between the estimated project costs and the actual project expenditure.  The three 
main areas on the graph relate to the under-estimated costs, accurate cost estimates and over-
estimated costs. 
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Figure 4-5: Freiman curve (Daschblach and Apgar, 1988). 
 
While low cost bids may win contracts or satisfy a preference for CAPEX minimisation, 
under-estimated project often observe the highest project costs.  Projects that under-estimate 
on cost are initially planned and resourced to that budget.  However, the under-estimate is 
soon realised as unachievable and the project requires rescheduling, incurring extra financial 
losses and schedule delays (Daschblach and Apgar, 1988). 
 
Projects that over-estimate on cost tend to observe Parkinson’s Law, which states that work 
or cost expands into the time or budget available (Parkinson, 1957).  Without sufficient 
budgetary policing, the over-estimate becomes a self fulfilling prophesy (Daschblach and 
Apgar, 1988).   
 
Realistic estimates consider the necessary detail to deliver the project without over 
compensating on the required float or contingency.  In doing so, project management is kept 
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aware of any excessive resource consumption (Daschblach and Apgar, 1988), whilst retaining 
flexibility in the project. 
 
As a product progresses from conceptual design through to detailed design, the number of 
cost elements should increase in line with the increased understanding of the product.     This 
increased definition of the product and its cost elements also leads to a more comprehensive 
cost estimate and reduced uncertainty.  The cost estimating methodology may also tend 
towards a more detailed technique as the understanding of the costs element behaviour also 
increases.   
 
Creese and Moore (1990) indicate that cost estimate accuracy increases significantly from 
conceptual design to detailed design (Table 4-1) as the system becomes better defined and 
more accurate cost estimation techniques are deployed.  These figures suggest that there is a 
tendency for projects to overestimate on cost.  This may be in response to the fact that, 
according to the Freiman curve, underestimated costs can lead to the highest project cost. 
 
Table 4-1: Cost estimate accuracy (Creese and Moore, 1990). 
Design phase Cost estimate accuracy 
Concept design -30% to +50% 
Preliminary design (FEED) -15% to +30% 
Detailed design -5% to +15% 
 
According to Figure 4-6 (modified from Jahn et al., 2001) cost estimate accuracy for oil field 
development projects increases from 35% estimate during project initiation to 15% estimate 
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in definition (FEED) and ultimately cost commitment and control in detailed design.  The 
values cited suggest that either cost estimators for field development projects are more 
accurate or (more likely) that the techniques have become more accurate over time as more 
relevant information has been collected.  Figure 4-6 also implies that the decision to progress 
a field development project is sensitive to the uncertainty of the cost estimates; that is 
projects may be rejected if the uncertainty surrounding the project cost is too great.  
 
 
Figure 4-6: Cost estimate uncertainty through the design life cycle (Jahn et al., 2001). 
 
4.3.2. Cost estimate methods 
Depending on the available information regarding the behaviour of the cost element and 
required accuracy, the cost element may be estimated through a variety cost estimating 
methodologies.  These can be generalised in to three categories: 
• Parametric cost estimating; 
• Cost estimates by analogy; and 
• Detailed costs estimates. 
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Parametric cost estimation relies on the determination of functions that explain the relation 
between cost and some other measurable characteristic of the item (Dean, 1995).  A 
parametric approach requires significant historical data to establish the statistical 
relationships that drive the functions.  However, once the relations have been established, the 
method can quickly produce estimates.  Parametric estimations may have a tendency for 
over-estimating the cost but are made more accurate over time as more information regarding 
the statistical relationship is acquired (Daschblach and Apgar, 1988).  Parametric cost 
estimates have proven to be successful for costing assemblies of components (Creese and 
Moore, 1990), suggesting that their application may be best deployed during FEED before 
the absolute detail of the design is finalised.  The reliance on historical data, however, means 
that this method is not suitable for estimating the cost of new technology. 
 
Analogous costing relies on costing the difference between the intended product and a similar 
product whose cost has already been observed.  The technique is dependent on the ability to 
identify the differences between the two products and judge the cost of the difference noted 
(Asiedu and Gu, 1998).  
 
Detailed modelling of cost provides the most accurate estimate of the cost at the expense of 
the time taken to generate the estimate.  The technique uses direct costing of materials, labour 
rates, machine time, et cetera with subsequent allocation of the overheads.  The approach can 
be complemented by activity based costing (ABC) in its allocation of overheads.  The method 
is best deployed for sustained repeat production of items rather than complex, one off 
systems (Asiedu and Gu, 1998).   
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4.4. Life cycle cost drivers 
Life cycle cost is composed of three major cost drivers, the cost of acquisition, cost of 
operation and the cost of disposal.  These cost drivers are decomposed into cost elements that 
differentiate the options.  With the exception of the cost of disposal, each of the major cost 
drivers can be differentiated according to the reliability effort in design (cost of acquisition) 
and the resultant reliability performance in operation (cost of operation).  
 
4.4.1. CAPEX cost elements 
ISO 15663 part 1 (2000) defines CAPEX as the money required to procure, install and 
commission a capital asset.  The cost of acquisition (CAPEX) is often the most visible part of 
the life cycle cost (IEC 60300-3-3, 2004) despite not necessarily being the largest cost driver.  
This visibility often makes it central to the decision making process.  Indeed, Hanrahan and 
Chitwood (2005) point out that the largest parts of the CAPEX breakdown often offer the 
greatest scope for cost reduction and that any CAPEX cost that can be delayed usually 
improves field economics.  The fact that CAPEX is not usually incurred as a lump sum 
means that the greatest amount of debt observed by the project (known as the maximum 
exposure) is often not equal to the total cost of acquisition.  Cost elements within the CAPEX 
cost driver that relate to the application of reliability analyses are the costs to introduce, 
identify and mitigate a fault or potential failure mode.  
 
The cost breakdown structure of the CAPEX should suit the objectives of the analysis (IEC 
60300-3-3, 2004).   As the objective of this research is to provide a value based planning tool 
for reliability analyses, the cost breakdown structure has been defined (Figure 4-4) to reflect 
the major project realisation phases that influence cost and reliability (and hence the cost of 
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operations).  Each major project realisation stage influences the introduction, identification 
and mitigation of faults or potential failure modes. 
 
IEC Standard 60050(191) (1990) defines a fault as the state of an item characterised by the 
inability to perform a required function (excluding during preventative maintenance or due to 
a lack of external resources).  Faults can, but need not, be the result of a failure, which is the 
event that brings about the cessation of an item’s ability to perform its required function.  The 
term fault is used herein to describe an item that is incapable of performing its intended 
function but not as a result of a failure event.  Items that are incapable of performing its 
intended function as a result of a failure are referred to as being in the failed state.  Faults can 
be introduced at any time during the product or project life cycle and can be defined 
according to the origin or cause of the fault (Table 4-2). 
 
Table 4-2: IEC 60050(191):1990 'Quality Vocabulary part 3.2' definitions of faults that (can) originate in the 
project realisation phase. 
Fault Name Fault Description 
Mishandling fault Fault cause by incorrect handling or lack of care of the item. 
Design fault Fault due to the inadequate design of the item. 
Manufacturing fault Fault due to non-conformity during manufacture to the design of 
the item or to its specified manufacturing process. 
 
Functional failure modes ultimately correlate back to their intended function (Tumer and 
Stone, 2003).  This may be expanded to state that all failure modes ultimately correlate back 
to an intended requirement.  If a failure mode is defined as the manner in which an item fails 
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(IEC 60812, 2006) then a potential failure mode is the way in which an item can fail.  All 
functions and requirement therefore have at least one potential failure mode, whether it 
occurs or not is dependent on the design management system and the conditions of use. 
  
An item with a fault, by definition, is incapable of performing its required function.  Faults 
are identified therefore when the function is requested either via an acceptance test or in 
service demand.  Faults can be revealed either as ‘functional faults’ or ‘fit faults’; functional 
faults are those that cannot provide the required function whereas fit faults are those that are 
directly concerned with the specified design space for the system.  Interference between sub-
systems or parts will occur when they occupy the same co-ordinates in the design space and, 
as such, will not fit (Thomke and Fujimoto, 2000).  Items with potential failure modes, by 
definition, have not yet failed.  Therefore potential failure modes can be identified by 
reviewing the requirements set upon the item.  As the existence of a potential failure mode is 
a function of defining a requirement, its existence is largely unavoidable.  Potential failure 
modes can be revealed as a result of a failure event, in which case the item is in the failed 
state and is no longer to able to perform its function.  This may occur either during operations 
or testing. 
  
Potential failure modes can only be removed if the associated requirement is also removed.  
As this is not always possible, the probability of failure or consequence of failure has to be 
managed instead.  For the purposes of this research, only ‘potential failure mode 
management’ is considered.  This is achieved through the managing the cause of the failure 
mode either through redesign at the system level (e.g. introducing redundancy) at the 
component level (e.g. at the failure mechanism level) or at the organizational level (e.g. 
improving internal procedures).  Items that either have a fault or are in the failed state require 
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either repair or replacement.  Depending on the cause of the fault or failure simple 
replacement/repair may not rectify the problem.  For example, common cause failures may 
affect all similar components.  Systematic faults or failures directly relate to specific causes 
and can only be eliminated by modification to the design or manufacturing process; 
corrective action does not necessarily eliminate the cause (IEC 60050(191), 1990). 
 
During the design process potential failure modes are both created and managed.  However, 
the timing and efficacy of the management events has a profound effect on the efficiency of 
the design, both in terms of the speed at which a reliable component or system can be brought 
to operation and the field life reliability.  Inefficient design protocol may lead to a delay to 
the inception of the system to operation, which when considering the oil and gas industry 
represents a costly delay to first oil.  Figure 4-7 (Booker et al. 2001) indicates the timing at 
which faults with cost implications are both generated and eliminated; 75% of the faults are 
generated in the development and planning stages whilst 80% are eliminated during the final 
testing and operational stages.   
 
The financial consequences of failure increases as the time between failure mode origin and 
observation increase (Rhee and Ishii, 2003) and resolution of problems identified late in the 
design stage can cause large redesign costs and project delays (Buede, 1994; Thomke and 
Fujimoto, 2000).  Redesign and problem resolution will incur direct financial consequences 
as a result of labour and material costs while time delays also incur an opportunity cost (Rhee 
and Ishii, 2003).  O’Conner (2005) quotes the ‘x10 rule’ which states that a problem will cost 
a factor of 10 higher for each project stage that it goes unnoticed.  This is an important 
consideration when establishing the requirements for a value based planning tool as analysis 
is the primary means of front loading potential failure mode realisation.   
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Figure 4-7 : Origin and removal of faults in design (Booker et al. 2001). 
 
4.4.2. CAPEX Cost Element Behaviour 
The process of design is an attempt to translate the required function of a system into a set of 
organized functions of units or components (Vliegen and Van Mal, 1990) via a specification.  
Throughout this process both the functional and physical architectures are defined in greater 
detail (Buede, 1994).  Expenditures associated with purchase, installation and commissioning 
of an asset are significantly greater than those incurred during design.  However, it is during 
design that the majority of the project costs are committed (Figure 4-3) and care must be 
taken to minimise the commitment of unnecessary cost.  Creese and Moore (1990), citing 
other authors, state that design is responsible for approximately two thirds of the unnecessary 
cost and that unnecessary cost represents 20-30% of the life cycle cost.  It is assumed that 
unnecessary costs are those expenditures that could have been avoided with adequate design 
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analysis and decision making.  The objective of design therefore may be two-fold; firstly, to 
translate a requirement into a specification and, secondly, to minimise the commitment of 
unnecessary cost.  
 
The observed increase in the level of detail associated with the different design stages 
represents opportunities to increase the value of the design effort or a threat to commit further 
unnecessary cost.  As the level of detail increase the number of components and potential 
failure modes also increases.  The effective management and core competency of the design 
team will determine if the project design is adding value or committing unwanted cost.   
 
If the objective of the design phase is to produce a specification, then the primary impact of 
design on the system reliability is to introduce potential failure modes and specify an 
acceptable probability of occurrence (e.g. a reliability specification).  Two particular 
specifications are of note; the performance (or functional) specification created during FEED 
and the product specification created during detailed design.  According to British Standard 
7373-1 (2001), a performance or functional specification states the requirements that define 
the performance of the product, whereas a product or technical specification is the document 
that prescribes the product attributes necessary to conform to the performance specification.  
That is the functional specification requests (or demands) a set of (performance) 
characteristics and the intended conditions of use.  The technical specification describes how 
the requested performance characteristics are to be achieved.  The organization creating the 
functional specification is not necessarily the same organization that creates the technical 
specification.   
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A product specification should differentiate mandatory and preferred characteristics, in terms 
of requirements and targets (or goals).  A requirement is an essential product characteristic 
for which evidence of conformance to the requirement is also necessary whereas goals are 
desirable characteristics for which evidence of conformance is either unobtainable or is not 
necessary (BS 5760-4, 2003).  For contractors creating a technical specification, it may be 
more practical to view goals and requirements in terms of order winning and order qualifying 
factors (especially if the creation of a technical specification is part of a competitive bidding 
process); order qualifying factors (requirements) are those aspects that should be achieved in 
order to be considered by the customer whereas order winning factors (goals) are those 
aspects that significantly contribute to winning the business (Slack et al., 2004). 
 
The process of setting goals and requirements translates the project’s objectives to the system 
and its constituent parts.  The allocation of reliability to a system’s component parts should 
be such that the system achieves its overall objectives without over-specifying reliability for 
one part whilst under-specifying for another (Smith, 2001).  Whilst the topic of reliability 
allocation attracts much discussion and research, no general method exists to solve the 
reliability allocation problem satisfactorily (Elegbede et al. 2003).  This may be due to the 
fact that a number of different techniques exist depending on the objective of the allocation 
activity.   
 
The evidence of conformance to a requirement may be termed as assurance.  British Standard 
5760-4 (2003) states that a performance specification should include a request for assurance 
while British Standard 7373-1 (2001) states that a product specification should include 
evidence of the product’s capability of conforming to the performance specification.  This 
assurance can be either through testing or analysis. 
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Assurance in design is achieved through reliability analysis (BS 5760-4, 2003).  Depending 
on the project stage, this analysis may assume different levels of detail and or analysis 
techniques (these techniques are reviewed in Chapter 5).  This analysis does not measure the 
reliability in operation directly (BS 5760-4, 2003) as there can be a disjoint between analysis 
using historical data and the future achieved performance (Strutt et al. 2007).  However, this 
analysis is an important input to the definition of goals and requirements and avoiding the 
commitment of unnecessary costs by minimizing the number of systematic faults or failure 
modes designed into the system. 
 
In terms of accumulating cost in design, constructing a reliability specification can be 
minimal; the life cycle cost benefit is achieved through minimising the commitment of 
unnecessary costs committed as a result of (Strutt et al. 2007): 
• Incomplete and ambiguous definitions of the operating environment; 
• Misunderstanding the relationship between component reliability, system availability 
and project objectives; and  
• Ambiguity in the definition of how performance metrics are calculated. 
 
Decisions made during the design phases all relate to how the intended system can achieve 
the project objectives.  In terms of reliability, this is achieved through allocating reliability 
performance to a system’s constituent parts.  For a subsea development there are typically 
four design stages (Design Feasibility, Conceptual Design, FEED and Detailed Design), each 
of which influences the CAPEX cost element behaviour to varying degrees. 
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The first question asked of any project is “can the field be economically developed?”  The 
answer to which is dependent on the properties of the reservoir, available technology and 
economic drivers.  Economic feasibility requires the identification of a technologically viable 
development scenario that could satisfy the investment criteria of the organization.  The input 
of system reliability analysis to this assessment is perhaps minimal as the reliability and 
maintainability strategy can only be inferred from availability scenarios and the system may 
be insufficiently defined to accurately perform systems reliability analysis. 
 
Concept selection requires the project team to identify the development scenario that provides 
the best opportunity to generate project value and shareholder wealth.  At this stage, the 
major technological options are proposed and assessed to provide the scope for the preferred 
option.  The decision making processes may consider each system’s ability to achieve certain 
availability goals, requirements or benchmarks and hence allocate reliability goals and 
requirements to the major system packages.  By allocating these goals and requirements 
against what is currently achieved (assuming there is an historical benchmark) the scope of 
the reliability and qualification effort required in subsequent project stages can be inputted to 
the decision making process. 
 
By the end of FEED (front end engineering design) the preferred solution is resolved into a 
functional specification and the project sanctioned if it satisfies the final investment decision 
making criteria.  Sanctioning the project defines/commits a project budget such that the 
project can invite prospective technology and or service suppliers to bid for the next stages of 
work.  The functional specification provides significant input to the decision to sanction a 
project as it demonstrates that the project is sufficiently well defined and that any major 
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technical uncertainties have been (or can be) adequately managed such that the proposed 
solution is technically robust.  In addition the functional specification provides the basis of 
the invitation to tender (ITT) sent out to potential detailed design contractors and or 
equipment suppliers.  By defining how the system is intended to work the functional 
specification also establishes how the system can fail (although failure modes are not 
necessarily defined explicitly in a specification).  Technical risk analyses support the 
definition of the functional specification as it can highlight system sensitivities to failure 
modes and identify where the system could benefit from design modifications and or risk 
reduction.  Therefore, a reliability specification could (and should) be defined as part of the 
functional specification to support the achievement of project objectives.  The reliability 
specification should include the allocation of the reliability performance to functions and 
define the assurance required given the perceived level of risk within the project.  
 
Detailed design observes the transformation of the functional specification into a set of 
engineering drawings and documents intended to guide the remaining project phases.  This 
procedure is initiated through clarification of the functional specification and results in the 
creation of detailed design drawings and procedures that satisfy and optimise delivery of the 
goals and requirements specified in the ITT.  As an optimisation process, detailed design may 
observe an iterative loop of design, review and re-design and may observe design phases 
similar to those already discussed.  Reliability goals and requirements specified in the ITT are 
allocated down to individual component parts or materials and combined with the definition 
of quality assurance procedures to ensure that the reliability designed into the system is 
delivered during the remaining project delivery stages.  As the specification of the system 
increases in detail most of the technical uncertainty should be resolved. 
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 Jahn et al. (2001) suggest that as much as 80% of the hardware may have been specified 
during detailed design at just 5% of the total project cost.  Considering the fraction of life 
cycle cost committed by the end of the design phases for relatively small cost expenditure 
and reflecting on the observation that 30% of this committed cost might be unnecessary, it 
seems illogical to forgo reliability analyses if these had the potential to reduce the 
commitment of unnecessary cost.   
 
The procurement stage observes the acquisition of all the necessary materials, components, 
assemblies, et cetera.  The procurement stage is often significant in terms of the project 
schedule as lead times for specific items can determine the critical path for the project.  This 
stage further increases the number of organizations associated with the project as the entire 
supply chain influences the reliability and quality of the system.  Project expenditure begins 
to ‘catch up’ with the committed cost as up to 40% of the budget may be consumed in this 
stage (Jahn et al., 2001).  Procurement is one of the most visible parts of the CAPEX.  Indeed 
the US Department of Defence developed life cycle costing to increase the effectiveness of 
government procurement (Shields and Young, 1991).   
 
The scope of the manufacture, construction and installation stage is quite significant as it 
brings the physical components together into sub-assemblies and sub-systems and installs 
them in the required geographic location.  The manufacturing lead time can pose a significant 
risk to the project schedule as can the installation of offshore and subsea equipment, which is 
dependent on the availability of the necessary installation support vessels.  Manufacturing 
lead times often result in some sub-systems observing project stages out of phase with the 
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rest of the project to account for the critical path.  Unforeseen problems with the design 
identified during these stages also pose significant schedule risk.  Quality management 
systems employed during this stage provide a significant input to the ultimate reliability of 
the system; poor quality control during construction and manufacture can undermine the 
design reliability.   
 
The final project stage before the system enters operations and begins to payback the 
accumulated costs is system commissioning.  This stage observes a series of tests designed to 
ensure that the system functions according to the specification.  While tests do little to ensure 
the intended reliability of the system, they can identify unforeseen problems in the design and 
faults introduced to the system during manufacture, construction and installation.  Hand-over 
to the operations team usually signifies the end of commissioning and the commencement of 
production.  At this point the project may be reviewed to assess the performance of the 
project team and identify where improvements can be made to future projects.   
 
4.4.3. Modelling CAPEX cost element behaviour 
Vintr (1999) points out that the concept of life cycle cost is not a preferred selling point and 
states that purchase decisions are based more on the purchase price and the warranty offered.  
A manufacturer may therefore choose to determine the procurement cost as a combination of 
the cost price as a function of reliability, CP, and the warranty cost, CW according to Equation 
1 (Vintr, 1999),  
 
( ) ( )λλλ gtfCCC wWP ..+=+=  Equation 1 
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where f(λ) is the cost price as a function of the hazard rate, λ, tw is the duration of the 
warranty period and g(λ) is the mean cost to repair as a function of the hazard rate.  Rather 
than explicitly propose functions for the cost price and cost to repair, Vintr (1999) provides a 
set of assumptions for each: 
1. The domain of the function f(λ) is the interval (0, λ0], where λ0 is the hazard rate of an 
item with no specific design for reliability effort.  
2. The function f(λ) is decreasing inside the domain. 
3. ( ) +∞=
+→
λ
λ
f
0
lim  
4. f(λ0) > 0 for all λ ∈ (0, λ0] 
5. The domain of the function g(λ) is the interval (0, λ0], where λ0 is the hazard rate of an 
item with no specific design for reliability effort.  
6. g(λ) ≤ f(λ) for all λ ∈ (0, λ0] 
7. g(λ) > 0 for all λ ∈ (0, λ0] 
 
Equation 1 is effectively a life cycle cost model for a manufacturer where f(λ) represents the 
CAPEX and ( )λλ gtw..  represents the OPEX model. The model is of limited use here as the 
CAPEX model is not well defined aside from stating that as the hazard rate of a component 
approaches zero (i.e. infinite reliability over any and all time periods) so the cost to produce 
the item also approaches infinity, suggesting that infinite reliability is financially 
unobtainable. 
 
Mettas (2000) proposes an expression for the general behaviour of a cost function for 
increasing the reliability of a component from its current value of reliability to some specified 
amount according to Equation 2,   
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where ci(Ri) is the cost of the i
th
 component, fi is the feasibility of increasing the reliability of 
the i
th
 component, Ri,min is the current reliability, Ri,max is the maximum achievable reliability 
for the i
th
 component and Ri is the i
th
 component’s target reliability (where Ri,min≥ Ri ≥ Ri,max).  
It should be noted that this is a penalty function used to describe the difficulty with which a 
component’s reliability is improved relative to other components.  In that respect it is not a 
CAPEX model and rather a decision aide with regard to those items within a system that 
should be improved (and by how much) to achieve the required reliability performance.  
However, it raises an important issue in that it considers the ease with which a component’s 
target reliability can be achieved.  This feasibility factor represents the difficulty of increasing 
one component’s reliability relative to the rest of the components in the system (Mettas, 
2000).  The author does not detail how a value for this parameter is determined aside from 
proposing the use of weighting factors or expert opinion.  In addition, it is not clear how the 
feasibility parameter relates to the improved reliability from Rmin to Ri and suggests that the 
reliability improvement feasibility could be the same for all values Ri.  It is not this author’s 
opinion that the feasibility to raise the reliability from, for example, 0.7 to 0.8 is the 
necessarily the same as increasing the reliability from 0.7 to 0.9.  While there is merit in 
including a feasibility parameter within a CAPEX model, Equation 2 assumes that reliability 
improvement is required at component level when in fact the reliability improvement could 
be achieved with system redesign through the inclusion of redundancy. 
 
Quigley and Walls (2003) combine the expected cost of running tests with the cost of 
detecting faults to determine the expected total cost of testing, E(Ct), according to Equation 3, 
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C  is the cost of running a test, δ is a constant interest rate and τ is the test 
duration.  ( )( )( )
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exp  is the expected cost of fixing the faults detected, V is the 
cost to repair a fault once detected and E[.] is the expected number of faults detected over the 
test interval, τ, where X(i) is the detection time of the i
th
 fault.   
 
The model assumes that there are a predefined number of faults that exist within the system.  
These are removed upon realisation during testing.  In doing so this model incorporates a 
reliability growth model into the cost behaviour of the fault identification and mitigation cost 
elements.  The underlying assumption that there are a number of faults in the system is 
unavoidable, but there remains a question as to how the inclusion of faults is accounted for in 
a cost breakdown structure such as that proposed in Figure 4-4.  Deming (2000) argues that 
injecting faults into a system incurs cost at the point of their introduction.  However, if 
sufficient information were available to model when faults are injected into a system, then 
attention should focus on preventing the injection of faults.   
 
The model fulfils many of the requirements of a CAPEX model reflecting the cost elements 
indentified in Figure 4-4 and clearly indicates that such a model should incorporate a 
reliability growth model.  However, Equation 3, which is constructed for component testing 
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rather than system design and analysis assumes perfect fault removal and does not consider 
potential failure modes.  As discussed, potential failure modes can only be removed if the 
associated requirement, from which the failure mode was derived, is also removed.  This may 
not be practicable.  In this case the potential failure mode probability can be reduced by some 
amount; the efficiency with which this is achieved should be incorporated into the model.   
 
Radaev (2004) defines the cost of assurance by testing, Cat, (Equation 4) through defining the 
number of tests required to provide the necessary assurance (Equation 5), 
 
ncCC fat += 0  Equation 4 
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mR
nn
ln
1ln
0
γ−
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where C0 is the fixed cost of the test facility, cf is the cost of testing one item, n is the number 
of tests, γ is the required confidence that the required reliability Rm has been achieved.  The 
model indicates that as the required reliability and the level of assurance increases so the 
number of tests increases (Figure 4-8).  Clearly specifying high reliability with high levels of 
confidence demands a large number of assurance tests which may go beyond economic 
feasibility.  This model has value during the goal setting phases as a guide of the practical 
level of assurance that should be requested through testing.  However, the model does not 
consider if the reliability of the equipment actually meets Rm.  For equipment where the 
actual reliability falls below the requirement, increasing the number of tests would increase 
the confidence that the required value has not been achieved.  A reliability assurance cost 
element is an important addition the CAPEX cost breakdown structure, but should be based 
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on assuring the actual reliability.  In terms of subsea equipment it is not always practical to 
use testing to assure system reliability due to the high costs per test.   
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Figure 4-8: Number of tests required to assure reliability to a specified level of confidence. 
 
The literature has highlighted some important features to consider when modelling the 
behaviour of the CAPEX cost elements identified in Figure 4-4.  Quigley and Walls (2003) 
have incorporated reliability growth model within their cost model.  In doing so, cost and 
reliability is estimated based on activities of finding and fixing faults.  This concept should be 
expanded to consider management of potential failure modes.  Mettas (2000) introduces the 
concept of reliability improvement feasibility, which acknowledges the practicality of 
improving reliability.  The cost efficiency with which potential failure modes are mitigated 
should be considered within a planning model.  Finally, Radaev (2004) proposes a cost model 
for defining the number of tests required to demonstrate reliability to a specified confidence.  
77 
 
Whilst it is not applicable to a planning tool in its current form, the cost of assurance may be 
a useful addition to the CAPEX model.  
 
4.4.4. OPEX Cost Element Behaviour 
The cost of operations may be considered to fall into five main cost elements: 
1. Support cost; 
2. Maintenance and intervention costs; 
3. Insurance; 
4. Revenue impact; and 
5. Consequential cost. 
While the first three items may be collectively referred to as operating expenditure (OPEX) it 
is important to consider them separately in a life cycle costing model.  As with CAPEX, the 
relative contribution of each part can provide an indication of where cost reductions can be 
most effectively observed.  For example, in their case study, Hanrahan and Chitwood (2005) 
indicate that 19% of the reported OPEX was attributed to subsea intervention; this suggests 
that the OPEX could be reduced by up to 19% though improvements to the reliability and or 
maintainability of the subsea system.  The reason for including an OPEX model is to capture 
the cost of failure in operations of those faults or potential failures that have escaped 
detection during design and manufacture.  It also provides the basis of the trade-off between 
fixing identified failure modes with letting them enter service unmitigated. 
 
Support cost often comprises a fixed cost associated with the host facility, a variable 
processing cost and a variable transportation cost (Hanrahan and Chitwood, 2005).  As 
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system failure results in the termination of production, some of the variable costs may be 
terminated during production downtime.  This results in the system deferring the processing 
cost to a later date while incurring costs elsewhere.  It is not the intention of this research to 
consider the support costs within the OPEX model. 
 
4.4.4.1. Maintenance and intervention costs 
British Standard 4778-3.1 (1991) defines maintenance cost as “the total cost of retaining an 
item in, or restoring it to, a state in which it can perform its required function”.  The cost 
breakdown structure (Figure 4-4) indicates that this cost can be broken down according to the 
type of maintenance performed as part of the maintenance strategy.  A maintenance strategy 
may be defined from a combination of maintenance elements; preventative maintenance, 
reactive maintenance, inspection, equipment spares and upgrade (Gallimore and Penlesky, 
1988).  While equipment spares are fundamental to the maintenance strategy their cost is 
usually attributed to the cost of acquisition.  In the same respect, the cost of defining a 
maintenance strategy is a CAPEX item.   
 
Maintenance can be defined as the activity of caring for physical facilities so as to avoid or 
minimise the chance of that facility failing (Slack et al. 2004).  Alternatively it can be defined 
as a method of sustaining the reliability of a function (Kelly, 1997).  These definitions tend to 
support the objective of preventative maintenance, which may aim to reduce the probability 
of breakdown by replacing equipment before it fails (Gallimore and Penlesky, 1988).  
Preventative maintenance can be either time based or condition based.  In its simplest 
application, time based preventative maintenance replaces or overhauls equipment after fixed 
time periods (Eti et al. 2006).  However, this method does not consider the condition of 
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equipment and can, therefore, result in significant wastage through replacement of equipment 
that is showing no signs of wear out.  Condition based preventative maintenance collects 
information relating to the state of the equipment until specific information is collected that 
signifies the need for maintenance (Schneider et al. 2006).  The total maintenance activity 
cost, therefore, is a function of both the frequency of the data collection and the criteria that 
trigger the maintenance activity.  The latter further differentiates condition based preventative 
maintenance depending on whether the maintenance activity criteria consider equipment 
condition in isolation or in terms of the overall system performance. 
 
Reactive maintenance is the simplest maintenance strategy where equipment is operated until 
failure when it is then decided if replacement is necessary (Schneider et al. 2006).  Reactive 
maintenance delays the cost of maintenance more than any other strategy, leaving the system 
in a productive state for a long as possible.  However, this strategy compromises the supply 
reliability (Schneider et al. 2006) as system shut down is unscheduled.  The unscheduled 
nature of a reactive breakdown strategy can also lead to longer system downtime and greater 
indirect costs.  It follows therefore that a reactive strategy is best applied to equipment whose 
failure is inconsequential to system performance (Schneider et al. 2006).  Despite this, the 
subsea oil and gas industry tends to operate a reactive approach to maintenance where the 
cost of planned preventative intervention is deemed too high (e.g. deepwater developments) 
compared to the revenue that could be generated.  The cost of a reactive breakdown strategy 
can be mitigated through condition monitoring or the purchase of equipment spares.  
Condition monitoring can reduce the time taken to isolate the source of failure, while holding 
spares can reduce the lead time for replacement equipment.   
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Inspection can be defined as the assessment of equipment characteristics against a specified 
benchmark to determine conformity (ISO 8402, 1995).  This quality driven definition suggest 
that inspection should be applied to reveal non-conformities or faults rather than equipment 
in a failed state.  The activity of identifying equipment in the failed state may be more 
correctly referred to as diagnosis, which is discussed below.  Both reactive and preventative 
maintenance strategies can be supported by inspection.  The value of the information 
generated through inspection, however, depends on the maintenance strategy.  As condition 
based preventative maintenance relies on the collection of data it clearly benefits the most 
from inspection.  Indeed, inspection identifies those instances where maintenance activities 
are required either before or after a fixed time preventative maintenance strategy (Gallimore 
and Penlesky, 1988).  Inspection costs are accumulated through the acquisition of the 
inspection equipment and the cost to perform the inspection.  These costs are either planned 
(preventative maintenance) or accumulated on demand.   
 
Much of the cost OPEX associated with a maintenance strategy is incurred when an 
intervention activity is required.  The component parts of an intervention activity are outlined 
below.  
1. Realisation is the time taken to recognize that there is a problem that requires (or 
might require) intervention.  This may be triggered by a failure event or through 
inspection.  Realisation time is often the longest for latent faults which are 
inconsequential to specific operations (e.g. a safety shut-off valve with a latent fault 
that prevents it from closing on demand may not be realised during normal production 
operations; that is not to say that the ‘failure to close on demand’ failure mode is 
inconsequential).  For a reactive maintenance policy, realisation reflects the time at 
which the other maintenance costs (diagnosis, procurement, repair and verification 
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and check-out) may be triggered and as such may not incur a direct cost. However, 
realisation prior to the system failure event can reduce the costs associated with the 
subsequent logistic delay of the intervention activity.   
2. Diagnosis is the process of determining the cause of the failure and identifying what 
remedial action is required.  The speed with which the fault can be isolated is 
dependent on the availability and accuracy of data.  Cost collection of this cost 
element is a function of the time taken to process the information and arrive at a 
decision.  Preventative maintenance strategies can ensure that much of the diagnosis 
time is consumed whilst the system is still in operation.  Reactive maintenance 
strategies, however, are more likely to observe diagnosis during downtime, which is 
reflected as revenue impact. 
3. Procurement is the acquisition of the equipment (including spare parts and tooling) 
necessary to perform the active repair.  Procurement can be a significant cost element 
in terms of replacement cost and replacement lead time.  However it may be reduced 
through the acquisition of spare parts up front (which forms part of the CAPEX).  
Many subsea interventions require support from an external vessel capable of 
transporting equipment to or from the subsea location.  The purchase of this service 
has been included as part of procurement.  The cost of these vessels (usually 
calculated on a day rate) is dependent on the equipment that needs replacement and 
the global vessel availability.  For example, an ROV support vessel required to 
change out a valve module in the North Sea is significantly cheaper and more readily 
available on site than a heavy lift vessel required to change out an entire production 
tree in the Asia-Pacific deepwater.  The lead time for procurement can be significantly 
influenced by when realisation occurs.  Procurement time is longest if realisation 
occurs when the item fails during demand for that item’s function.  If realisation, 
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through inspection, occurs prior to the failure event then diagnosis and procurement 
can be initiated before system failure, thus reducing the total downtime.  
4. Repair is the actual activity of restoring the system to an operational state.  Cost 
collection of this cost element is driven by the time taken to carry out the repair 
(which manifests as revenue impact) and may be limited to labour charges.  
Depending on the repair activity, ‘hot’ repair can be performed on an operational 
system.  In this case the impact of repair on lost or deferred revenue is minimised.   
5. Verification and check-out is the time taken to perform any final adjustments and 
confirm that the repair activity has returned the failed item to the operational state 
before restarting. As a cost element, verification may not collect as much cost as 
procurement, for example, but can have significant implications if it is discovered, at 
a later date, that the intervention has not corrected the problem.   
 
Aside from any compulsory insurance that an operator may have to purchase, there are two 
types of insurance that could be purchased to protect the operator against the cost of failure.  
Engineering insurance provides compensation for damage to equipment caused by its own 
failure (Diacon and Carter, 2005).  Interruption insurance covers losses in profit during 
downtime, overhead costs incurred irrespective of whether revenue is being generated and 
additional costs associated with restarting operations.  Interruption insurance is usually 
conditional on purchasing an engineering insurance policy to cover the material damages 
(Diacon and Carter, 2005). 
 
Insurance premiums are paid out on an annual basis to transfer risk (e.g. of failure) away 
from the operator to an insurer.  Depending on the policy, insurance can offer varying levels 
of protection from the cost of failure.  There are a number of general policies that can be 
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purchased; full insurance, deductible insurance, franchise, coinsurance and first loss 
insurance (Diacon and Carter, 2005). 
1. A full insurance policy protects the insured against the whole cost of failure.  The 
insurer assumes responsibility for the total cost. 
2. With a deductible insurance policy, the insured pays a fixed amount of the total cost 
of the failure event (which may result in paying for the entire cost of failure).  The 
insurer pays the excess of the cost of failure over a specified amount. 
3. Holding a franchise insurance policy means that the insured pays all costs under a 
certain amount, providing that the total cost remains below the specified amount.  The 
insurer bares no cost for failures costing less than the specified amount but assumes 
responsibility for the total cost if it exceeds the specified amount.  
4. Coinsurance can assume two different meanings.  Firstly, it can mean the acquisition 
of insurance through multiple insurers.  Alternatively it can be where the insurer 
covers a specified percentage of the total cost of failure, the insured pays the 
remainder.   
5. With a first loss policy the insurer pays up to a specified amount for all failure events.  
The insured only pays the excess (this is essentially the reverse of a deductible 
policy).   
 
The cost of the policy depends on a number of variables.  Variables of note include the size 
of the pool of exposure units and the concepts of moral hazard and adverse selection.  As the 
number of exposure units (the object being insured against a specific risk) increases, the 
insurer can be more accurate in calculating the premium as a result of the law of large 
numbers (Diacon and Carter, 2005).  This law states that as the sample population increases 
the actual losses approach that which is expected.  The concept of moral hazard means that 
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policy holders are less risk averse (and hence more likely to claim) when they have insurance 
compared with when they do not; as a result insurers must be sure that the insured cannot 
benefit from a claim (Glenn, 2003).  The concepts of adverse selection means that people 
who believe that they are at high risk are more likely to purchase insurance compared to those 
who do not; this is in conflict with the assumption that the pool of exposure units, used to 
calculate the expected loss, is homogeneous (Glenn, 2003).  The level of risk and uncertainty 
in these factors combined with the administrative fees of the insurer influence the insurance 
premium.  This is an interesting topic in terms of risk mitigation but insurance is a risk 
transfer strategy and as such is unlikely to support planning for design for reliability effort in 
the design stage. 
 
Revenue impact may be considered as either lost or deferred revenue.  Lost revenue is simply 
the revenue forgone as a result of not providing a product or service.  Deferred revenue is 
money received for a product or service prior to the delivery of the product or service to the 
customer.  As deferred revenue has not been fully earned (i.e. the product or service has not 
been supplied) it not recorded as income but as a liability (Myddleton, 2000) until the oil or 
gas has been supplied.  In the oil and gas industry revenue impact from failure is usually in 
the form of deferred revenue as the oil or gas is ultimately produced.  However, there are 
cases where failure can result in lost revenue.  Clearly the total cost of revenue impact 
(deferred or lost production) is a function of the duration of time that the system is not in 
operation.  This is a function of both the reliability (frequency of failure) and maintainability 
(duration of the failure). 
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Consequential costs in operation are incurred when the system becomes unavailable (IEC 
60300-3-3, 2004).  It may be argued that all failure related costs are therefore consequential 
costs.  Indeed, IEC 60300-3-3 (2004) states that revenue impact may be considered a 
consequential cost; it does not, however, state that corrective maintenance, which can occur 
when the system is unavailable, is a consequential cost.  Consequential costs can include 
direct and indirect costs.  The direct costs include warranty and liability costs, whereas 
indirect costs include damages to image, reputation and prestige (IEC 60300-3-3, 2004). 
 
Warranty costs tend to be consumed by the supplier, who bears the financial implications of 
hardware replacement (excluding revenue impact) should it fail within a set time period.  
While warranty costs are part of the cost of operation for the product life cycle, they are not 
part of the project life cycle cost from the view point of the operator.  Indeed, ISO 15663-2 
(2001) does not include warranty cost as a constituent part of the life cycle cost.   Liability 
costs are the legal costs encountered as a result of failure or unavailability; along with 
damages the company’s reputation, these costs may be very difficult to accurately estimate 
(IEC 60300-3-3, 2004). 
 
4.4.5. Modelling OPEX cost element behaviour 
Reliability based cost of operations models presented in the literature tend to focus on 
maintenance and intervention costs.  Their application varies in complexity and accuracy 
from rule based equations to direct simulation.   
 
Govil (1984) presented a set of equations for the logistic support cost component of the life 
cycle cost based on a set of underlying assumptions listed below:  
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• Logistic support cost (LSC) of a low reliability component is very high; 
• LSC of a high reliability component is very low; 
• LSC is a monotonic decreasing function of reliability; and  
• Derivative of LSC with respect to reliability is a monotonic decreasing function of 
reliability. 
 
Through analogy with existing cost of acquisition models, Govil (1984) suggests five 
analytical models for the logistic support cost (Equation 6 through Equation 10) shown in 
Figure 4-9,   
( )gRFLSC −= 11  F, g > 0 Equation 6 
( )( )[ ]g21tan2 RπFLSC −=  F > 0 , 1 ≤ g ≤ 2 Equation 7 
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where F is a cost scaling factor, g is a shaping factor and R is the reliability. 
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Figure 4-9: Graphical Representation of Govil (1984) LSC curves, F=1, g=1.5 
 
Figure 4-9 shows the significant differences in sensitivity of the logistic cost curves to 
reliability; constants F and g have been arbitrarily selected to satisfy the condition specified 
for Equation 6 through Equation 10.  All curves except LSC1 tend to infinity as reliability 
approaches zero, suggesting that this equation does not necessarily satisfy the first 
assumption noted.  Application of any of these curves is dependent on collecting sufficient 
data to estimate the F and g constants (this is especially true for g as it relates to the tolerance 
of the LSC to reliability).  As F is a cost scaling factor its value should be obtainable from the 
cost breakdown structure.  For example the scaling factor for LSC3 relates to the cost of an 
infinitely reliable component while the scaling factor for LSC1 relates to an infinitely 
unreliable component.  Neither of these values is particularly useful for calculating service 
life cost, especially if the cost of failure varies over time (as would be expected for a subsea 
production facility).  The shape factor, g, indicates the sensitivity of the LSC to component 
reliability suggesting that the cost of failure escalates significantly at low reliabilities.  
However, all of these models are quite insensitive at high reliabilities, which could deter 
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decision makers from investing in reliability improvements based on the OPEX.  While they 
may be useful in a life cycle costing model where significant data already exists, they do little 
to establish how improvements can actually be made and whether a reliability improvement 
is, in fact, the best course of action.  Indeed, Hennecke (1999) claims that for pumps with low 
reliability, life cycle cost reductions may be best achieved through enhanced condition 
monitoring rather than improving the reliability.   
 
Ntuen (1987) presents a discounted cost of operations model based on the annual operating 
time and the hazard rate.  The model draws on the assumptions from other authors, 
assumptions of note include: 
• Each component observes a fixed penalty cost given failure; 
• System failure cost rate is proportional to system hazard rate; and 
• Life cycle cost is the additive components of the subsystem cost function. 
 
By implementing a discounted cost model, Ntuen (1987) acknowledges the time value of 
money.  However, it is not true for subsea systems that the penalty given failure is constant 
due to the variable production profile.  The last assumption states that components’ cost 
behaviour does not interact and is included due to the belief that the life cycle cost is too 
difficult to predict if the cost function does not satisfy simple criteria (Ntuen and Moore, 
1986).  While it may be the objective of any model to attain a suitable balance between 
simplicity and accuracy, it is not true that cost element behaviours do not interact.  Complex 
systems can consume cost through the occurrence of system cut sets and individual items 
may belong to multiple cut sets.  Furthermore, depending on the specific cut set intervention 
vessel requirements may varying meaning that failed items requiring high cost intervention 
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vessel support can share this cost with other components.  Modern computing capability has 
reduced the reliance on such oversimplifying assumptions.  
 
Goble and Tucker (1993) calculate the cost of operations as the sum of the fixed maintenance 
cost, variable maintenance cost, engineering change cost and failure incident cost.  
Engineering change cost are those costs incurred to improve system operations that could not 
be (or were not) anticipated during design.  The failure incident cost, CFI, is a function of 
both the mean time to failure and the mean time to repair, according to Equation 11,  
 
( )
MTTFMTTR
MTTRCC
C LPRLFI +
+
=  Equation 11 
 
where CRL is the repair labour cost and CLP is the cost of lost production.  Equation 11 
provides greater scope for decision making as it suggests that life cycle cost improvements 
can be made through the maintainability (i.e. reducing the cost given failure) and well as the 
reliability.  However, this model is only applicable for single items or a system whose OPEX 
relates directly to unavailability. 
 
De Leon and Ang (2003) construct a reliability based life cycle cost model for an offshore oil 
platform to assess alternative design options under the consideration of hurricane wave 
damage.   The expected cost of operation model comprehensively includes the expected cost 
of structural repair, equipment damage, deferred production, injury, fatality and indirect 
losses.  Each cost is estimated from a relation to a global damage index, which is calculated 
as the union of the response of critical structural elements to energy impact (Ang and De 
Leon, 1997); the response of these structural elements is a function of a damage index.  Cost 
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elements assume an upper limit and depending on the value of, and relation to, the damage 
index a proportion of this upper limit is consumed.  For example the cost of deferred 
production is calculated according to Equation 12, 
 
2****1.0 DPTPC RPPDP =  D < 1 
RPPDP PTPC ***1.0=  D ≥ 1 
Equation 12 
 
where PP is the price of oil per barrel, TP is the time to restore normal production, PR is the 
production rate, D is the global damage index and assuming that the loss due to deferred 
production is a 10% drop of the full cash flow (De Leon and Ang, 2003).  The authors do not 
explain how the relation of the cost of deferred production to the square of the damage index 
was determined
2
.  The model is included here as one of few cost estimates for deferred 
production presented in the literature.   While De Loen and Ang (2003) where considering the 
effect of wave damage a similar construct for the cost given failure can be applied to 
functional reliability in terms of lost or deferred revenue. 
 
Todinov (2004) derives Equation 13 as the basis of risk analysis driven by the cost of failure 
for M competing failure modes, which cause the system to fail should any occur,   
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2
 The previous work of Ang and De Leon (1996) suggest that the relationship is determined from damage and 
cost data collected from the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. 
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where K is the risk of failure, λk is the (constant) hazard rate of the k
th
 failure mode, a is the 
specified operating time and kC  is the mean cost of k
th
 failure mode given failure.  Equation 
13 can be used to find the set of hazard rates that satisfy a specified maximum acceptable risk 
of failure, K.  As such it is presented in the literature, primarily, as a tool for setting 
requirements based on the cost of failure.  Importantly, however, this model acknowledges 
that failure mode cost functions do interact and that for a series system observing a constant 
hazard rate, this interaction can be modelled accurately and simply.  The total losses from 
failure can be determined from the Poisson distribution of the number of failures observed 
over the system’s operational life.  By using the Poisson distribution, a range of potential cost 
outcomes are presented.  Todinov (2003) defines the concept of potential losses as the 
distribution function of the consequences from failure and its variance.    
 
For more complex systems the expected or potential cost of failure over a system lifetime can 
be determined using Monte Carlo simulation (Todinov, 2006a).  Todinov (2006a, 2006b) 
presents a cost of failure based net present value model for complex systems; the cost of 
operation is presented in Equation 14, 
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where PV is the present value of the cost of operation, n is the system life, r is the risk free 
discount rate and OF,i is the actual negative cash flow in the i
th
 year.  The actual negative cash 
flow in the i
th
 year is calculated from the support costs in the i
th
 year and the actual losses 
from failure in the i
th
 year.  Losses from failure are calculated as the sum of the cost of lost 
production, the cost of intervention and the cost of repair/replacement (Todinov, 2006a).  The 
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cost of lost production is calculated as the product of the selling price, daily production 
volume and the number of lost production days (Todinov, 2006b).  Todinov (2006b) has 
incorporated Equation 14 into a discrete event simulation for determining the losses from 
failure to assess competing design alternatives for subsea oil and gas production facilities.   
 
The models proposed by Todinov (2003; 2006a; 2006b) are the most comprehensive of the 
literature reviewed.  They recognise that the cost of failure should be presented as a 
distribution to reflect the stochastic nature of reliability and that for more complex system 
this should be achieved through simulation.  As with all models though these concentrate on 
losses from failure rather than focus on improving the value of the project. 
 
4.5. Traditional LCC Assessment Criteria 
International standard ISO 15663 part 2 (ISO, 2001) specifies a number of financial 
performance metrics that can be applied to support the life cycle costing decision making 
process.  These evaluation criteria deploy discounted cash-flow techniques to indicate the 
financial desirability of an investment at present time to account for the time value of money.  
Table 4-3 (modified from ISO 15663 – 2, 2001) suggests the preferred metric for each project 
stage, indicating that traditional investment appraisal techniques should be applied during the 
early project stages followed by calculating the life cycle cost as the project progresses 
through more detailed project stages.  
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Table 4-3: ISO 15663 recommended financial decision criteria through projects. 
Project 
Stage 
Feasibility Concept 
Selection 
FEED Detailed Design Procurement 
Result Go / No go Preferred 
option 
Functional 
specification 
Design solution 
selection 
Equipment 
Metric NPV / IRR NPV / IRR LCC LCC LCC 
 
Net present value (NPV) is defined as the sum of present values of the annual cash-flows 
observed over the duration of the project and indicates how profitable a project might be to an 
investor given the opportunity cost of capital.  Determination of the opportunity cost of 
capital is often through either calculation of the weighted average cost of capital or the capital 
asset pricing model (Brealey and Myers, 2003).  These values may be adjusted if an 
investment option is considered more or less risky than the typical investment taken by the 
decision maker or company. NPV is calculated according to Equation 15, 
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where Ct is the expected net cash flow at the end of year t, k is the discount rate, I0 is the 
initial investment and N is the project duration in years 
 
The decision rule for a single investment is to reject the project if the net present value is less 
than zero.  If the NPV is greater than zero, than the project investment exceeds the 
opportunity cost of capital and should be accepted.  For a comparative decision, the decision 
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maker should choose the option that maximises the NPV, given that it satisfies the single 
investment criterion. 
 
NPV is the preferred capital investment appraisal method in many financial management 
texts as the method specifically accounts for the timing of all the relevant cash-flows 
expected during the project and it has a direct relation to the generation of shareholder wealth 
(Atrill and McLaney, 2002; Brealey and Myers, 2003).  However, the technique can be 
insensitive to the scale of the initial investment when considering competing options.  That is 
the NPV does not give any indication of the return on investment. 
 
Life cycle cost (LCC) is defined as the sum of the cost of acquisition and the cost of 
operation and uses the same methods of discounting cash flow.  However the Ct term in the 
LCC calculation only includes those items identified as OPEX cost elements and does not 
consider revenue generated or profit.  Instead LCC considers revenue impact – the cost of lost 
or deferred revenue.  LCC cannot therefore be used as an individual investment appraisal 
technique as it does not consider the profitability of a project.   
 
The decision rule for competing options using the LCC criterion is to accept the option that 
minimises the life cycle cost.  Without risk based assessment to support the LCC 
minimisation decision, however, this can lead to misleading results (Markeset and Kumar, 
2001) and the possible selection of a sub-optimal solution (BS 60300-3-3, 2004).   
 
Putting life cycle cost into the context of reliability, the total cost incurred to achieve a 
specific reliability, L(λ) is given according to Equation 16, 
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( ) ( ) ( )λλλ KQL +=  Equation 16 
 
where Q(λ) is the capital outlay required to achieve a hazard rate, λ, and K(λ) is the risk of 
operational expenditure associated with λ.  Equation 33 can be implemented with specific 
regard to reliability investments, the total cost of a reliability investment for a system 
observing a constant hazard rate, is given according to Equation 17 (Todinov, 2004), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )xKxQxL −+=− λλ  Equation 17 
 
where L(λ-x) is the total loss after decreasing λ by x, Q(x) is the investment required to 
reduce λ by x (Q(0)=0) and K(λ-x) is the risk associated with the hazard rate, λ-x (Todinov, 
2004).  By minimising L(λ-x) with respect to x in the interval (0, xmax) (0≤ x ≤ xmax < λ), an 
optimum hazard rate λopt = λ-x
*
 can be determined where x
*
 is the investment that minimises 
L(λ-x) (Todinov, 2004). 
 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is closely related to the net present value; it is the discount 
rate that returns an NPV of zero.  IRR is calculated such that Equation 18 is satisfied. 
 
( )∑= +
=
n
t
t
t
IRR
C
I
1
0
1
 Equation 18 
 
The decision rule for a single investment option is to accept the project if the IRR is greater 
than the opportunity cost of capital.  For competing options the decision maker should favour 
that which maximises the IRR, given that it is greater than the opportunity cost of capital.   
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The IRR may be preferred as it does not require the definition of a discount rate (although it 
should be compared to a specified hurdle rate).  However, there are a number of weaknesses 
with the IRR as an investment appraisal methodology.  Firstly, the solution to Equation 18 is 
derived through an awkward trial and error process and spreadsheet solutions for the IRR 
calculation can give erroneous result for marginal investment decisions (Woods et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, it is possible to return multiple IRR values when there are multiple changes in 
the sign of the cash flow (Brealey and Myers, 2003).  Additionally, the IRR can be 
insensitive to the scale of the investment made when assessing competing investment 
decisions (Myddleton, 2000).  
 
The cost per standard barrel of oil or standard technical cost, STC, (Equation 19) is the 
minimum selling price required that can still return a profit.  The metric suggests that a 
project is profitable if the cost per standard barrel is less than the market selling price.  
However it does not follow that the option which minimises cost per barrel maximises profit 
for competing options. 
 
production  totalExpected
OPEXCAPEX
  oil of barrel standardper Cost 
+
=  Equation 19 
 
Profitability index (PI) is a variation of the net present value and is defined as the present 
value of the project cash-flow divided by the initial investment (Equation 20). 
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The decision rule for a single investment decision is to reject the project if the profitability 
index is less than 1.  For competing decision alternatives, the decision maker should favour 
that which maximises PI, given that it is above 1.  The profitability index, as a ratio, provides 
an indication of the margin of safety for the project (Myddleton, 2000).  The greater the PI, 
the more profitable the project and the less sensitive the decision is to cash-flow uncertainty.  
The PI is particularly useful for organizations that use capital rationing as it can be used to 
rank options such that the best combination of investments is achieved.  The decision 
criterion for PI means that it agrees with the NPV criterion.  In addition, it removes the 
sensitivity to scale that the NPV is sometime subject to.  For the purposes of planning 
reliability effort the PI is attractive due to its application to capital rationing, where a budget 
is provided and the combination of smaller investments (totalling the capital ration) that 
maximise the PI offers the greatest return on the overall investment.  Such an approach would 
allow a planning process to focus investments in reliability effort based on maximising the 
potential value generated within a specified ‘reliability budget’. 
 
The payback period (Equation 21) defines the time required to pay back the initial 
investment.  
 
receiptscash  annual
periodPayback 0
I
=  Equation 21 
 
Minimising the payback period is desirable but where there are fluctuations in the cash-flow 
the payback period cannot support the identification of the most profitable investment option.  
Definition of the payback period may, however, be useful in determining the early life period 
when defining reliability requirements.    
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The break-even volume (Equation 22) is related to the payback period as it defines the 
required production volume such that revenue is equal to the initial investment.   That is, it 
defines the production volume at which the NPV first equals zero after having paid off the 
CAPEX.   
 
producedunit per  OPEX -unit per  Price
eeven volum-Break 0
I
=  Equation 22 
 
As with the payback period, the break-even volume cannot identify the profit maximising 
option when there are fluctuating production profiles. 
 
4.6. Chapter Summary 
This Chapter has provided a review of the application of life cycle costing with specific 
regard to reliability.  Life cycle cost is constructed from the costs of acquisition, operation 
and disposal, of which the cost of acquisition and operation were considered here.  One of the 
objectives of the review is to assess the suitability of life cycle costing as a technique to 
support the planning of reliability analyses during design.  To this end a cost breakdown 
structure, fundamental to the application of life cycle costing, is required that reflects the 
behaviour of the cost elements associated with performing the analyses during design and the 
subsequent effect they may have in operations.  The cost breakdown structure for the cost of 
acquisition was originally constructed of three cost elements; the costs to introduce, identify 
and subsequently mitigate potential failure modes within the system.  The cost breakdown 
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structure for operations identified the costs of reactive maintenance and revenue impact as the 
primary components (although other cost elements exist).   
 
None of the literature reviewed explicitly addresses the use of life cycle costing to plan 
reliability effort (specifically analyses).  However, Quigley and Walls (2003) do demonstrate 
the use of life cycle costing to plan testing to find and fix faults that would otherwise 
undermine reliability.  The authors’ underlying assumption that a certain number of faults 
exist is key to the creation of a planning tool as the belief that faults exist or uncertainty that 
failure modes remain undiscovered or unmitigated should influence the decision to invest in 
reliability analyses.  It is this uncertainty that is indirectly captured during the technical risk 
categorisation activity conducted during the Define phase of the reliability and technical risk 
management process.  
 
It is not necessarily the case that systematic weakness is the result of faults; potential failure 
modes may exist within the system, which, if left unmitigated, could undermine reliability 
and erode project value.  As potential failure modes are created as result of specifying a 
functional requirement, the failure mode can only be removed if the functional requirement is 
also removed.  As this may not be feasible, the failure mode probability must be reduced 
(assuming that the consequences of failure are both unacceptable and cannot be mitigated).  It 
follows that the management of these potential failure modes is dependent on the ability with 
which the organization can improve the reliability of the component.  This is similar in 
concept to the feasibility described by Mettas (2000) but should relate more to organization 
capability rather than relative feasibility between components.  Organizations that would 
otherwise not invest in design for reliability may not be able to identify where reliability 
improvements need to be made or be incapable of effecting an improvement to reliability.  
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The CAPEX model therefore should be based on a reliability growth model that considers the 
ability with which an organization can identify unacceptable potential failure modes and the 
effectiveness with which their frequency of occurrence is reduced. 
 
An OPEX model is required to enable decision makers to trade off the certain cost of 
acquiring information through reliability analyses against the uncertain operational cost.  The 
OPEX model, therefore, needs to simulate the occurrence of the failure modes during the 
operational life.  Such models are quite well defined in the literature and the concept 
proposed by Todinov (2003; 2006a; 2660b) can be used as the basis for these models.  The 
models tend to focus on the accumulation of cost rather than the generation of potential value.  
This may be attributable to the metric used or the definition of cost drivers.  Identifying major 
cost drivers may lead decision makers to investigate how to cut cost out of the project.  By 
redefining the cost breakdown structure to identify ‘value drivers’, decision makers may be 
encourage to investigate opportunities to generate project value beyond cutting cost out of the 
project.  The decision metric can also shape the planning process; traditionally this been LCC 
or NPV but the preference, here, for a planning tool is to adopt the profitability index.  The 
reasons are two-fold.  Firstly the PI agrees with the decision criteria of the NPV with the 
benefit of removing the insensitivity to the scale of investment that the NPV is sometimes 
subject.  Secondly and more importantly is the application of PI to capital rationing projects; 
the PI allows decision makers to identify the combination of smaller investments that 
maximise the overall project value.  By adopting a capital rationing approach to planning, a 
pre-specified ‘reliability budget’ is formed allowing decision makers to focus on those 
investments in reliability that have the greatest potential value to the project.  This value is 
generated through identifying potential failure modes (or faults) that would otherwise 
compromise system reliability and erode project value. 
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If the planning tool is to be created that supports investment in reliability analyses then the 
prior assumption that unmitigated failure modes (or faults) exist within the system should be 
made.  If sufficient information were available to predict when faults or unmitigated failure 
modes where introduced into the system then the focus of reliability effort should be to 
prevent their introduction rather than plan when to look for them at a later date.  Reliability 
analyses are performed to acquire information relating to the existence of unmitigated failure 
modes.  It follows that analysis should only be performed if it has the potential to influence 
the design.  The following chapter reviews the reliability engineer’s toolkit, discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses as it applies to reliability and technical risk management. 
102 
 
5. Application of Systems Reliability Analyses to LCC 
5.1. Introduction 
System reliability analyses are central to the application of reliability and technical risk 
management to support decision making during the design phases.  This support is in the 
form of (API RP 17N, 2007; ISO 20815, 2007): 
• Identifying potential failure modes and failure logic; 
• Assessing the probability of occurrence of the failure mode; 
• Setting reliability goals and requirements; 
• Predicting reliability performance; 
• Identifying weaknesses in design; and 
• Identify opportunities for design improvement.   
 
For this to add value to the project the analysis should be appropriate for the level risk within 
the project; for low risk projects, where minimal uncertainty exists, it may not be beneficial 
or even suitable to perform certain types of analysis.  ISO 20815 (2007) and API RP 17N 
(2007) suggest that analysis is not required for low risk or repeat projects (under the 
assumption that relevant analysis has been performed during previous projects).  When 
planning these activities it is necessary to understand the level of risk or uncertainty within 
the project and the analysis effort required to quantify risk and or reduce uncertainty about 
the reliability performance.  This chapter reviews the analysis within the reliability engineer’s 
toolkit, identifying their strengths and weaknesses with respect to their application within the 
reliability and technical risk management framework.  It is not the intention of this chapter to 
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review every tool/techniques that is at the disposal of the reliability engineer as the chapter is 
focused more on systems reliability analyses (for example, stress strength interference is not 
considered at the system level). 
 
5.2. Failure modes effects and criticality analysis 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is a systematic method used to identify potential 
failure modes, their effects and possible cause (Cassanelli et al. 2006).  It intends to identify 
those failures that have unwanted consequences affecting the functionality of the system.  
The application of criticality analysis (FMECA) provides a means to prioritise design 
improvement recommendations. 
 
There are a vast number of standards providing varying degrees of guidance for conducting a 
FMECA over a range of industries (ISO 20815, 2007; SAE JA1000-1, 1999; US Mil-Std-
1629, 1984; IEC 60812, 2006; SAE ARP 5580, 2001; SAE J1739, 2002).  The general 
procedure is outlined here: 
1. Define the system to be analysed, including a breakdown of the items to be assessed, 
their interfaces, performance expectations and definition of failure; 
2. For each item, identify all possible failure modes and the immediate local and system 
effects; 
3. For each failure mode assign a severity category based on the consequences given 
occurrence of the failure mode; 
4. For each failure mode assign a probability of occurrence; 
5. Plot the failure mode on a criticality matrix; 
6. For each failure mode identify and rank detection method; 
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7. Identify corrective actions necessary to mitigate failure mode risk; and 
8. Record the recommended/agreed actions. 
 
FMECA is an extremely versatile technique that can be applied to functions, hardware and 
processes.  The technique can be implemented at the first stages of system design and can be 
updated throughout the design and development phases.  It is perhaps the most widely used 
member of the reliability toolkit and as such has received significant attention in the 
literature.  One of the most documented criticisms of FMECA is the risk priority number.  
The risk priority number is defined as the product of the ranks given for severity, probability 
of occurrence and detection.  Ben-Daya and Raouf (1996) and Bowles (2004) summarise 
these shortfalls; 
• RPN is not a continuous scale (i.e. many numbers in the possible range can’t be 
produced by the RPN calculation and many can be produced by more than one 
combination of severity, probability and detection) making it difficult to interpret the 
results; 
• It doesn’t satisfy the usual requirements for measurements and therefore cannot be 
used to evaluate the impact of remedial action; 
• It offers no indication as to how the item can be improved; 
• It hides the probability that a customer will receive a fault; and 
• There is no logical reason as to why the RPN should be calculated as the product of 
the severity, probability and detection ranks (detection is not a ratio measurement). 
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Perroux (2007) provides a critical review of the FMECA process and its implementation and 
identifies further limitations of the technique: 
• Can be a very time consuming technique (especially for large or complex systems); 
• Cannot guarantee that all potential failure modes will be identified for new 
technology; 
• Not suited to identifying common cause failure modes; 
• Not suited to the assessment of combined failure mode effects; and 
• Subjective assessment depends on the contribution of expert knowledge. 
 
Teng and Ho (1996) highlight that a significant shortfall with the implementation of a 
FMECA is that it is completed to fulfil the customer’s document requirement rather than 
improving design reliability.    This observation tends to be true for the oil and gas 
exploration and production industry and can be extended to other reliability analysis 
techniques.  Indeed, where analysis has been implemented and a potential weakness 
identified the industry has tended to question the input data rather than the design. 
 
FMECA cannot necessarily identify the root cause of the failure mode; it is for this reason 
that a FMECA is often complemented by fault tree analysis (BS 5760-5, 1991) after failure 
mode prioritisation.  Further examples of the versatility of FMECA and its inherent 
compatibility with other reliability analysis include: 
• Use of FMECA to identify known repeat failures and drive a proactive root cause 
analysis (Latino and Latino, 2006); 
• Using reliability block diagrams to help identify system failure modes (US Mil-Std-
1629, 1984); and 
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• Using automated reliability block diagram reports to construct and populate FMECA 
work sheets (Perroux, 2007). 
 
Rhee and Ishii (2003) present a life cost based FMEA as a solution to the problems associated 
with traditional FMECA using the risk priority number.  The authors modify the existing 
FMEA worksheet to include the information contained in Table 5-1, which is used to 
calculate the expected labour cost, material cost and opportunity cost.  
 
Table 5-1: Life cost based FMEA worksheet inputs (Rhee and Ishii, 2003). 
Input Description 
Failure mode Description of the failure mode 
Root cause of failure Description of root cause of failure mode 
Effect of failure Description of the result of failure 
Origin Project stage that failure mode was introduced 
Detection Phase Project stage that failure is realised 
Re-occurrence Indicates extent to which failure reoccurs over the lifetime 
Frequency Frequency of failure mode occurring over 1year period. 
Detection time Time to realise and identify failure occurrence and location 
Fixing time Active time required to fix the problem 
Delay time Logistic delay waiting for response, parts, et cetera. 
Loss time Total downtime; sum of detection, fixing and delay time 
Quantity Quantity of parts required to fix problem 
Parts cost Cost of parts required to fix the problem 
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Kmenta and Ishii (2004) develop this concept to present a scenario based FMEA where 
failure scenarios are allocated an expected cost based on when a failure cause was introduced 
and when the failure effect was discovered.  By defining a failure scenario as a chain of 
events commencing with the introduction of a failure cause and leading to the eventual 
discovery of the failure effect (Figure 5-1, modified from Kmenta and Ishii, 2004), the 
authors replace the risk priority number with the expected cost of a failure scenario.  The total 
cost of a system is defined as the sum of the expected costs of the individual failure scenarios, 
according to Equation 23, 
 
( ) ( ) Cost*causegiven effect  endPr*causePrCost Expected =  Equation 23 
 
where Pr(cause) is the probability that a failure cause has been introduced, Pr(end effect) is 
the conditional probability of occurrence of failure given the cause has been introduced and 
Cost is the financial consequence of the end effect of that failure.  In terms of the cost 
breakdown structure discussed in Chapter 4, Pr(cause) can be related to the introduction of 
potential failure modes and Pr(end effect) relates to failure mode identification and Cost is 
failure mode mitigation.  According to Equation 23 there are no costs associated with the 
introduction and identification of potential failure modes.  The scenarios imply that the end 
effect is unexpected and the cost associated with the end effect is reactionary (i.e. worst 
case); design decisions are prioritised based on the rank of the expected cost.  The calculation 
of the expected cost of the failure scenario requires some very specific data in the form of the 
probability that a failure cause is introduced, which may be difficult to obtain.  When 
considering potential failure modes, however, this probability is known to be Pr = 1 as the 
existence of a potential failure mode is a consequence of specifying a functional requirement.  
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The scenarios assume a probability of detection, which may or may not reflect the ability of 
the organization to discover failures.  However, there is no apparent consideration of the 
ability with which the failure cause is removed or the how the potential failure mode is 
mitigated. 
 
Figure 5-1: Failure scenarios, modified from Kmenta and Ishii (2004). 
 
5.3. Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive method that graphically represents the conditions or 
factors causing or contributing to the occurrence of an undesirable (failure) event.  This is a 
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good method to determine the failure mechanism(s) of the failure mode and improves 
understanding of the physics of failure.  Fault tree analysis can commence early in the design 
stage and progress concurrently with the design process, growing with the increasing detail of 
the design (BS 5760-7, 1991).  Fault trees are ‘failure space’ models that describe a system in 
terms of how component failures lead to system failure (Gough et al. 1990).  As such a fault 
tree is constructed, as follows, to describe the flow of events that lead to the occurrence of the 
top event (EN 61025, 2007): 
1. Define the scope of the analysis including the system definition, analysis objectives, 
detail and any assumptions; 
2. Clearly define the top event; 
3. Identify the immediate cause event(s) necessary and sufficient for the top event to 
occur; 
4. Define the relationship of the immediate event(s) to the occurrence of the top event 
and represent by a logic gate; 
5. Repeat the procedure of defining immediate causes until the basic event is identified 
or there is insufficient information available to further expand the event causes;  
6. Evaluation of the tree is either numerical, to define the hazard rate of the specified top 
event, or logical to define the cut sets or minimal cut sets for the top event.   
 
The primary strength of fault tree analysis is through the identification of the causes for 
specified unwanted events.  The method used in constructing a fault tree is often used in both 
common cause failure and root cause failure analysis.  Fault trees are often used to analyse 
specific events prioritised by other, less detailed, analysis techniques.  For example, FTA can 
be used to define the failure mechanism for failure modes identified during a FMECA or to 
determine the hazard rate of the component parts of a reliability block diagram.   
110 
 
 
Through identifying how a system can fail, fault trees define the system cut sets.  Cut sets can 
be used to (Gough et al. 1990): 
1. Determine the causes of system unavailability; 
2. Determine the importance of each components; 
3. Perform sensitivity analysis; and 
4. Verification of the system model. 
 
The ability to perform detailed assessment of singular top events means that FTA may not be 
suited to the analysis of entire systems.  Indeed, as fault trees are a representation of Boolean 
logic, it is assumed that the events are binary (Bedford and Cooke, 2001); that is, the fault 
tree accommodates events that have two outcomes (i.e. success or failure) and therefore 
assessing partial or degraded failure modes can be difficult. Furthermore the logical 
dependencies between events can become difficult to represent, for a complex system, 
without detailed knowledge of the system (Gough et al. 1990).  In addition, the evaluation of 
fault tress may require further techniques (for example, PAND gates require Markov 
analysis) and or software support. 
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Figure 5-2: Example fault tree 
 
Figure 5-2 indicates a simplified fault tree for how a design fault might be introduced during 
the design phase, escape detection and enter operations.  The use of PAND gates indicate that 
a specific sequence is required (signified by numbering the input events to the gate) but it 
does not, and cannot, reflect the cyclic nature of the design phase.  Furthermore, the 
probability of no fault found is dependent on existence of faults in the design (it seems valid 
to assume that the probability of not fault found will be higher when there is no fault to be 
found), which is not reflected in the tree; although conditional events can be incorporated into 
a fault tree, what seemed like a simple fault tree is actually fairly complex and awkward to 
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evaluate.  For these reasons FTA may not be suited to modelling project phases prior to 
operation.   
 
Little research has been directed specifically at the application of FTA to life cycle cost based 
decision making, perhaps due to the fact that fault tree analysis is used to identify how 
specified unwanted events occur.  That is, the events have already been identified as 
unwanted (in terms of cost) and FTA often serves as an input to systems level analyses.  
Clearly, FTA can facilitate the provision of a set of possible solutions, whose cost-benefit can 
be assessed to determine the optimum response.  Latino and Latino (2006) use FTA to 
identify the root cause of persistent failures and suggest solutions; the return on investment 
used to determine the preferred solution is independent of the fault tree analysis.   
 
5.4. Decision/Event Tree Analysis 
Whereas fault trees aim to identify the cause of a specified unwanted event, event trees start 
with an initiating event and propagate through the system by considering all possible ways 
that the event can influence the behaviour of the system (Bedford and Cooke, 2001).  This 
supports the identification of mitigation actions, which can prevent consequence escalation of 
a failure event.  If the initiating event is a decision, then the tree may be referred to as a 
decision tree. 
 
Event trees can identify any number of events resulting from the initiating event and allows 
the sequential modelling of events.  There is no standard methodology for event tree analysis; 
however, a generalised procedure is provided here (from Billington and Allen 1983; 
Fjellheim and Fiksel, 1990):  
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1. Define the scope of the analysis, including: the definition of the system, the agreed 
level of analysis detail and any assumptions made; 
2. Identify the initiating event to be assessed; 
3. Identify all credible and immediate outcomes from the initiating event until the final 
outcome is identified; 
4. For each immediate event assign a conditional probability with which they occur and 
consequence; 
5. The numerical assessment of the event tree considers the cumulative expected 
consequence of each branched path defined; 
6. Identify and recommend appropriate mitigations, review the event tree with these 
mitigations in place. 
 
As event trees trace the propagation of an initiating event, they are particularly strong in 
conjunction with fault tree analysis in safety assessments and accident scenarios (Siu, 1994).  
They are also a fundamental part of the visualisation of decision models (i.e. decision trees) 
and can be used to model system reliability analysis.  However, event trees can become 
unmanageable when dealing with large or complex systems and become time consuming 
when evaluated manually.  For example, a system comprising 50 components, which have 
two states (success or failure) the subsequent event tree has 2^50 end states.  As indicated by 
Siu (1994), event trees are best suited to modelling individual scenarios rather than dynamic 
systems or whole life assessments; however, event trees do give credence to the possibility 
that events can observe multiple outcomes (e.g. success, failure, partial failure). 
 
Event trees are inherently related to cost based decision making due to their inclusion in 
decision trees.  Many authors used decision trees to inform traditional risk based decision 
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making (Roberts, 1999; Koller, 2000; Phelps, 2004) and real options
3
 (Herath and Park, 
2002; Boute et al. 2004; Lund, 2000; Trigeorgis, 2005).  Decision trees provide a sound basis 
for formalising the decision structure and analysing the possible outcomes as each branch of 
the tree has an assigned probability and consequence of failure.   
 
Event trees are suited to modelling the decision making process rather than addressing 
specific design for reliability issues.  As such event trees may be more valuable as a tool 
assess the potential value of the other analyses. 
 
5.5. Reliability Block Diagram 
Reliability block diagrams (RBD) provide a graphical representation of a system’s reliability 
logic.  They are constructed as a ‘success space’ model that describes a system in terms of the 
component successes required for system success (Gough et al. 1990).  An RBD can also be 
used to describe the relationship between component failure and system failure (Willingham 
and Forster, 1990).  Analysis of an RBD includes the identification of cut sets and the 
prediction of system reliability and probability of failure. 
  
Reliability block diagrams look much like process flow charts or functional flow charts; 
however, because they describe the system reliability logic, they do not necessarily reflect 
how a system functions (Gough et al. 1990).  Construction of an RBD is as follows (BS 
61078, 2006): 
                                                 
3
 Strictly speaking, real options are often presented as a binomial lattice which differs from a decision tree as 
certain event outcomes merge together as their result is the same; however, they are constructed with much the 
same methodology although their evaluation differs. 
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1. Define a state of system success; 
2. Break the system down into the smallest number blocks that reflect the logical 
behaviour of the system and are statistically independent; 
3. Define a start and end node; 
4. Arrange the blocks to form a success path between the start and end node. 
 
Compared with the other graphical methods discusses (fault trees and event trees), the 
reliability block diagram is the best method for graphically representing complex system 
reliability logic, as such it is often used as the basis of RAM analysis (below).  However, the 
methodology requires comprehensive understanding of the way the system operates and can 
only treat one functional mode at a time.   
 
The ease with which the system reliability is calculated depends on the system logic.  For 
example, the reliability of a system whose constituent parts are logically arranged in series is 
calculated by taking the product of the reliabilities of those constituent parts.  Conversely, the 
probability of failure for a system whose constituent parts are logically arranged in parallel is 
calculated as the product of all the probabilities of failure of those constituent parts.  The 
reliability of systems that observe components logically arranged in both series and parallel is 
calculated through reduction; reduction presents a group of blocks (i.e. a group of series 
blocks or a group of parallel blocks) as a single block with a new reliability based on the rules 
stated above.  This process of reduction can become quite complicated involving calculations 
which are prone to error (when completed manually) for large or complex systems.  In 
addition, a system’s functional architecture may observe numerous functional states that have 
to be resolved separately in the RBD, which can lead to time consuming calculations and 
when simplified (through reduction) may not return accurate results. The use of simulation 
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packages for the assessment of reliability is discussed further in section 5.6.  The sole 
purpose of a reliability block diagram is essentially that of a visualisation tool, which 
provides a logical framework for the techniques discussed below (RAM analysis and 
importance/sensitivity analysis). 
 
5.6. Reliability Availability Maintainability Analysis 
RAM analysis provides an assessment of the overall system performance over the operational 
phase of the life cycle.  Its application during design can support the definition of reliability 
requirements (API RP 17N, 2007; BP, 2007b; Strutt et al. 2007), develop the maintenance 
strategy (Hall, 2006; Cockerill and Lavoie, 1990) and assess design alternatives.   
 
There is no standard procedure for conducting RAM analysis as the term is often used as a 
collective noun for reliability, availability and maintainability analyses (ISO 15663-2, 2001; 
Smith, 2001).  In addition, RAM analysis is often unique to the decision and system being 
assessed.  Here, RAM analysis is taken to mean a systems analysis that considers the effect of 
a reliability and maintainability strategy on the overall system availability over the 
operational life of the system.  Hall (2006) proposes a generalised approach for conducting 
RAM analysis: 
1. Define the objectives and scope of the analysis; 
2. Collect and review the system information; 
3. Review data and assumptions used to develop the system model; 
4. Construct, review and validate the RAM system model; 
5. Collect model results and perform sensitivity analysis; 
6. Document results and recommendations. 
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RAM models tend to be evaluated using Monte Carlo simulation techniques to assess the 
effect of input parameter uncertainty on the behaviour of the system; the steps required to 
perform Monte Carlo simulation are (Ayyub and McCuen, 2002): 
1. Define system using a model; 
2. Generate of random numbers; 
3. Generate of random variables; 
4. Evaluate model; 
5. Perform statistical analysis on resulting system behaviour; 
6. Review simulation efficiency and convergence. 
 
RAM analysis goes beyond conventional RBD analysis to support a wide range of 
operational decisions during design.  These decisions are often based on more practical 
decision metrics, such as production availability.  Due to the added complexity of the input 
data and case specific assumptions, manual evaluation of the RAM model is not possible 
(Murphy et al. 2005).  However, there is an array of commercially available software to 
perform RAM analysis, these include; 
• OpSim (Relex, 2007) 
• BlockSim (Reliasoft, 2007) 
• AvSim+ (Isograph, 2007) 
• RAPTOR (ARINC, 2007) 
• MIRIAM Regina (CognIT, 2004) 
• PLASMA (SimEng, 2007) 
• MAROS (DNV, 2007) 
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Brall et al. (2007) provide a comparison of a selection of software packages over a variety of 
different reliability block diagrams, simulation lengths and number of trials.  The authors 
reveal some inconsistencies in some of the test case results indicating that different software 
packages are iterating from different directions (Brall et al. 2007).  This begins to raises 
concerns about the effort required to get accurate results for complex systems, which could 
present a significant barrier to active implementation of reliability software in the support of 
subsea projects.   
 
RAM analysis is a very data intensive application and the acquisition of this data may be the 
rate determining step for RAM analysis; Sandtorv et al. (1996) indicate that up 30% of a 
reliability assessment is consumed by data collection.  The time taken to actually run the 
simulation and evaluate the model is relatively short in comparison; Brall et al. (2007) record 
that evaluating complex systems can take in excess of one hour for some software packages.  
The time taken to perform the analysis is dependent on a number of variables such as the size 
of the RBD, the simulation length, number of iterations and specification of the computer 
running the analysis.  Of fundamental importance is the ability to achieve convergence of the 
results; convergence is a measure of the stability of the results distribution statistics (i.e. 
extent to which the result distribution changes with additional trials or iterations) (Palisade, 
2002).  The number of iterations required to produce stable results ultimately lies with the 
tolerance of the decision maker (Murphy et al. 2001). 
 
Of the reliability techniques discussed, RAM analysis is the most suited to cost collection 
over the operational life cycle.  Any event that triggers lost production and or necessitates 
intervention also incurs a financial cost.  As ‘conventional’ RAM analysis already simulates 
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these events for the purposes of calculating system availability and reliability metrics it is a 
natural progression to extend RAM analysis to simulate the cost of operations.  Indeed, many 
of the software package listed above include LCC modules while others can produce output 
files with sufficient data for post processing.   
 
5.7. Sensitivity/Importance Analysis  
Sensitivity or importance analysis is not usually conducted as singular analysis in isolation; 
instead, it is a technique often applied as a constituent part of the other analyses already 
mentioned.  This is because the analysis is usually deployed to determine the effect of the 
input variables on the output metrics.  The term importance usually refers to a ranking of the 
extent to which an individual component, basic event or cut sets contributes to the top event 
or system failure (Smith, 2001).  The conventional reliability importance measures, which are 
usually applied to FTA or RBD, are described below (Bedford and Cooke, 2001); 
1. The Fussel-Vesely importance of an item is the conditional probability that the item 
has failed given that the system has failed. 
2. The Barlow-Proscham importance of an item is the average number of system failures 
up to a specified time cause by that component failure. 
3. The Birnbaum importance of an item is the probability that item failure causes system 
failure. 
 
Sensitivity analysis has a boarder scope of application compared to importance analysis as it 
considers the effect of all input variables on the output (performance) metric.  Sensitivity to a 
variable can be presented as a regression or correlation co-efficient or graphically.   
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Sensitivity or importance analysis is the primary method for identifying the components that, 
if improved, could result in the greatest improvement in the overall system performance.  
Selection of an appropriate sensitivity or importance measure is important as conventional 
importance measures can be quite misleading.  For instance, the Barlow-Proschan importance 
of a component is the average number of system failures up to a point in time caused by the 
failure of the component in question.  This means that, for example, a frequent failure (e.g. 
one a week) of a topside component which causes shutdown for an hour at a time is more 
important than a subsea failure which occurs once a year but results in shutdown for two 
months.  In reality a subsea failure may have a greater impact on the system’s financial 
performance due to a prolonged reduction in the production capacity and the high cost of 
intervention.  Traditional reliability importance analyses are more suited to component level 
design whereas project life cycle cost based decision making requires risk based sensitivity 
analysis.  When considering a decision framework for adding to project value through 
reliability, sensitivity analysis provides a suitable platform for establishing potential benefit 
or even calculating a reliability budget. 
 
5.8. Traditional system reliability assessment criteria 
The tools and techniques discussed evaluate a component or system in terms of its ability to 
perform a function and the consequences should this ability cease.  At the component level, 
reliability and maintainability is normally the metric of choice.  At the system level 
availability is more appropriate as a function of the reliability and maintainability of the 
system’s component parts. 
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Reliability is defined as the probability that an item can perform a required function under 
given conditions for a given time interval (IEC 60050(191), 1990) and it usually calculated as 
a function of time and a hazard rate.  For a component that observes a constant hazard rate 
(i.e. random failures) the reliability, R, is calculated according to Equation 24, 
 
( )tR λ−= exp  Equation 24 
 
where λ is the hazard rate and t is the time.  For a component that observes a hazard rate that 
varies with time (i.e. early life failure or wear out failure) the reliability can be calculated 
according to a two parameter Weibull function according to Equation 25, 
 
( )βηtR −= exp  Equation 25 
 
where η is the characteristic life parameter and β is the characteristic shape parameter.  In 
practice Equation 24 and Equation 25 are of little immediate value in terms of life cycle 
performance as they just represent a survival probability over a specified time period.  That 
is, the equations only consider the probability of a single failure; in terms of operational 
performance, the failure pattern over the operation life is of more interest. These equations, 
however, are very important as the basis of generating the failure patterns required for 
discrete event time to failure simulations. 
 
The assumption that a component observes random failures is traditionally reserved for 
electrical components; mechanical equipment is more susceptible to wear out characterised 
by an increasing likelihood of failure as the service life increase.  However, the majority of 
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data provided for the offshore and subsea industries assume all data reflects a constant hazard 
rate when expert opinion may suggest otherwise. 
 
Maintainability is representative of the ease with which the system and be kept in or returned 
to the operational state.  Maintainability can be defined as the probability that a failed item is 
restored to the operational state within a given period of time when the repair action is 
performed with the prescribed procedure (Smith, 2001).  This definition, however, does not 
consider the ease with which a system is kept in the operational state.  As a metric, 
maintainability is often quoted in terms of the mean time to repair (MTTR).  The mean time 
to repair is usually reserved for the active repair time and does not necessarily consider the 
total downtime associated with a failure. 
 
Availability reflects the combined effect of reliability and maintainability on a system’s 
planned operational time and can be defined from a number of perspectives.  The formal 
definition of instantaneous availability of a component is the probability that the component 
is in a state to perform its required function under given condition at a given instant of time 
assuming the required external resources are provided (IEC 60050(191), 1990).  The steady-
state availability of a component, A, is calculated according to Equation 26,  
 
MTTRMUT
MUT
A
+
=  
Equation 26 
 
where MUT is the mean uptime (MUT=MTTF if the component operates continually) and 
MTTR is the mean time to repair.  That is, the steady state availability as defined as the ratio 
of uptime to total time (and unavailability is one minus the availability).   This equation 
123 
 
assumes a constant hazard rate and implies a constant production rate; steady state 
availability ignores the occurrence of early life and wear out failure and oil and gas 
production systems observe a dynamic (non-constant) production rate.  The alternative is the 
production availability, Ap, which is the ratio of actual production to planned production; this 
may be defined in terms of production volume, according to Equation 27, or time, according 
to Equation 28,   
 
p
a
pA φ
φ
=  
Equation 27 
MPTA
ETPLT
A −=1  
Equation 28 
 
where Фa is the actual produced volume, Фp is the planned produced volume, ETPLT is the 
equivalent total production loss time and MPTA is the maximum production time available.  
To accommodate partial failure resulting in degraded performance (i.e. reduced production 
capacity), the equivalent total production loss time converts the time in a state of reduced 
output to the equivalent time that the system is in the zero production state.  For example, 
suppose one of four subsea wells, all operating at full capacity, did not produce for one day 
(i.e. the system was operating at 75% capacity), the equivalent total production loss time is a 
quarter of a day (i.e. the losses associated with one well down for one day is equivalent to the 
losses of the entire system down for a quarter of a day).  Conversely, if there is spare capacity 
in the system that can accommodate failure, the equivalent total production loss time may be 
reduced.  Suppose the same four wells only operate at 75% maximum capacity and one does 
not produce for a day, if the remaining three wells could increases their capacity to 100% for 
that day then there is no lost production (i.e. output from four wells at 75% equals three wells 
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at 100% and hence the equivalent total production loss time is zero).  This introduces greater 
management flexibility by introducing the effect of operability into the availability metric. 
 
5.9. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the primary systems reliability analyses that can be employed as 
part of reliability and technical risk management.  Each analysis types observe strengths and 
weaknesses depending on it application.  Many of the weaknesses are mitigated through the 
joint application of analyses as synergies exist between analysis types.  This is clearly an 
important consideration when planning design for reliability activities. 
 
The most common tool is failure modes and effects (criticality) analysis, which serves a 
primary purpose of identifying and prioritising potential failure modes.  These failure modes 
may be identified through the construction of a reliability block diagram, which graphically 
represents the system reliability logic.  Criticality analysis, used to prioritise failure modes, 
ranks failure modes based on a risk priority number, which has been the subject of much 
criticism in the literature.  The RPN could be replaced by life cycle costs, the calculation of 
which requires RAM analysis to accurately capture the cost accumulation over the 
operational phase.  Replacing the RPN with LCC prioritises potential failure modes based on 
cost accumulation, with sensitivity analysis used to identify where potential improvements to 
project value could be made.  Having prioritised these failure modes, FMECA is not suited to 
identifying the root cause of the failure modes; this weakness of FMECA is mitigated through 
the application of fault tree analysis, which identifies the failure logic for unacceptable failure 
modes.   
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Of the tools/techniques reviewed, event tree analysis does not feature within the synergies 
discussed above.  That is not to say it is unimportant.   Event trees are beneficial as they can 
be used to determine the value of information and control.  As the purpose of reliability 
analyses is to acquire information, event trees could play an important part in the planning 
process.  The value of control and information are discussed here with the aid of a 
hypothetical decision scenario. 
  
Value from control is generated through actively influencing the outcome of an event (de 
Klerk, 2001).  Consider a decision (Figure 5-3) were a risk neutral decision maker can choose 
to invest in improved reliability by introducing redundancy; there is an incentive payment of 
£300,000 should the project succeed, it is assumed that the penalty for failure does not 
differentiate the decision.  Suppose the probability of project success, with no extra reliability 
effort, is P=0.607 then the expected value of accepting the base case reliability is 
approximately £182,000.  If it is assumed that the introduction of redundancy to the system, 
at the cost of £60,000, can increase the probability of project success to P=0.845 then the 
expected value from investing £60,000 to introduce redundancy is approximately £193,600.  
The value of controlling the reliability of the system is worth (£193,600 - £182,000) £11,600 
to the risk neutral decision maker. 
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Figure 5-3: Simple reliability investment decision. 
 
The value of information is defined as the worth to a decision maker of having information 
relating to the outcome of an uncertain event (de Klerk, 2001).  Expanding the decision 
described in Figure 5-3, suppose the decision maker is uncertain as to the reliability of the 
component parts of the system; depending on the supplier (over which the decision maker has 
no prior knowledge) the component observes a relatively high reliability or a relatively low 
reliability.  The component characterised by relatively low reliability observes a probability 
of P=0.607 that it will survive the mission while the component characterised by relatively 
high probability observes a probability of P=0.779 that it will survive the mission.  Prior to 
knowing if the component parts of the system are of relatively high or low reliability, the 
decision maker has to choose whether or not to accept the base case reliability or introduce 
redundancy, at a cost of £60,000, and improve the system reliability performance.  A rational 
risk based decision maker would choose to invest in the redundant system, observing an 
expected value of £209,400 (Figure 5-4).  If the decision maker was furnished with perfect 
information regarding the reliability of the components prior to deciding whether or not to 
invest in reliability then the decision would change; Figure 5-5 indicates that if it was known 
with certainty that the component reliability was relatively high, then the risk neutral decision 
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maker would opt for the base case series system.  If, however, the component reliability was 
relatively low then the decision maker’s preference is for the parallel system.  The expected 
value of this decision under perfect information is approximately £213,600.   
 
The value of perfect information is the difference between the decision with perfect 
information and the decision under uncertainty.  In this case, the value of perfect information 
is £213,600 - £209,400 = £4,200 and the decision maker should pay not more than £4,200 to 
acquire the information relating to the reliability of the components.  In reality it is unlikely 
that perfect information can be acquired; and thus the value of imperfect information is of 
more immediate interest.  The expected value of imperfect information is the expected payoff 
with imperfect information less the expected payoff under uncertainty (Mian, 2002). 
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Figure 5-4: Expanded decision with uncertain component reliability. 
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Figure 5-5: Figure 5-4 decision with perfect information. 
 
The example in Figure 5-4 indicates a decision under uncertainty regarding the selection of a 
system layout given a prior perception of the component reliability; perfect information 
(Figure 5-5) indicates that if the component reliability is relatively high, then a series system 
is preferable but if the component reliability is comparatively low a parallel structure is 
preferable.  Given the uncertainty about the component reliability a risk neutral decision 
maker maximises the expected value by choosing the parallel system layout. 
 
Suppose the decision maker is given the option to test the components in order to gain better 
clarity of the reliability; how much should be paid for this information?  Reliability engineers 
estimate that the conditional probability of passing the test given that the component has a 
high reliability is P(Pass|RHigh) = 0.85 and that the conditional probability of passing the test 
given that the component has a low reliability is P(Pass|RLow) =  0.1.   Assuming complete 
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uncertainty about the prior probability of the component’s reliability, the total probability of 
passing the reliability test is the sum of the joint probabilities of the prior probability of the 
component’s reliability and the conditional probability of passing the test (Equation 29).   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )5.0*85.05.0*1.0475.0
..
+=
+= HighHighLowLow RPRPassPRPRPassPPassP
 Equation 29 
 
Similarly, the total probability of failing the test is calculated according to Equation 30, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )5.0*15.05.0*9.0525.0
..
+=
+= HighHighLowLow RPRFailPRPRFailPFailP
 Equation 30 
 
where P(Fail|RLow) is the conditional probability that the test is failed given a low reliability 
component and P(Pass|RHigh) is the conditional probability that the test is failed given a high 
reliability component. 
 
The conditional probability, P(Ai|B), of a prior probability, P(Ai), given the result, B,  of an 
event is updated according to Bayes formula (Equation 31), 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )∑
=
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Equation 31 
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where ( ) ( )∑
=
n
i
ii APABP
1
.  is the total probability of the result of an event.  For example, the 
probability of the component being of high reliability given that the test has been passed is 
updated according to Equation 32. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )LowLowHighHigh
HighHigh
High
RPRPassPRPRPassP
RPRPassP
PassRP
..
.
+
=  Equation 32 
 
The updated probabilities of the component reliability given the result of the test are shown in 
Figure 5-6.  Note that the system layout decision changes depending on the outcome of the 
test; if the test is failed then the decision favours the parallel layout, if the test is passed then 
the series layout is preferred.  
 
Figure 5-6 indicates that the risk neutral decision maker observes an expected value of 
£209,400 if the decision to test the reliability is not made.  If the decision maker chooses to 
test the reliability, at no cost, than the expected value increased to £212,400.  The difference 
£212,400 - £209,400 ≈ £3,000 is the value of imperfect information, in this case, offered by 
testing the component reliability.  That is, the decision maker should reject the decision to 
test if it costs more than £3,000. 
 
 
131 
 
77.9% 0.330990333
300 300
89.5% Project result
233.6402349
22.1% 0.094009667
0 0
TRUE Component reliability
0 228.2001258
60.7% 0.030326533
300 300
10.5% Project result
181.9591979
39.3% 0.019673467
0 0
47.5% Layout
0 228.2001258
95.1% 0
300 240
89.5% Project result
225.3212719
4.9% 0
0 -60
FALSE Component reliability
-60 221.9774079
84.5% 0
300 240
10.5% Project result
193.5545635
15.5% 0
0 -60
TRUE Test result
0 212.3937087
77.9% 0
300 300
14.3% Project result
233.6402349
22.1% 0
0 0
FALSE Component reliability
0 189.3422032
60.7% 0
300 300
85.7% Project result
181.9591979
39.3% 0
0 0
52.5% Layout
0 198.0926647
95.1% 0.071330318
300 240
14.3% Project result
225.3212719
4.9% 0.003669682
0 -60
TRUE Component reliability
-60 198.0926647
84.5% 0.380331845
300 240
85.7% Project result
193.5545635
15.5% 0.069668155
0 -60
Analyse reliability
212.3937087
FALSE 0
209.4379177 209.4379177
Value of imperfect information
Yes
No
Passed
Failed
Series
Parallel
High
Low
High
Low
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Series
Parallel
High
Low
High
Low
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
 
Figure 5-6: Value of imperfect information (no analysis payoff is payoff from Figure 5-4). 
   
The example above demonstrates how reliability analyses can generate financial value 
through the provision of information.  However, this value can only be realised if the analysis 
has the ability to alter a decision.   The selection and planning on these analyses, therefore, 
should be based on the perception that any information provided by analyses could alter the 
current approach to reliability and technical risk management based on potential results and 
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the timely acquisition of data.  Any planning tool should take these issues into consideration.  
In terms of a life cycle costing model, analyses accumulate cost within the CAPEX cost 
driver but may reduce cost accumulation in the OPEX cost driver.  Their influence, therefore, 
must be made transparent during the planning process and as such a decision making process 
should indicate the potential cost benefit of performing such analysis.  That is the planning 
process is both risk based in terms of the inherent technical risk within the project and the 
risk that the analysis does not generate value added information.  The following chapter 
discusses the application of economics of reliability models to support the decision making 
process. 
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6. Economics of Reliability 
6.1. Introduction 
Product design and micro-economics share a common goal of achieving a competitive 
advantage.  However, the methods by which they can be achieved are often opposed; it does 
not follow that the best product satisfies the economic goal of cost minimisation (Noble and 
Tanchoco, 1990).  Therefore, the life cycle cost is often presented in terms of a key 
performance metric with the intent to assess the optimum cost-performance.  The 
development of an economics of ‘X’ model can facilitate the identification of key cost driver 
elements and provide the basis for a cost-performance improvement process.  The economics 
of quality (EOQ) has received significantly more attention in the literature compared to other 
economics of ‘X’ models.  Naturally these economics of quality models provide a reference 
point for other economics of ‘X’ models to be developed through analogy.  
 
Many different approaches to modelling the cost of quality have been proposed in the 
literature (Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996).  Of the models proposed, variants of the prevention, 
appraisal and failure (Feigenbaum, 1956) model have received the most attention; Plunkett 
and Dale (1988a) provide a thorough critique of the numerous models that have been 
developed between 1963 and 1986, during which time this area received substantial attention.  
The authors concluded that many of the models were inaccurate despite there being sufficient 
collective knowledge to propose a reasonable hypothesis (Plunkett and Dale, 1988a) of the 
behaviour of cost as a function of quality. 
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Despite the proposal of a large number of theoretical models, there has been a lack of 
empirical studies presented in the literature (Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996).  Difficulty exists 
in distinguishing and costing quality specific activities from good/essential engineering 
practice (Plunkett and Dale, 1988b).  This problem is often attributed to the ambiguous 
definition of cost parameters (Chen and Tang, 1992).  Furthermore, there is a pre-occupation 
with in-house costs (often excluding supplier’s costs) that can become distorted due to the 
incorrect allocation of overheads (Plunkett and Dale, 1988b).  In addition, Anderson and 
Sedatole (1998) argue that quality cost management is restricted by the focus on the 
capability of the manufacturing processes to consistently conform to the design specification 
rather than capability of the product’s design specification to meet the needs and expectations 
of the customer.  This chapter reviews the prevention, appraisal and failure (PAF) economics 
of quality models, their analogous development for design for reliability and their use as a 
decision support tool. 
 
6.2. Prevention, Appraisal and Failure Model 
The PAF model defines the total cost of quality as the sum of the cost of prevention, appraisal 
and failure.  Although adopting a variety of meanings, quality costs are defined as those costs 
associated with poor quality (Gryna, 1999).   
 
Prevention costs are the costs incurred in preventing shortfalls against specification from 
occurring (Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996).  That is, prevention costs are those costs incurred to 
keep failure and appraisal costs at a minimum (Gryna, 1999).  Prevention costs include 
design analyses such as FMEA and HAZOP studies (Johnson, 1995). 
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Appraisal costs are incurred when implementing a system with the intent of detecting non-
conformances as soon as they occur (Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996) and determining the 
degree of the conformance to the quality requirement (Gryna, 1999).  These costs include 
activities such as inspection and testing (Johnson, 1995; Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996; Gryna, 
1999). 
 
Failure costs are broken down into two sub-categories; internal and external failure.  Internal 
failure costs are those resulting from a product failing to meet requirements before reaching 
the customer (Gryna, 1999), including; scrap, reworking and redesign (Johnson, 1995).  
External failures occur after delivery to the customer (Gryna, 1999); that is, they have 
avoided prevention and appraisal (Hwang and Aspinwall, 1996).  Costs associated with 
external failures include warranties and loss of customer goodwill and revenue (Johnson, 
1995). 
 
6.2.1. Competing views of the economics of quality 
There are two competing views regarding the economics of quality; the traditional acceptable 
quality level proposed by Juran and Taguchi and the more recent zero defects view of 
Schneiderman and Crosby (Love et al. 1995).  The acceptable quality level model states that 
there exists an optimum amount of quality effort (and hence an acceptable quality level) that 
minimises the combined costs of prevention, appraisal and failure (Figure 6-1, Weheba and 
Elshennawy, 2004).  This model has come under criticism from advocates of total quality 
management who argue that adoption of the optimum quality model means accepting of the 
inevitability of failure (Slack et al. 2004).  The more recent view is that the optimum quality 
level occurs at 100% quality and that higher quality costs less (Figure 6-2, Weheba and 
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Elshennawy, 2004).  This paradigm shift has evolved from increasingly automated processes 
which have made zero defects economically viable (Yasin et al. 1999). 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Traditional economics of quality model (Weheba and Elshennawy, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Zero defect economics of quality model (Weheba and Elshennawy, 2004). 
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6.3. Economics of reliability 
The relationship between quality and reliability provides a basis for the development of an 
economics of reliability model through analogy with the EOQ model.  O’Conner (2002) has 
extended the zero defect model to suggest that cost minimum occurs at the 100% 
reliability/quality level due to under-estimations in the cost of failure.  In accordance with the 
zero defect philosophy, O’Conner argues that the total cost will decline as the reliability of a 
product increases to perfection.  Other literature (Lakner and Anderson, 1985; Smith, 2001; 
BS 5670-4, 2003; Hecht, 2004) suggests that there exists an optimum cost-reliability (Figure 
6-3), where the marginal increase in the cost to improve reliability equals the marginal saving 
in the cost of failure (IEC 60300-3-3, 2004).  The economics of reliability models, however, 
differ from the EOQ models as the cost elements are not defined as parts of prevention, 
appraisal and failure cost drivers.  Instead, the economics of reliability models tend to follow 
the life cycle cost drivers due to the concurrent development with life cycle costing. 
 
 
Figure 6-3: Optimal economics of reliability model (BS 5670-4, 2003). 
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6.3.1. The relationship of quality to reliability  
The development of an economics of reliability model through the extension of EOQ models 
has a number of conceptual difficulties, some of which can be attributed to the vague 
relationship between quality and reliability.  Reliability is often defined as the continuation of 
quality over time (Levin and Kalal, 2003) and quality defined as the degree to which a set of 
inherent characteristics fulfils requirements (ISO 9000, 2005).  ISO 9000 also defines 
reliability as a temporal quality characteristic (ISO 9000, 2005), suggesting that equipment 
has to demonstrate reliability to achieve a level of quality.   
 
More correctly, reliability is defined as the probability that an item can perform a required 
function under given conditions for a given time interval (IEC 60050(191), 1990).  While the 
implementation of reliability concepts, models and strategies may benefit from showing a 
strong affinity with the well established field of quality assurance and management it is 
important that oversimplifying the relationship between reliability and quality does not 
devalue their synergy. 
 
Consider, for example, a normally distributed component strength and operational stress, the 
reliability index, β, is determined from Equation 33, 
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Equation 33 
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where µS and µL are the respective mean strength and mean operational stress and σS and σL 
are the standard deviations of the strength and stress, respectively.  The reliability on demand, 
R, is determined from R=Ф(β), where Ф(•) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution.  Suppose a quality system exists that can deliver a component 
whose strength is known with certainty (i.e. zero defects).  Then the reliability is determined 
from Equation 34, 
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Equation 34 
 
where β* is the reliability index when the strength is known with certainty.  Although β* 
corresponds to increased reliability it is still not 100% because of the uncertainty associated 
with the load.  Designers rarely know the operational loads with certainty and as such the 
reliability will always be less than 100% even with zero defects.  Reliability is designed into 
a component or system.  Quality management can only ensure that the design reliability is 
achieved.  If the reliability is incorrectly specified during the design phase, then quality 
management can only serve to guarantee poor reliability. 
 
Conversely, consider a system that utilises standby redundancy and suppose that the supplier 
of the switching mechanism does not implement a quality control system.  The poor quality 
of the switching mechanism will only be exposed when the primary component fails 
requiring the redundant component to function.  If the reliability of the primary component is 
such that the redundant component is not required during the mission time then the reliability 
of the primary component has masked the poor quality of the switching mechanism.  That is 
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the complete system has defects but the reliability of primary function could render this lack 
of total quality (zero defects) inconsequential.   
 
6.3.2. Competing reliability functions reduce system reliability 
Within a system there are often competing reliability functions as a result of technical 
practicality or mandatory requirements.  ISO 13628-4 (1999) states that a subsea production 
tree requires at least one production master valve which operates on a failsafe closed basis.    
This requirement introduces a mechanism for the flow of hydrocarbons to be blocked.  Table 
6-1 (Modified from Rausand and Øien, 1996) indicates the functions and failure modes of a 
process shutdown valve.  Introducing the function ‘keep flow path open’ introduces the 
potential failure mode ‘flow path closes’.  Unless the reliability of the keep flow path open 
function is unity then the mandatory inclusion of a production master valve reduces the 
system’s ability to maintain the flow of hydrocarbons over the specified field life. 
 
Table 6-1: Functions and respective failure modes of a process shutdown valve (Modified from Rausand and 
Øien, 1996). 
Function Failure mode 
Not closing at all 
Not closing completely 
Closing too slowly 
Closing too fast 
Close flow path on 
demand 
Improper operation 
Keep flow path closed Opening spuriously 
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Function Failure mode 
 Internal leakage 
 External leakage 
Not opening at all 
Not opening completely 
Opening too slowly 
Opening to fast 
Open flow path on 
demand 
Improper operation 
Keep flow path open Closing spuriously 
 External leakage 
 Plugged 
 
Another example for a subsea system might be through the inclusion of a high integrity 
pressure protection system (HIPPS).  HIPPS are usually required when a new field 
development is tying into an existing processing facility whose pressure rating is below peak 
pressure spikes expected from the newly exploited reservoir.  If the HIPPS records a 
specified high pressure then a safety shutdown valve is closed, halting the flow of 
hydrocarbons.  As safety critical equipment, the ability of a HIPPS to function on demand is 
paramount and as such comprises more than one shutdown valve.  If it is assumed that the 
HIPPS has two shutdown valves then the reliability block diagram logically arranges these 
valves in parallel for the shutdown on command function; both valves would have to fail to 
close on command for the HIPPS to fail to close on demand.  As a further safety measure, 
shutdown valve are design to fail safe in the closed position.  This introduces a failure mode 
that, should it occur, would cause the system’s production function to fail.    It follows that if 
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only one valve is required to stop production on demand, then only one valve failing closed 
will halt production.  The reliability block diagram, therefore, logically arranges these valves 
in series for the system’s production function, reducing the reliability.  Clearly the trade-off 
between safety measures and production reliability must be balanced, but the reliability of 
safety critical equipment takes priority.  It is this priority that can potentially compromise the 
maximum reliability achievable for the system’s revenue generating function. 
 
6.3.3. Reliability growth function 
Economics of reliability models do not differentiate between failures caused by residual and 
systematic weakness.  Reliability growth models presented in the literature make a clear 
differentiation between failures caused by residual and systematic weakness (Walls et al. 
2005).  Systematic failures are a result of weaknesses in the system relating to inefficiencies 
in the product design and development process such as; product design, component selection 
and the manufacturing process (IEC 61014, 2003).  These inefficiencies manifest as service 
life failures given exposure of the systematic weakness to particular conditions.  Two 
examples of systematic failures in the subsea oil and gas industry have been listed in the 
SIREN database: 
• A flowline was connected to the wrong valve due to incorrect correlation between the 
design drawings and the underwater identification markers on the hardware.  As a 
result, when the valve supposedly connected to the flowline was opened, there was no 
oil on start-up (SIREN, 1995).   
• The second example features a cathodic protection system designed for an ambient 
temperature of 4°C but the temperature measured on location was 70°C which 
resulted in accelerated wastage of the anodes (SIREN, 1999). 
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In both examples, the (near) failure occurred as a result of exposing the systematic weakness 
to certain conditions.  In the first example the inefficiency in correlating the design and 
hardware markings was exposed when the open valve command resulted in the realisation of 
failure (i.e. there was no oil on start-up).  In the second example, exposing the cathodic 
protection system to a greater operational temperature resulted in an accelerated failure 
mechanism.  In contrast, wear out or random failures can occur as a result of residual 
weaknesses in the system.  Residual weaknesses left in the system are due to the uncontrolled 
random variation of the system’s constituent parts (IEC 61014, 2003) and the uncontrollable 
random variation in the operating stresses. 
 
6.3.4. The relationship of reliability to maintainability 
Although the economics of reliability models include maintenance costs, the cost reliability 
curves do not necessarily reflect the relationship between reliability and maintenance cost.  
Some economics of reliability models (Figure 6-3) imply that the maintenance costs only 
reduce as a function of reliability.  While this implication can be true as improved reliability 
reduces the demand for maintenance, reliability can be improved at the cost of 
maintainability.  Consider a system designed with a slot-modular architecture (Ulrich and 
Eppinger, 2000) where each functional component in the system is attached to a host with a 
specific interface.  Any component can be changed out independently given failure without 
the need to replace the entire system.  System reliability could be improved removing these 
interfaces and adopting an integrated design.   However, the ability to replace individual 
functional components is lost (or at least greatly reduced) and the maintainability decreases, 
potentially increasing the cost per maintenance demand (and hence OPEX). 
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Combining life cycle cost and system availability performance acknowledges the trade-off 
relationship between the availability growth factors (reliability and maintainability) and life 
cycle cost (Hwang, 2005).     
 
Figure 6-4: Optimal economics of system availability (Goble and Tucker, 1993). 
 
Goble and Tucker (1993) propose an economics of availability model (Figure 6-4) where 
incident cost, CINCIDENT, (part of the total operating cost) is determined according to Equation 
35, 
 
( )UCC LPRL +=INCIDENTC  Equation 35 
 
where CRL is the repair labour cost per unit time, CLP is the cost of lost production per unit 
time and U is the system unavailability.  Equation 35 indicates that the conditional loss for a 
failure event is determined from the cost rates (CRL and CLP) and the duration over which the 
cost rates are incurred.  By defining the system performance as a function of MTTR and 
MTTF, the economics of availability model allows more scope for cost reduction through 
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both maintainability and reliability.  This OPEX model is only applicable to individual 
components or simple systems.  It is too much of a simplification to assume that, for complex 
systems, CINCIDENT observes a linear relationship with unavailability.  However, availability 
provides a better indication of the system’s ability to generate revenue compared with 
reliability (or quality
4
), which is not explicitly considered otherwise. Although reliability is of 
fundamental interest, ultimately it is the availability of a system that is critical to the 
economic performance of the facility (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1998). 
 
6.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the PAF economics of quality models that have 
spawned the analogous development of economics of reliability and availability models, due 
to the close relationship between reliability and quality.  The economics of quality models 
have been criticised in the literature due to the inability to construct an accurate cost of 
quality model despite a wealth of data.  One of the primary reasons for this is the difficulty in 
distinguishing quality management applications from what is otherwise considered good 
engineering practice; this is a significant reason for rejecting similar applications to reliability 
and technical risk management.  Many of the systems reliability analysis techniques 
discussed in Chapter 5 (such as FMEA) are already considered within economics of quality 
models and cannot necessarily be singled out for inclusion in an economics of reliability 
model.  This is actually beneficial when considering the ability of reliability analyses to 
generate project value.   
 
                                                 
4
 Deming (2000) argues that increased availability is implied with increased quality as increased quality means 
less reworking, which leads to greater productivity and hence improved availability. 
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Firstly, if analyses are already considered part of good engineering practice, then the cost to 
perform the analyses can be split across project functions already employing them.  The 
potential value generated from analysis increases by effectively reducing the associated 
implementation cost.  Chapter 5 concluded by demonstrating the relative value of perfect and 
imperfect information; imperfect information is worth less to a decision maker than perfect 
information.  As analyses can only provide imperfect information to the decision making 
process, reducing the implementation cost increases probability that the analysis will add 
value. 
 
Secondly, it is not the intention of reliability and technical risk management to isolate the 
reliability function.  Isolating the reliability function only serves to introduce barriers to 
implementation and increase scepticism of analysis output.  Reliability should be considered 
part of best engineering practice and managed through decentralised decision making across 
all project functions.   
 
While this is perhaps the most significant reason for rejecting an economics of ‘X’ approach 
to reliability and technical risk management, the graphical presentation is also problematic as 
it does not truly reflect the decision making scenario of certain expenditure traded off against 
uncertain cost or value improvement.  The economics of ‘X’ models provide a point estimate 
of cost for all levels of performance, revealing no uncertainty about the cost performance.  As 
the models do not state otherwise it is assumed that they represent the expected value.   
 
The inapplicability of the expected value has been discussed by Todinov (2006a) with the use 
of simple counter examples.  To counter the possible risks in decision making based on the 
expected value criterion, Todinov (2003) introduced the concept of potential losses, which 
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expresses the distribution function of the consequences of failure and its variance.  By 
generating a distribution of the losses, the decision maker is furnished with a broader view of 
what could happen rather than being constrained to the view of what is expected to happen.  
Potential losses describe the distribution of the consequences of failure and acknowledge that 
for a system of any given reliability there is uncertainty about the related cost of operation.  It 
should be noted that there is also uncertainty about reliability performance and the stochastic 
nature of the cost during operation is exacerbated by the uncertainty of the input data. 
 
A final issue relating to the inapplicability of the economics of ‘X’ models to the decision 
scenario is that decisions made during system design are normally comparisons of discrete 
options, rather than attempting to optimise across a continuum.  For example, during concept 
selection, a number of bespoke system designs may be considered that cannot be rationalised 
within a single economics of reliability model.  The implication that life cycle cost follows a 
continuum can only be reserved for individual components or simple systems and even then, 
reliability growth may be discrete rather than continuous (i.e. adding redundancy causes a 
step change in the reliability). 
 
The rejection of economics of ‘X’ models is not to say that a guiding decision making criteria 
is unimportant or unnecessary.  The decentralised decision making approach to reliability and 
technical risk management advocated here needs a central decision making framework in 
order to ensure consistent decision making and avoid conflicts of interest.  The following 
chapter proposes a decision making framework to guide decentralised decision making. 
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7. Proposition of a Potential Value Framework 
7.1. Introduction 
This research has considered the need for a framework that can provide evidence to decision 
makers, early in the design decision making process, of the value of investing time and 
management effort in design for reliability activities during the design life cycle.  A review of 
relevant literature has focused on concepts of life cycle costing and economics of ‘X’.  In 
reviewing this literature no application was identified that explicitly relate to the use of life 
cycle costing or economics of ‘X’ to justify reliability analyses, which is fundamental to the 
application of reliability and technical risk management strategies proposed in API RP 17N 
(2007) and ISO 20815 (2007).  However, the literature has identified many important aspects 
to be considered when constructing a support framework for planning reliability analyses.  
Along with the basic requirements established as part of the research objective, the features 
(as identified from the literature) that should be included within the framework are as 
follows: 
• Support the implementation of a reliability and technical risk management strategy 
such as that proposed in API RP 17N; 
• The ability to support the planning process; 
• Links decisions in design to operational performance; 
• Support discrete option comparison decisions; 
• Consider both systematic and residual weakness (i.e. incorporate a reliability growth 
model); 
• Assume the prior existence of systematic weakness; 
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• Consider the ability with which weaknesses are mitigated; 
• Reflects uncertainty in cash flow (OPEX) performance; 
• Be able to identify value improvement opportunities; 
• Have the ability to allocate budgets for reliability improvement; 
• Assess multiple investments in reliability improvement; and 
• Support decentralised decision making. 
 
This chapter constructs a reliability value framework to address this need.  The framework 
defines a potential reliability value index employed as the overriding decision metric and 
generates a breakdown structure to support the decision making process. 
   
7.2. The reliability value index 
Functional value can be defined as a measure of the cost required to supply the desired 
function (Park, 1999) and can be measured according to Equation 36 (Dejmek and Ford, 
1997). 
 
Cost
eperformanc Functional
Value =  Equation 36 
 
Assuming a baseline functional performance, P, is achieved at cost, K, then the decision to 
invest in reliability analyses at cost, Q, is guided by the inequality in Equation 37, 
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where P
*
 is the system performance measure after implementing the analysis and K
*
 is the 
resultant life cycle cost (excluding Q).  If system performance is measured in terms of the 
change in service life cash flow, then the reliability activity adds value to a project when the 
inequality in Equation 38 is satisfied, 
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where Q is the implementation cost for the reliability improvement activity, ∆CFn is the 
change in cash flow in the n
th
 year as a result of implementing the reliability analysis and r is 
the discount rate.  Defining ∆CF(strategy)=
∑
=
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lifen
n
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1 )1(  as the present value of the relevant 
cash flow as a result of a reliability investment, Q, then the reliability effort investment 
criterion is to invest when the reliability value index, RVI, satisfies the inequality in Equation 
39. 
 
1/)( >∆= QstrategyCFRVI  Equation 39 
 
There is a clearly a range of potential outcomes for RVI depending on how ∆CF(strategy) is 
influenced by the analysis; the intervals of particular note are outlined below: 
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• RVI > 1.  The investment decision criterion has been satisfied and the improvement to 
the resultant cash flow is greater than the cost required to implement analysis.  The 
investment in reliability effort should be made. 
• RVI = 1.  The cost to implement the reliability analysis is exactly equal to the present 
cost of the resultant cash flow. 
• 1 > RVI > 0.  The result cash flow is better than the baseline condition but the 
improvements are not justifiable at the cost of the analysis.   
• RVI = 0.  The resultant cash flow is no different to that of the baseline option and 
hence analysis is not influencing the decision making process. 
• RVI < 0.  The resultant cash flow is less than that observed from the original system.  
In this case the reliability improvement may be seen as forgoing greater value by 
implementing the strategy and the project value and should not be undertaken. 
 
While the RVI metric is equivalent to the profitability index, its application to justify the 
implementation of reliability analysis has not been considered previously in the literature.  
The adaptation of the PI to form RVI considers the initial investment to be that of the 
reliability analysis, which is traded off against the resultant life cycle cash flow.  Its analogy 
to the PI also means that RVI can be used to rank reliability analyses where projects have 
budgetary constraints.   
 
7.2.1. Potential reliability value index 
One of the highlighted shortfalls of the economics of ‘X’ model was the implied use of the 
expected value criterion.  For non-repetitive decisions such as those observed during subsea 
development projects, the decision made is often not that of the expected value criterion 
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(Benedikt, 1993).  This can be resolved by implementing a utility function.  However, many 
decision makers are reluctant to use such decision analysis due to the information required to 
define the utility function (Moskowitz et al. 1993).  The solution proposed here is to 
incorporate the concept of potential losses (Todinov, 2003) into the reliability value index. 
 
The profitability index provides an indication of the margin of safety for an investment 
(Myddleton, 2000).  It follows that the reliability value index also indicates the margin of 
safety for the reliability investment; however, this is only implied as the probability that the 
reliability value index satisfies the investment criteria is dependent on the distribution 
function of the reliability value index.  In analogy with potential losses, the potential 
reliability value index describes the distribution function of the reliability value index 
(Equation 39) and its variance.  By presenting the distribution of the component parts of the 
reliability value index, the probability with which the reliability investment satisfies the 
reliability value index decision criterion can be calculated using the stress strength 
interference model.  Assuming a normal distribution for the investment cost and potential 
cost savings, adapting Equation 34 to the cost items defined in Equation 39 gives Equation 
40, 
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where βRVI is the safety margin for the reliability investment, ( )strategyCF∆  is the mean 
change in operational cash flow as a result of the mean analysis investment, Q ; ( )strategyCF∆σ  is 
the standard deviation of the change in operational cash flow and σQ is the standard deviation 
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of the reliability analysis investment.  In reality it is likely that the cost to perform analysis is 
known with certainty and thus Equation 40 simplifies to Equation 41. 
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β  Equation 41 
 
The probability that the reliability value index satisfies the investment criteria P(RVI > 1) = 
Ф(βRVI), where Ф(•) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution.   
 
7.3. RVI model 
Adopting the approach taken to model life cycle cost, the reliability value index is logically 
decomposed into RVI drivers and elements.  A generic reliability value index breakdown 
structure is presented in Figure 7-1.  The RVI breakdown structure adopts the same cost 
elements of failure mode identification and mitigation to differentiate the decision 
alternatives but applies them to all major RVI elements (CAPEX, OPEX and Revenue).  As 
with other reliability growth models (Quigley and Walls, 2003), the prior existence of faults 
and or potentially unwanted failure modes is assumed and hence this cost element is 
excluded. 
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Figure 7-1: Reliability value index breakdown structure. 
 
In accordance with Equation 39, the reliability value index is constructed from the cost to 
implement reliability analyses and the resultant cash flow.  The resultant cash flow is 
subsequently decomposed into CAPEX, OPEX and Revenue.  The relevant cost associated 
with CAPEX is the design response to the analysis only (failure mode mitigation).  Note that 
fault or failure mode identification is not considered a cost element of CAPEX as it is 
assumed that faults/failure modes are identified as a result of analysis.  Any subsequent 
discovery of the failure modes during design would be purely fortuitous and it does not seem 
logical that supposed risk averse decision makers would factor in such chance events into a 
decision making process.  As such it is assumed that faults or potentially unwanted failure 
modes escape the design process unless there is concerted effort to find them.   
 
The cost of operations is presented as OPEX and revenue, both of which are affected by 
failure mode identification and mitigation.  OPEX costs for failure mode identification 
include those costs relating to inspection and diagnosis.  Failure mode mitigation costs are 
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those costs required to return an item, known to have failed, to the operational state.  Revenue 
is constructed from the deferred or lost revenue observed during failure mode identification 
and mitigation.  The remaining sections of this chapter define how each of these elements is 
estimated. 
 
7.3.1. Cost to implement analysis 
Reliability analyses should be deployed to influence design decisions.  This is usually 
achieved through the identification of design weakness, which is considered either systematic 
or residual.  Analysis, therefore, should be selected to identify systematic or residual 
weakness based on a prior assumption that these weaknesses exist.  API RP 17N (2007), 
through application of technical risk categorisation identifies four potential sources of 
systematic weakness; technology, environment, architecture and organization.  The reliability 
stretch factor may be considered in relation to the target residual weakness.  If it assumed that 
these (five) weakness sources can be characterised by a hazard rate then, assuming that all 
hazard rates are mutually exclusive, the overall hazard rate of an item can be defined as the 
sum of the individual residual and systematic hazard rates according to Equation 42, 
 
OEATRitem λλλλλλ ++++=  Equation 42 
 
where λR is the target residual hazard rate that reflects the reliability goal or requirement and 
λT, λA, λE and λO are the systematic hazard rates attributed to technology, architecture, 
environment and organization, respectively.   
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If it is assumed that there are five hazard rates then it follows that there are five potential 
focal points of any reliability analysis performed.  As with the CAPEX driver, it is assumed 
that failure modes relating to a specific source of weakness can only be identified if the 
analysis is examining issues relating to those potential sources of weakness.  For example, 
recall the SIREN case of rapid anode wastage, failures relating to environmental loads and 
stresses can only be identified if the environment is being considered as a potential source of 
weakness.  In addition, it cannot be assumed that directing attention to a specific source of 
weakness guarantees the provision of sufficient information to allow mitigating activities.  
There exists some probability that despite investing in reliability analyses, the fault or 
unwanted failure mode remains undetected; this probability depends on the ‘detectability’ of 
the failure mode and the duration over which the source of weakness is analysed.  Finally it is 
logical to assume that there exist diminishing returns on the probability of detection versus 
time invested.  A simple model satisfying the above criteria is provided in Equation 43, 
 
( )iiidentify tP λλγ−−= exp1  Equation 43 
 
where Pidentify is the probability with which the failure mode is detected, γλi is a measure of the 
detectability, measured in units of inverse time over the range (0,∞], of the i
th
 potential source 
of weakness and tλi is the duration of the respective reliability analysis.  It follows therefore 
that the analyses should be selected based on the perceived presence and detectability of a 
given source of weakness. 
 
157 
 
The cost of performing reliability analysis, CRA, is a function of the time spent analysing each 
potential source of weakness and the cost rate of the person or persons performing the 
analysis, according to Equation 44, 
 
OOEEAATTRRRA CtCtCtCtCtC λλλλλλλλλλ .... ++++=  Equation 44 
 
where Cλi is the cost per unit time of the assessment of the i
th
 failure type and tλi is the 
duration of the assessments of the i
th
 failure type. 
 
7.3.2. Cost of failure mode mitigation 
The CAPEX response to failure mode identification is treated differently depending on the 
specific response to the analysis.  If it is assumed that some mitigating action occurs then the 
design response to reliability analysis is either system reconfiguration or reliability growth (or 
a combination of the two).  System reconfiguration may be considered to include introducing 
redundancy or selecting a different technology to achieve the same function, whereas 
reliability growth influences the hazard rate of the existing component parts of the system.   
 
System configuration is achieved through changing the system reliability logic or changing 
the technology required to achieve same function.  Changes to the system reliability logic 
include such design decisions as introducing redundancy with no attempt to influence the 
residual or systematic weaknesses of the component technology.  The resultant cost 
accumulation is the cost differential required to implement that change (i.e. the cost to add a 
redundant component or procure alternate technology) and the resultant system reliability is 
defined according to the updated reliability block diagram. 
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Reliability growth models have been developed to support the management of reliability 
effort during reliability growth programmes by estimating the number and magnitude of 
product reiterations required during design and development to achieve a specific reliability 
target (Krasich et al. 2004).  IEC 61164 (2004) details the Modified Bayesian IBM-Rosner 
model (Quigley and Walls, 1999) and the Modified Power Law model for planning reliability 
growth in design.  Although the models more readily applied to product development and 
reliability growth through testing, they are applicable to reliability growth through design as 
it is still assumed that the more significant (systematic) weaknesses have a higher probability 
of identification.  Where a residual or systematic failure mode evaluated during reliability 
analysis has identified that reliability growth is required it is assumed that the growth 
observes a power function (Krasich et al. 2004) according to Equation 45, 
 
( ) iiGi M
αλλ −+= 10  Equation 45 
 
where λGi is the hazard rate of the i
th
 failure mode as a result of the reliability growth 
programme, λ0i is the historical or original hazard rate of the i
th
 failure mode (relating to one 
of the sources of weakness) prior to the reliability growth program, M is the number of design 
modifications and αi is the growth rate for the i
th 
hazard rate.  The cost associated with the 
reliability growth model defined in Equation 45 is a function of the number of design 
modifications; the Power Law model is not strictly a discrete model for reliability growth in 
design.  However, as the design reliability improves as a function of the number and efficacy 
of the modifications, the activity cost is defined as CG = M.CDM where CDM is the cost of a 
single design modification.  
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7.3.3. Potential cost of operations  
The resultant cash flow in operations is a function of the OPEX accumulation relating to 
restoring the system to the operational state given component failure and lost or deferred 
revenue.  These costs are incurred whenever a cut set, as defined by the system reliability 
logic (i.e. the design response to analysis), occurs.  For complex systems it is necessary to 
model cut set occurrence and cost accumulation through simulation.  This can be achieved 
through the development of a discrete event time to failure simulation tool, which has been 
initially developed as part of this research using a combination of MS Visio
TM
, MS Excel
TM
 
and Palisade’s @Risk add in for Excel.  The tool observes four parts: 
• A Method for data collection and system reliability logic definition; 
• The generation of pseudo-random component failure patterns; 
• Network analysis to determine system functional states based on component failure 
state; and 
• Discounted cost accumulation at appropriate event triggers. 
 
Data collection and system reliability logic definition is managed through MS Visio.  Data 
collection utilises MS Visio’s reporting feature that enables the user to export specific data to 
Excel.  In order to export all the relevant information required to drive the simulation, a 
custom Visio stencil is required.    The RBD stencil created includes four basic shapes; ‘RBD 
start node’, ‘RBD end node’, ‘RBD Block’ and ‘Connection’.  Each shape has a set of custom 
properties that have been defined to support the network analysis and reliability based life 
cycle cost simulation.  Table 7-1 describes the custom properties, which are generated in the 
RBD report; the ‘X’ in the final column defines which shape master (node, block or 
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connection) has the specified custom properties.  Custom properties ‘Name’, ‘Cost’, ‘MTTF’ 
and ‘MTTR’ require manual input from the creator of the RBD. 
 
Table 7-1: Description of custom properties presented in RBD report created in MS Visio. 
Custom Property Description 
R
B
D
 N
o
d
e 
R
B
D
 B
lo
ck
 
C
o
n
n
ec
ti
o
n
 
Master Name Label of master shape for all similar shapes X X X 
Shape ID Unique identification tag for each shape in RBD 
drawing  
X X X 
BeginX X-coordinate of the starting point of RBD connection   X 
BeginY Y-coordinate of the starting point of RBD connection   X 
Connection1X X-coordinate of 1
st
 connection point on RBD Block/end 
node 
X X  
Connection1Y Y-coordinate of 1
st
 connection point on RBD Block/end 
node 
X X  
Connection2X X-coordinate of 2
nd
 connection point on RBD Block  X  
Connection2Y Y-coordinate of 2
nd
 connection point on RBD Block  X  
Connection3X X-coordinate of 3
rd
 connection point on RBD Block/start 
node 
 X  
Connection3Y Y-coordinate of 3
rd
 connection point on RBD Block/start 
node 
 X  
Connection4X X-coordinate of 4
th
 connection point on RBD Block  X  
Connection4Y Y-coordinate of 4
th
 connection point on RBD Block  X  
Cost Active cost to repair given failure  X  
EndX X-coordinate of end point of RBD connection   X 
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Custom Property Description 
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EndY Y-coordinate of end point of RBD connection   X 
MTTF Mean time to failure of RBD block, in years  X  
MTTR Mean time to repair of RBD block, in days  X  
Name Equipment name for RBD block  X  
 
The generation of random failure patterns is driven by the underlying assumption of the 
failure pattern.  Consider a component with constant hazard rate, λ; the probability of failure 
over time, t, is given according to Equation 46. 
 
( )tPf λ−−= exp1  Equation 46 
 
The time to failure of the component, TTF, can be simulated by using the inverse transform 
method (Banks and Carson, 1984). 
 
)1ln(
1
UTTF −−=
λ
 Equation 47 
 
Equation 47 returns an exponential distribution of TTF when U is a random number 
uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1].   
 
For a component that does not observe a constant hazard rate the probability of failure is 
characterised by the two parameter Weibull function (Equation 48), 
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( )βηtPf −−= exp^1  Equation 48 
 
where η is the characteristic life parameter and β is the characteristic shape parameter.  Using 
the inverse transform method the time to failure distribution is determined according to 
Equation 49 where U is a random number uniformly distributed in the interval (0, 1]. 
 
( )[ ] βη /11ln UTTF −−=  Equation 49 
 
The failure pattern of a component is determined from its randomly generated time to failure, 
delay to the repair activity (i.e. the time to system failure if the component failure does not 
trigger a requirement for intervention) and the time taken to repair the component/system.   
Random component times to failure are generated using Palisade’s @Risk software, which is 
a Monte Carlo add-in to Excel. 
 
The time to system failure is dependent on the component times to failure (above) and the 
failure logic.  The failure logic is determined from analysing the data collected from the Visio 
RBD.  From the reported information exported from the Visio RBD, a connectivity matrix is 
created which indicates the connections between the blocks of the RBD.  The algorithm for 
creating the connectivity matrix takes the (x, y) coordinates that correspond to the beginning 
of the connection link and finds the RBD block that has the matching (x, y) coordinates as 
one of its connection points.  After recording this RBD block, the process is then repeated for 
the (x, y) coordinates for the end of the link.  Once all (x, y) coordinates for the links have 
been matched to a connection point on an RBD block a two column ‘connection list’ of start 
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blocks and finish blocks for each link is created.  This information is then represented in an ‘n 
by n’ matrix where n is the number of blocks in the RBD.  The matrix is constructed 
according to Figure 7-2. 
 
Each column in the matrix has a column header identifying one of blocks in the RBD.  
Likewise, each row has a row header identifying one of the blocks in the RBD.  The 
information from the connection list is transposed onto the connection matrix such that the (x, 
y) coordinate of the matrix marked with a ‘1’ indicates a link between two blocks interpreted 
as column header ‘x’ is linked to row header ‘y’.  For example in Figure 7-2, which provides 
a reliability block diagram for a typical bridge network with the corresponding connectivity 
matrix, reading down from column header ‘4’ reveals that block four is linked to block five 
(row header ‘5’) and block six (row header ‘6’).  
 
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 1
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
6 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Figure 7-2: Bridge network RBD with corresponding connectivity matrix. 
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RAM analysis programs require a method of determining the system status given failure of 
individual components and sets of components.  A network analysis algorithm has been 
developed specifically for the connectivity matrix constructed from the MS Visio report, 
called the ‘deteriorating path’ algorithm and outlined in Figure 7-3.  The algorithm gradually 
restricts the paths through the network by disabling blocks that do not link to others until 
either a path is found or the start node is disabled. 
 
The deteriorating path algorithm travels through the connectivity matrix by starting at the 
column header that represents the start node of the RBD.  The program runs down the column 
until a ‘1’ is found, at which point the row header is collected and checked to see if it matches 
the shape ID of the RBD end node.  If it does not, the program finds the column header that 
matches the row header and runs back down the column looking for a ‘1’ again and collecting 
the row header.  The process continues until either the row header found matches the shape 
ID of the RBD end node (at which point the system is recorded as being in a working state) 
or the program runs through a column and does not find a ‘1’ (i.e. no connection is found).  If 
no connection is found, then the program disables the block (that does not link to any 
working block) by back tracking to find the row header that matches the current column 
header and setting all values in that row to zero, which stops the program from travelling to 
the recently disabled block.  The program then starts again at the top of the column 
corresponding to the RBD start node.  If the program runs down the column corresponding to 
the start node and does not identify a ‘1’, then the system is recorded as having failed. 
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Figure 7-3: Schematic of the deteriorating path network analysis algorithm. 
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Figure 7-4: Cost of operation algorithm flow chart. 
 
The algorithm for collecting the potential cost of operation for a system is outlined in Figure 
7-4.  Data collected during the construction of the RBD in Visio is exported to Excel, which 
is supplemented by direct user input of the discount rate and operational lifetime (“Ops. Life” 
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in Figure 7-4).  Once an in initial reference connection matrix has been created, which 
describes the system reliability logic, the cost of operations can be simulated.  The simulation 
runs over 10,000 iterations in order to capture the variation in the potential cost.  Each 
iteration starts by generating a set of component times to failure (Equation 47 or Equation 49) 
and identifies the smallest non-zero value, which is set as an event time.  A list of failed items 
is created, all items equal to or below the event time are considered in the failed state, and the 
connections of all failed components are removed from the connection matrix.  The 
deteriorating path algorithm is executed to determine the system state; if the system is still 
operational then the failed component’s time to failure is set to zero and the next event time 
determined.  If the system has failed as a result of the component failure then the present cost 
of the repair and associated downtime is recorded, new times to failure are generated and the 
reference connection matrix restored.  The process repeats until the event time exceeds the 
operational life time.  When the event time is greater than the system life then the iteration is 
halted and the lifetime availability and present value of the cost of operations recorded.  Once 
all iterations are complete the present value of the cost of operation and availability are 
presented in @Risk.  Reliability sensitivity analysis is conducted by holding all other input 
variables (i.e. Mean times to failure) constant whilst changing the input of one variable. 
 
7.4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has outlined the foundations of a decision support framework, constructed with 
the intent of providing decision makers, during the design process, evidence of the value that 
can be generated from implementing reliability and technical risk management such as that 
proposed in API RP 17N (2007).  While the approach draws on recognised theories and 
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concepts already presented in the literature, it is unique in its focus on reliability analyses and 
the technical risk categories identified in API RP 2007 (2007). 
 
The framework is grounded on the definition of a reliability value index (RVI).  The index 
draws analogy from the profitability index by assessing the cash flow as a result of an initial 
investment.  The decision criteria for the reliability index is to invest if RVI > 1.  As with the 
profitability index, the RVI gives an indication of the margin of safety of the investment.  
However, the expected value gives no indication of the probability that a specified investment 
will add value (although it may be true that a decision alternative returning RVI = 1.1 is less 
attractive than an alternative returning RVI = 3).  By incorporating the uncertainty of future 
cash flow (specifically from operations) a distribution of the RVI is generated, referred to as 
the potential reliability value index.  This distribution can be used to determine the 
probability with which the RVI exceeds the acceptance criteria.   
 
The analogous development of the RVI from the profitability index enables the use of RVI to 
identify the best selection of smaller investment decisions given a prescribed capital budget.  
The RVI can also be used to identify an acceptable budget available for the achievement of a 
specified improvement in reliability.  This is elaborated later in this section. 
 
Having defined the decision metric its logical decomposition is presented as a reliability 
value index breakdown structure.  A generic RVI breakdown structure is provided to indicate 
the relevant cost/value elements of immediate concern for the decision making process.  The 
RVI breakdown structure excludes all cost elements not directly relating to the cost of failure 
mode identification and or mitigation. While this agrees with the initial cost breakdown 
structure proposed in Chapter 4 it excludes fault or failure mode identification as, in 
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agreement with other authors (Quigley and Walls, 2003), their presence in the system design 
is already assumed.  If sufficient data was available to model the introduction of faults or 
failure modes then effort would surely be focused on preventing their introduction rather than 
planning when to remove them.   
 
The assumed presence of potential failure modes is driven by the application of technical risk 
categorisation as defined by API RP 17N (and ISO 20815).  Technical risk categorisation 
(presented in Chapter 2) is an activity used to identify changes in the current project 
compared with previous projects; this activity attempts to draw analogy with previous 
projects and identify where changes have occurred.  It is these changes that are the potential 
sources of weakness in the system.  The activity makes no attempt to quantify the number of 
potential weaknesses or characterise them with a hazard rate.  Rather, the intention of 
technical risk categorisation is to prioritise the focus of analyses (or other design for 
reliability effort).  The assumption that either an unacceptable residual weakness and or up to 
four sources of systematic weakness exist within the system demands that further effort is 
required to analyses these areas of potential weakness.  The cost to implement these analyses 
defines the first component of the RVI breakdown structure, Q. 
 
It is not sufficient to cost Q alone; doing so only serves to accumulate cost within the design 
process.  The RVI breakdown structure also requires that the resultant cash flow is 
subsequently considered.  To achieve this, a probability of fault or failure mode identification 
is required to give designers the opportunity to make decision as a result of the analysis.  
After all, this is the purpose of acquiring information through analyses.  The probability of 
fault or failure mode identification is calculated as a function of the time spent analysing the 
system and the detectability of the fault of failure mode.  This detectability parameter is an 
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important feature not previously considered as it relates to the ability with which an 
organization can identify the causes of systematic or residual weakness.  FMECA can address 
detectability, but this relates to the identification of known failure modes once they have 
occurred; the efficiency with which failure modes are identified during the FMECA is 
dependent on the capability of the team conducting the workshop.  That is, one organization 
may find the cause of weakness much more cost efficiently than another.  It is not illogical to 
assume that an organization, that otherwise pays no attention to system reliability, might be 
incapable of identifying certain sources of weakness.  While improvement feasibility has 
been considered in the literature it presupposes that the failure cause is known, which might 
not be true.   
 
Having invested in attempting to identify potential weaknesses in the system, the RVI 
breakdown structure identifies the design response to analysis.  There are two active design 
responses (excluding taking no action); system reconfiguration or reliability growth.  The 
system reconfiguration decision includes decisions to change the basic system layout or to 
achieve the functional requirement with different technology.  While it is unlikely that 
reliability analysis would force a change to the system layout it is included to enable the 
assessment of discrete decision alternatives such as those observed during concept selection.  
The second system reconfiguration option is to change the technology providing the required 
function; in this instance the system reliability logic does not change, just the component 
parts.  This decision may be applicable when selecting specific technology solutions that 
deliver the same functional requirement.  In both options no attempt is made to change the 
reliability of the component technology.  That it, there is no reliability growth at the 
component level, which is considered separately.  The alternative design response, reliability 
growth, attempts to reduce the hazard rate through mitigating residual or systematic 
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weakness.  The extent with which this mitigation alters the characteristic hazard rate is 
modelled according to a growth factor.  This growth factor, as with detectability, relates to 
the capability of the organization implementing the change.   
 
The cost of operations is defined, in the RVI breakdown structure, as the combined effect of 
the design response to analysis on both revenue and OPEX.  OPEX models (which can be 
extended to include revenue) have received the significant coverage in the literature and the 
application of discrete event simulation is well known.  The cash flow model presented here 
used a combination of software capabilities to collect the information required and to 
simulate the resultant cash flow in operations.  Fundamental to its application, Visio is used 
to collect the relevant data, which it exports to Excel (an example of the exported datasheet is 
provided in Appendix A).  Excel, through VBA, interrogates the data imported from Visio to 
determine the system reliability logic and drive the discrete event simulation (the VBA code 
is provided in Appendix B).  While commercially off the shelf software may be available to 
support this part of the RVI calculation, the use of MS Office
TM
 tools removes some of the 
perceived exclusivity of reliability analysis.  While bespoke code is required for the network 
analysis and simulation the calculation of operational cash flow as a result of design decisions 
is generated from an engineering drawing package, not separate reliability software. 
 
The code is not the most efficient, nor is it intended to be for a number of reasons.  Firstly the 
code is presented to demonstrate that separate reliability tools are not required, just an 
engineering drawing package.  Secondly, processing speed is not the rate determining step in 
such an application, data collection is.  The preoccupation with software processing speed is 
due to its visibility, but significantly more time is spent collecting all the necessary inputs 
(and not just reliability and maintainability data).  Although it is beneficial to generate quick 
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results (especially when conducting sensitivity analysis or generating ‘what if’ scenarios) 
there is greater scope for value improvement is making the data acquisition phase more 
efficient before the ‘start simulation’ button is even pressed.  This can be achieved through a 
decentralised approach to reliability and technical risk management and is considered further 
in the discussion to this research. 
 
It is accepted that the decision scenario presented within the RVI breakdown structure may 
not always be appropriate.  The potential RVI metric can be used for other applications, 
specifically the allocation of a reliability improvement budget.  Recall Equation 39 where 
RVI = ∆CF(strategy)/Q; if Q is redefined as the design expenditure relating to fault/failure 
mode identification and the design response (i.e. fault/failure mode mitigations), then setting 
∆CF(strategy)=Q can facilitate the identification of capital ration available to improve the 
reliability by a specified amount.  By discounting the benefit of the operational cash flow as a 
result of the reliability improvement to the time at which the reliability investment is made, 
the available resources for reliability improvement can be determined (Figure 7-5).  The 
resources available for the reliability improvement strategy are dependent on both the degree 
to which the reliability is improved and the measure of cost of failure. 
 
Investment
time
X X X
Failure events
time
Operational 
start time
Cost of failure
 
Figure 7-5 Establishing the financial resources available for a reliability improvement activity. 
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The reliability improvement governs the number of service life failures that are removed; as 
more failures are removed, so the available resource increases.  Consider a failure that occurs 
n years into the operational life and incurs a cost of C; the resource available to remove that 
failure in design is 
( )nr
C
+1
(where r is the discount rate).  If, however, two failures were to 
occur n years into the operational life, both incurring a cost C, then the available resource 
is
( )nr
C
+1
2
; the resource available has increased, although there is an implied assumption that 
a greater reliability improvement is required. 
 
Furthermore, there are more resources available to remove early life failures then there are 
for wear out failures.  Consider an early life failure that occurs in year n and required a cost C 
to repair, a wear out failure event occurs in year m (m>n), requiring the same cost C; the time 
value of money dictates that
( ) ( )mn r
C
r
C
+
>
+ 11
. 
 
The constituent parts of ∆CF(strategy) also determine the level of resources available for the 
reliability effort.  Consider a failure that occurs in year n and requires a cost C to repair, as 
the system is in the failed state it cannot perform its function and forgoes revenue R.  The 
resources afforded to the design team to remove the failure are 
( )nr
RC
+
+
1
 or 
( )nr
C
+1
 depending 
on the inclusion or exclusion of the lost revenue, respectively.  It should be noted however, 
that if the resources available for the reliability improvement strategy includes the revenue 
lost or deferred due to failure and all of the available resources were consumed whilst 
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improving the reliability, then the financial performance of the system is compromised; the 
NPV would remain unchanged but the return on investment would be reduced. 
 
The probability the design response satisfies the RVI decision criteria even at zero cost is not 
unity.  This is due to a finite probability that despite the improvement the system 
characterised by improved reliability observes the same failure pattern as the original system 
reliability.  This includes the probability that both components are reliable (i.e. no failures) or 
that they both observe the same number of failures in the same financial time intervals.  
Figure 7-6 indicates the effect of the magnitude of the reliability investment on the 
probability that the investment will add value to a reliability improvement that observes an 
mean ∆CF(strategy) of £71,600 with a standard deviation of £20,000 (diamonds) and 
£10,000 (squares).   
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Figure 7-6: Effect of Q on P(RVI > 1) where ∆CF(strategy) = £71,600 and σStratgy = £20,000. 
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As the investment cost for the same the design response, Q, increases so the probability that it 
will add value reduces.  The operator is required, therefore, to specify a design response 
budget that returns an acceptable probability of satisfying the RVI decision criterion and is a 
feasible budget to achieve the specified reliability improvement.  The determination of a 
reliability improvement budget presupposes that the design response does not modify the 
system reliability logic at the current level of system indenture.  That is, it is assumed that the 
specification of a reliability budget is applied to an individual block within the reliability 
block diagram.  The approach is more applicable to improvements to the residual weakness 
or technology selection as, in most cases data used to assess ∆CF(strategy) assumes the 
residual hazard rate.  That is, databases such as OREDA do not report early life failure, which 
tend to be the result of a systematic weakness.  Specifying a reliability improvement budget 
also assumes a different decision scenario to that previously discussed.  These decision 
scenarios are compared in Figure 7-7.  Decision scenario 1 observes a decision to react to the 
analysis immediately after the analysis has identified potential system weaknesses.  Each 
reaction is subsequently assessed and a decision to implement, modify or reject the reaction is 
made.  In decision scenario 2 the identification of system weakness is analysed further to 
determine the potential value from the reliability improvement achieved at no cost, from 
which a reliability budget is specified.  This allows an immediate decision as to whether or 
not an improvement is financially viable.  The decision reaction, then, can focus on achieving 
the improvement within the specified budget.  This removes the design reaction modification 
iterations as the financial constraints have been established up front.  This decision scenario 
also provides the opportunity to generate multiple design reactions from which the best 
combination of smaller investments can be selected within the constraints of the budget. 
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Figure 7-7: Comparison of alternate RVI decision scenarios. 
 
The RVI approach is differentiated as it supports proactive reliability improvement to 
enhance project value rather than minimise losses.  That is, the metric encourages 
investments in reliability improvements rather than cutting cost.  The following chapter 
presents some case studies to demonstrate the features of the RVI framework presented in 
this chapter.   
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8. Potential Value Framework Case Studies 
8.1. Introduction 
The RVI breakdown structure proposed in the previous chapter describes a design decision 
scenario that is driven by an initial investment in analysis whose effects propagate through to 
operations.  The purpose of which is to support the planning process for reliability and 
technical risk management.  Based on the prior assumption that weaknesses exist in the 
system, reliability analysis is performed in an attempt to identify these weaknesses.  In 
response to the analysis an active design reaction may be employed to change the layout of 
the system (i.e. change the system reliability logic), change the technology required to deliver 
the function or increase reliability of the technology.  This chapter demonstrates the 
application of these decision scenarios through a selection of case studies.  It also 
demonstrates the effect of setting a reliability budget for a reliability improvement based on 
the probability that it will add value to the project.  The case studies are based on reliability 
and technical risk management training material given to subsea engineers.  Reliability data 
has been sourced from OREDA (SINTEF, 2002) and the sponsoring company’s proprietary 
datasets.  The latter was also the source of all remaining input data.  Operational costs were 
simulated according to the cost of operations model described in the previous chapter. 
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8.2. Decision Scenario 1 – Discrete Options and Changing 
Technology 
8.2.1. Problem definition 
The first decision scenario considered is that of changing technology; this scenario may be 
applied to concept selection where competing design options are considered.  The case 
assumes the identification of a small reservoir which can be exploited economically using a 
single production well, utilising production boosting technology, tied back to an existing 
facility.  Three production boosting technologies are considered; water injection (WI), an 
electric submersible pump (ESP) and a seabed mounted multiphase pump (MPP). 
 
All systems are assumed to observe series reliability logic, failure of any component results 
in total system failure.  Given any failure during the 10 year operational lifetime items are 
restored to as good as new.  The revenue trade-off between the production boosting 
technologies is captured through the production decline function; the daily production rate for 
the n
th
 year, φn, is determined from a decline function according to Equation 50, 
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where φi is the initial flow rate, ∑
−=
=
Φ
1
0
nn
n
n is the cumulative production to date (year n-1), RR is 
the recoverable reserves, b is the decline rate and φtp (φtp = 5kbopd) is the topside processing 
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capacity.   The following cost assumptions are common to all options but are collected at 
different rates depending on the reliability performance.   
• Standard OPEX per barrel: £1/bbl; 
• Market price of oil less tax and other royalties: £20/bbl; 
• Discount rate: 10%; 
• Vessel charges collect cost according to Table 8-1. 
 
Table 8-1: Vessel charges for case study 1. 
Vessel ID Day rate (£) Mobilisation time (days) 
0 0 0 
1 30,000 20 
2 60,000 30 
3 90,000 60 
4 250,000 90 
 
Water injection 
Reliability and repair cost data for the water injection option are given in Table 8-2.  The 
relevant CAPEX for the water injection system is £60,057,000 and the production decline 
function variables are RR = 22MMbbls, φi = 8kbopd and b = 2.4. 
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Table 8-2: Water injection option reliability and repair cost input data. 
Item MTTF 
(yrs) 
Replacement 
cost 
MTTR 
(days) 
Vessel ID 
requirement 
Control umbilical 26.7 110000 21 2 
Production flowline 260 150000 30 3 
Production riser 36.3 75000 7 1 
Production tree 7 575000 3 2 
Production well & completion 167 200000 2 4 
Subsea control equipment 1.3 100000 1 1 
Topside control equipment 1.3 15000 1 0 
Water injection flowline 260 150000 30 3 
Water injection riser 36.3 75000 7 1 
Water injection tree 7 575000 3 2 
Water injection well & completion 167 200000 2 4 
 
Electric submersible pump 
Reliability and repair cost data for the electric submersible pump (ESP) are given in Table 
8-3.  The relevant CAPEX for the water injection system is £36,585,750 and the production 
decline function variables are RR = 20MMbbls, φi = 18kbopd and b = 2.4. 
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Table 8-3: Electric submersible pump reliability and cost input data. 
Item MTTF 
(yrs) 
Replacement 
cost 
MTTR 
(days) 
Vessel ID 
requirement 
Control umbilical 26.7 110000 21 2 
Electric submersible pump unit 1.75 45000 2 3 
Production flowline 260 150000 30 3 
Production riser 36.3 75000 7 1 
Production tree 7 575000 3 2 
Production well & completion 167 200000 2 4 
Pump topside control 1.3 10000 1 0 
Subsea control equipment 1.3 100000 1 1 
Topside control equipment 1.3 15000 1 0 
 
Multiphase pump 
Reliability and repair cost data for the multiphase pump (MPP) option are given in Table 8-4.  
The relevant CAPEX for the water injection system is £35,585,750 and the production 
decline function variables are RR = 20MMbbls, φi = 8kbopd and b = 1.9. 
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Table 8-4: Multiphase pump reliability and cost input data. 
Item MTTF 
(yrs) 
Replacement 
cost 
MTTR 
(days) 
Vessel ID 
Requirement 
Control umbilical 26.7 110000 21 2 
Electric submersible pump unit 1.75 45000 2 3 
Production flowline 260 150000 30 3 
Production riser 36.3 75000 7 1 
Production tree 7 575000 3 2 
Production well & completion 167 200000 2 4 
Pump topside control 1.3 10000 1 0 
Subsea control equipment 1.3 100000 1 1 
Topside control equipment 1.3 15000 1 0 
 
8.2.2. Results 
The conventional life cycle costing and system availability (uptime/total time) are provided 
for each option in Table 8-5.  The results indicate that while the water injection option 
benefits from the greatest availability, the pump options offer superior financial performance.  
Values for the net present value and profitability index do not significantly differentiate the 
pump options.  However, the ESP option has a significantly lower availability and higher life 
cycle cost, suggesting that the cost given failure of the ESP system is much greater than that 
of the MPP option. 
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Table 8-5: Life cycle costing metrics for decision scenario 1. 
Metric WI ESP MPP Preferred option 
NPV £75.2 million £99.7 million £100.1 million ESP/MPP 
LCC £85.2 million £83.6 million £65.8 million MPP 
IRR 43.4% 70.2% 78.6% MPP 
STC £10.2/bbl £8.2/bbl £7.2/bbl MPP 
PI 2.07 3.72 3.8 MPP/ESP 
Payback 2.07 years 1.31 years 1.21 years MPP/ESP 
Availability 0.921 0.856 0.897 WI 
 
Using the same input data, the RVI metrics are calculated.  If the application of RVI to 
discrete options is considered first, the RVI can be calculated from the data provided in Table 
8-5 where RVI = (NPV + CAPEX)/CAPEX  (adding back the CAPEX to the NPV gives 
∆CF(strategy) where the cash flow prior to the decision to invest the CAPEX is zero).  In this 
instance, for discrete options, the RVI is equivalent to the profitability index.  Calculating the 
RVI for the change in technology decision requires that one of the options is defined as the 
base case.  As the RVI reflects investment criteria, the base case option has to be that which 
observes the minimum capital expenditure.  The RVI for each pair wise comparison is 
calculated according to Figure 8-1 and provided in Table 8-6, where the first technology 
specified is the CAPEX minimising option.  The water injection option, despite being the 
availability maximising option is clearly the least favourable option based on the RVI; the 
cash flow as a result of the design reaction is actually negative so despite the increase in 
system uptime, the design decision is not justifiable when compared to either of the pumping 
options.  When comparing the two pumping options, the RVI gives a clear indication that the 
multiphase pumping option is preferable, unlike a number of the life cycle costing metrics. 
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Figure 8-1: RVI calculation for decision scenario 1. 
 
Table 8-6: RVI for discrete comparison. 
 MPP:ESP MPP:WI ESP:WI 
Additional CAPEX (£m) 1 24.47125 23.47125 
∆Cash Flow (£m) 0.6 -0.42875 -1.02875 
RVI 0.6 -0.0018 -0.04 
Preferred option MPP MPP ESP 
 
8.3. Decision Scenario 2 – changing system reliability logic 
8.3.1. Problem definition 
The second decision scenario is system reconfiguration by changing the system reliability 
logic.  For mature hardware, one of the simplest methods deployed to improve the reliability 
is to introduce redundancy into the system.  Using a single component as the base case 
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scenario, redundant components are added to increase the reliability for a system that 
observes a high cost given failure. 
 
The relevant cost of the CAPEX is the sum of the redundant components; each component 
costs £100,000.  On failure the entire system is replaced at a cost equal to the CAPEX plus a 
logistic support cost of £1,500,000.  Repair consumes 50 days of operation at a cost of 
£100,000 per day in revenue impact, totalling £5,000,000.  Costs are incurred at a discount 
rate of 10%. 
 
The design life of the system is 10 years and each component observes a mean time to failure, 
MTTF = 8 years.  The system observes a 1 out of n failure logic (system is operational 
providing one component is operational).   
 
8.3.2. Results 
Figure 8-2 provides mean results from the problem presented in a typical economics of 
reliability model.  The optimum reliability is characterised by seven components logically 
arranged in parallel, giving a reliability R = 0.906.  Figure 8-3 indicates the results in terms of 
the reliability value index.  The RVI indicates that any number of additional items in parallel 
adds value when compared to the base case.  The economics of reliability model agrees with 
this as all life cycle costs for all reliability improvements are less than the base case scenario.  
The marginal RVI curve indicates the value added from adding one extra component in 
parallel, where the marginal RVI is less than one the benefit of adding an extra component in 
parallel does not satisfy the RVI investment criterion.  In this case the first instance when the 
marginal RVI is less than one is when eight components are logically arranged in parallel, 
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meaning that, in agreement with the economics of reliability model, the optimum reliability is 
achieved with seven components arranged in parallel.   
 
 
Figure 8-2: Economics of reliability model for decision scenario 2. 
 
Figure 8-3: Reliability value index for decision scenario 2. 
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8.4. Decision Scenario 3 – Reliability Analysis Decision 
8.4.1. Problem definition 
Figure 8-4 provides a decision tree for the RVI breakdown structure and associated decision 
scenario described in the previous chapter whereby the design team considers the potential 
financial value of performing reliability analysis.  Consider, for the base case, a decision to 
invest present cost of £30,000 to perform some form of reliability analysis based on a prior 
assumption that unacceptable system weakness exists within the proposed subject of the 
analysis (derived from the technical risk categorisation activity recommended by API RP 
17N, 2007).  Should the decision maker choose to implement the analysis and subsequently 
discovers a systematic weakness, there is a further decision to react to the analysis findings 
and improve the component reliability through design modification, at a present cost of 
£250,000.  If a systematic failure exists within the system and it escapes detection or no 
mitigation is implemented then it is assumed to incur a present cost of £4,000,000 should it 
failure in the first year of operations.  The decision to analyse the system is under uncertainty 
with respect to the following parameters: 
• The existence of a systematic failure mode; 
• The ability to identify the systematic failure mode; and 
• The capability with which a systematic failure mode is rectified.   
 
The existence of weaknesses within the system is based on a prior assumption as a result of 
performing an activity such as technical risk categorisation.  Technical risk categorisation 
ranks items based on deviations from previous applications of the same or similar items.  As 
the deviations from previous project increase so the perception that unwanted weaknesses 
exist in the system also increases.  For the base case it is assumed that the decision maker is 
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completely uncertain about the presence of any systematic weaknesses in the system and 
assumes a probability, P = 0.5, that a systematic weakness exists.   
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Figure 8-4: Decision tree for systematic failure mode management. 
 
The ability to identify system weakness is determined according to ( )tPidentify γ−−= exp1  
(Equation 43) where t = 1 and the detection rate, γ, is uniformly distributed over the range (0, 
5].  The ability with which the systematic weakness is mitigated is determined according to 
( ) αλλ −+= MGi 10  (Equation 45) where the base case systematic weakness is characterised by 
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a hazard rate λ0 = 2 and the fix coefficient, α, is uniformly distributed over the range (0, 5].  It 
is assumed that the design response it typified by one reliability improvement activity.    
 
8.4.2. Results  
The results are presented in terms of a decision region graph indicating the decision to invest 
in analysis based on the perceived capability of the organization to find and fix systematic 
weaknesses.  Figure 8-5 indicates the decision region graph for the base case described 
above.  The decision region indicates the organizational ability required to manage the system 
weakness, through identification and mitigation.  The results suggest that the decision to 
invest should only be rejected if the organization has almost no ability to detect the system 
weakness or has limited ability to improve the reliability.    
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Figure 8-5: Decision region graph based on detection rate and fix coefficient. 
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Figure 8-6: Decision region graph based on probability of detection and probability of first year failure. 
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Figure 8-7: Decision Region sensitivity to system weakness existence. 
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Figure 8-6 provides the decision region for the same decision scenario based on the 
probability of detection and the probability of first year failure rather than detection rate and 
the fix coefficient.  Figure 8-7 indicates the decision switching point sensitivity to the 
probability of existence of a system weakness.  As the probability of existence of a system 
weakness decreases so the required capability to manage the weakness increases.   
 
8.5. Decision Scenario 4 – Specifying a reliability budget 
8.5.1. Problem definition 
By discounting the potential losses avoided by improving the reliability of system to the point 
at which the initial investment is made, a budget for the reliability improvement can be 
defined.  However, the probability with which this investment adds value is dependent on the 
fraction of the potential benefit allocated to the reliability improvement. 
 
The base case scenario observes a system with a mean time to failure MTTF = 4years and a 
standard deviation of 1 year, intended to operate for 15years.  Given failure the component is 
instantaneously replaced at a cost of £2,000,000.  The mean time to failure is enhanced over 
half year intervals (up to MTTF = 8years) to observe the potential losses avoided by 
improving the reliability.  Values for P(RVI > 1) are calculated for incremental values of Q. 
 
8.5.2. Results 
Figure 8-8 indicates the probability of satisfying the reliability value index decision making 
criteria given a reliability improvement investment, Q.  The results confirm that as Q 
increases so the probability that the investment adds value decreases. 
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MTTF = 8 years
MTTF = 4.5 years
Figur
e 8-8: P(RVI > 1) for increasing values of Q. 
 
8.6. Chapter summary 
This chapter has demonstrated the application of the RVI decision metric and decision 
scenarios defined by the RVI breakdown structure.  Decision scenarios 1 and 2 are presented 
to validate the application of the RVI metric against the existing concepts of life cycle costing 
and economics of reliability.  Decision scenarios 3 and 4 demonstrate the unique application 
of the RVI breakdown structure to investing in reliability analyses and specifying a reliability 
improvement budget. 
 
ISO 15663-2 (2001) recommends that during the concept selection phase, traditional 
investment criteria, such as net present value, profitability index and internal rate of return, 
are the preferred decision metrics to drive life cycle costing applications.  Based on the 
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results generated in Table 8-5, these criteria, with the possible exception of IRR, only suggest 
a marginal preference for the multiphase pumping option.  Implementing the RVI metric and 
applying the change system reconfiguration decision scenario appears to generate more 
definitive results.  The application of the RVI breakdown structure explicitly considers the 
change in future cash flow as a result of a design decision.  For concept selection, this 
requires a pair wise comparison between options that evaluates one concept against another 
by trading off the extra capital expenditure required against the future change in cash flow as 
a result of the decision to change options.  In the example provided, the water injection 
concept drops out quite clearly (it is also the least favoured when considering the traditional 
life cycle costing metrics) leaving the two pumping options.  However, using the tradition 
investment appraisal techniques, these options are not clearly differentiated.  By applying the 
RVI breakdown structure the comparison of the two options is simplified down to a decision 
to invest £1 million to achieve a future cash flow benefit of £0.6 million, which does not 
satisfy the investment criteria. 
 
Decision scenario 2 as with decision scenario 1 is presented to demonstrate compliance with 
more conventional applications.  The economics of reliability model clearly demonstrates the 
trade off between capital expenditure and operating expenditure when considering the 
optimal number of elements logically arranged in parallel, and hence reliability, required to 
minimise life cycle cost.  However, separating the CAPEX and OPEX derives a 
preoccupation with cost.  The RVI breakdown structure, when applied to the same decision, 
ultimately returns the same result but the reporting structure only considers if the result of the 
decision is to enhance the project value.  The application forces a change in focus, switching 
the driver for decision making from reducing cost to improving value.   
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The third decision scenario considers the primary purpose of the RVI breakdown structure, to 
assess the value of investing in reliability analyses.  The decision under uncertainty, defined 
in Figure 8-4, is evaluated to determine the reliability and technical risk management 
capability required to manage the perceived system weakness.  This capability is 
characterised by the ability to detect system weaknesses and subsequently mitigate the related 
probability of failure.  The resultant switching point for the decision to invest is defined here 
as the reliability management efficiency frontier.  It is this efficiency frontier that becomes 
the determining factor of whether or not reliability analyses add value to the project.  The 
capability efficiency frontier supports the conventional view that, in terms of project 
management, control offers greater value than information.  The decision to implement 
reliability analyses is dependent on the prior assumption that system weaknesses exist, the 
potential value that could be generated through mitigating these weaknesses and the 
reliability management efficiency frontier that characterises the organization.  However, it is 
the cost efficiency with which an organization can actively influence the probability of failure 
that ultimately drives the decision to implement reliability analyses.  If the design decision 
maker has no intention of reacting to the analyses, or has no ability to influence the design’s 
reliability then there is no value in performing reliability analyses.  In fact, under these 
circumstances, the implementation of reliability analyses actually deteriorates project value.   
 
The RVI breakdown structure used to determine if reliability analysis adds project value 
requires some very specific data.  This data includes: 
• A prior assumption that system weakness exists in the system; 
• A probability of failure that characterises the system weakness; 
• The cost associated with the system weakness being exposed during operations; 
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• Data characterising the ability with which the organization performing the analysis 
can identify system weaknesses; 
• Data characterising the ability with which the organization can mitigate system 
weakness; and 
• Data characterising the cost of mitigating the system weakness in design. 
 
Much of this data is specific to the individual project and the reliability and technical risk 
management capability of the organization and may, in fact, be unknown or at least uncertain.  
The prior assumption that a system weakness exists can be inferred from a process such as 
technical risk categorisation.  Through technical risk categorisation, API RP 17N (2007) 
implies that up to four classes of systematic failure can be introduced into a system as a result 
of technological, architectural, environmental and organizational uncertainties.  If these 
systematic failure modes escape the project delivery process then they are revealed as early 
life failures, which observe a high operational cost of failure.  While the cost to replace or 
repair equipment that has failed may be estimated, the probability with which this event 
occurs is highly uncertain; much of the data available in industry standard reliability 
databases does not reflect early life or systematic failures.   
 
The data characterising the reliability efficiency frontier and the response to identifying 
system weakness in design is specific to the system weakness and the organization.  Williams 
et al. (2003) present a five level reliability capability maturity model, which describes the 
increasing ability of organizations to manage reliability achievement in projects.  While this 
does not discuss the reliability efficiency frontier, it follows that as an organization’s 
reliability capability maturity level increases so their reliability efficiency frontier expands.  
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As the reliability efficiency frontier expands, the likelihood with which reliability analyses 
adds value also increases.   
 
Case 4 demonstrates the use of the RVI breakdown structure to specify the budget for 
reliability improvement.  The methodology supposes that by discounting the improvement in 
cash flow as a result of a specified reliability improvement a budget to achieve that 
improvement can be estimated.  Due to the stochastic nature of reliability performance, the 
probability with which the budget adds value is dependent on the fraction of the future cash 
flow benefit allocated to the reliability improvement activity.  The approach is similar to that 
of the sensitivity analysis recommended in the life cycle costing standards (ISO 15663-1, 
2000) but this application focuses solely on the benefit in cash flow after a design decision to 
identify an investment amount that can be fed back into the project in order to achieve the 
specified reliability improvement.  The purpose of the RVI structure and the allocation of a 
reliability improvement budget is to analyse the propagation of design for reliability decisions 
(specifically analysis) through the life of the project and as such does not give an opportunity 
for cost cutting. 
 
The reliability value index and its associated breakdown structure are reliability and technical 
risk management specific applications of life cycle costing, not previously considered in the 
literature.  The breakdown structure reflects how the output generated through reliability 
analyses propagates through the remaining life of the project and is intended to support 
decision makers in planning for design for reliability.  Central to this is the ability with which 
organizations actively influence system reliability, which is characterised by the reliability 
efficiency frontier.   Organizations that consider reliability as a source of competitive 
advantage should actively seek methods that enhance their reliability capability maturity and 
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hence expand their reliability efficiency frontier.  The following chapter discusses the 
measures, such as decentralising reliability and technical risk management, which can help to 
expand the reliability efficiency frontier, making more reliability effort potentially value 
added. 
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9. Discussion and Final Conclusions 
9.1. Introduction 
90% of deep sea hydrocarbon reserves are not economically feasible (Chitwood et al. 2004) 
due to the cost associated with installing more traditional topside host facilities (Leffler et al. 
2003).  The current trend to achieve economic feasibility is to reduce the capital expenditure, 
often accomplished through the deployment of subsea equipment.  The financial benefit 
afforded to a field development project by deploying subsea equipment is offset by the 
potential risk of high operational costs associated with subsea failure.  In an attempt to tackle 
the potential risks to reliability achievement, the industry has produced API RP 17N (2007), a 
subsea specific framework for reliability and technical risk management. 
 
A key component of reliability and technical risk management is the reliability analysis that 
supports many of the primary activities associated with the management system.  These 
analyses, in theory, are implemented to influence design by identifying weaknesses 
introduced to the system.  However, all projects are different and reliability and technical risk 
management systems, such as that proposed in API RP 17N (2007), cannot be applied in the 
same fashion for all projects.  Engineers applying the recommended practice need a rational 
methodology to provide evidence to decision makers, early in design decision making 
process, of the value of investing time and management effort in design for reliability 
activities during the design life cycle.   
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Existing techniques such as life cycle costing do specify reliability analyses as cost elements 
that can be included within a cost breakdown structure, but only as cost consuming activities.  
Applications of life cycle costing presented in the literature do not consider the potential 
value generate from reliability analyses.  In order for reliability analysis to add value, they 
must have the ability to influence design decisions and therefore must be considered in terms 
of how actions resulting from analyses effect the remaining project life cycle.  A potential 
reliability value framework is presented herein, as an advanced life cycle costing application, 
to support the reliability management planning process.   
 
The framework derives an RVI breakdown structure that describes the logical decomposition 
of the cash flow elements required to calculate the reliability value index, a value metric 
based on the profitability index.  The breakdown structure is presented to reflect a generic 
decision scenario where the effects of reliability analyses propagate through the design 
process, via a design response to the analysis and the subsequent effect on the operational 
cash flow.  Quantifying the resultant reliability value index confirms if the decision scenario 
has the potential to enhance project value.   
 
While the potential reliability value framework can be applied to more conventional 
investment decisions, the intended application is to support the planning process.  The 
reliability value index and its associated breakdown structure are driven by the cost efficiency 
with which organizations can identify and mitigate system weaknesses.  It is this 
organizational characteristic, presented here as the reliability management efficiency frontier, 
that defines if reliability analyses add project value.   
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9.2. Decentralising Reliability Management to Enhance the 
Reliability Management Efficiency Frontier 
Traditionally, reliability is managed through a central reliability function.  This structure is 
expensive to maintain and is subject to the possibility of a specialist discipline silo becoming 
disjointed from the rest of the project organization.  The centralisation of the reliability 
function is the cause for many of the barriers to implementing reliability and technical risk 
management, specifically the industries perception of the reliability discipline and the lack of 
knowledge of failure causation.  One organizational solution is to decentralise reliability and 
technical risk management.  Figure 9-1 provides an organizational structure for a subsea 
project, which reflects the decentralised reliability function.   
 
 
Figure 9-1: Centralised reliability function within project organization structure (developed from Brall, 2004). 
 
The major project functions (operations, procurement, engineering, quality management and 
project services) all assume some responsibility for reliability and technical risk management.  
A (small) reliability engineering function is still present in the organization to support some 
of the more specialist activities.  The organizational structure indicates that the specialist 
reliability function is subordinate to engineering.  Despite the affinity between quality and 
reliability, it is this author’s opinion that quality is a more necessary feature of reliability than 
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reliability is of quality.  As a result the reliability function cannot be a subordinate to quality 
in any project organization.   
 
While decentralised reliability and technical risk management is proposed here as a method 
for enhancing the reliability management efficiency frontier there are other benefits that can 
result from decentralisation.  The expense relating to a central reliability function has been 
discussed; decentralising the reliability and technical risk management function should 
reduce the specialist headcount and hence the project overhead associated with sustaining a 
centralised reliability function.  While this is perhaps not a significant CAPEX reduction for 
an individual project, it is more attractive as a long term objective of sustaining competitive 
advantage, especially for smaller organizations.     
 
By decentralising the reliability function, awareness and responsibility for application of the 
reliability activities expands to other project functions.  The decomposition of a specialist 
reliability discipline silo widens the scope of involvement throughout the organization by 
integrating the reliability and technical risk management activities into the pre-existing 
project organization structure.  As the scope of involvement widens throughout the 
organization, different project functions are exposed to the reliability strategy and greater 
awareness of the reliability discipline is generated throughout the organization.    Training 
can increase awareness of the reliability strategy and is a pivotal starting point of the roll out 
of any strategy but increasing the scope of application to the other project functions provides 
direct exposure.  Decentralisation of reliability will only work if certain reliability activities 
become an integral part of the skill set required for a given project function.  Figure 9-1 
suggests the reliability skill set that each project function should be conversant with or 
actively implement.   
202 
 
 
The lack of knowledge of failure causation results from poor communication of the 
information relating to failure.  While a decentralised reliability function may not remove the 
fear of a blame culture within a project organization, it can enhance the communication 
between project functions in terms of the reliability objectives, how they might be achieved 
and what might prevent their achievement.  By increasing reliability awareness and 
communication between project functions through decentralising the reliability function, the 
capability efficiency frontier should expand.  A decentralised reliability function means that 
more people are involved in the collection and communication of data, thus increasing the 
probability that system weaknesses are found.  Ultimately, organizations with greater 
awareness and an increased likelihood of identifying system weakness are less likely to 
institutionalise a blame culture due to their greater understanding of the organization 
dependencies that lead to failure.  Furthermore with the reduced overhead generated from the 
decomposition of the specialist reliability discipline silo more resources could be afforded to 
investigating where reliability improvements might be made.   
 
It has been reported in the literature that up to 85% of the life cycle cost is committed at the 
end of FEED, which is the point at which the performance or functional specification is 
constructed.  Some of this committed cost is unnecessary and relates to equipment failure as a 
result of poorly specified reliability.  By enhancing the communication of reliability goals 
and requirements throughout the project organization some unnecessary failure cost can be 
avoided. 
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9.3. Central guidance to decentralised reliability and technical 
risk management 
Decentralised reliability and technical risk management is not without its own potential 
problems.  The greatest potential weakness of decentralising reliability and technical risk 
management is uncontrolled decision making based on what the decision maker believes to 
be the optimum solution.  Decentralised decision making is not necessarily the best for the 
organization or project as a whole as these ‘local’ decisions can result in conflicts of interest 
unless they are guided centrally.   That is a common driver for reliability and technical risk 
management is required to influence consistent decision making.   
 
This research has proposed a reliability value index and RVI breakdown structure as a 
common guide.  The approach requires that the effects of design reactions to reliability 
analysis are propagated through the remaining project life to determine if they add value to 
the project.  The responsibility and participation in analyses by multiple project functions 
means that the propagation of design reactions to analysis is better understood throughout the 
organization.  Decisions are not made based on an individual’s perception on what is best for 
the project or the project function that they are accountable for. 
 
What this means in reality is that it is the process of assessing the decision scenario described 
by the RVI breakdown structure that actually becomes the common guidance for 
decentralised reliability and technical risk management.  To recall, the decision scenario 
commences with reliability analysis, intended to identify potential weaknesses in the system.  
As a result of the analysis a design reaction is proposed, which is analysed to determine if its 
effects, when propagated through the remaining project life, add value.  That is the 
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application of reliability analysis, as defined by the decision scenario in the RVI breakdown 
structure, becomes the primary vehicle of central guidance.  Figure 9-2 expands the decision 
scenario to include the application of the reliability analyses. 
 
 
Base case system RBD Construction
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Input system 
failure modes and 
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Reliability value 
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Figure 9-2: Central guidance for the application of reliability analyses. 
 
The decision scenario commences with the development of a technically feasible design 
option which is treated as the base case.  This design feeds into the construction of a 
reliability block diagram to represent the system reliability logic, which also defines the 
system failure modes.  Based on the system reliability logic defined by the reliability block 
diagram a failure modes and effects analysis is performed to determine the failure modes, 
how they propagate through the system and collect the data required for the reliability value 
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index calculation.  That is the failure modes identified by the reliability block diagram drives 
the data collection for reliability centred life cycle costing via a failure modes effect analysis.   
 
The output from the initial analysis is the criticality of the failure modes in terms of life cycle 
cash flow.  Sensitivity analysis is performed to identify where the greatest scope for value 
improvement exists within the system and this information is fed back into the FMEA, 
upgrading it to a ‘potential value FMECA’.  Here, the ‘criticality’ in failure modes effect and 
criticality analysis refers to the potential value that could be realised through improving the 
reliability from the base case, thus prioritising where to focus design improvements.  As the 
criticality is reported in terms of life cycle cash flow, it is not subject to the criticisms of the 
risk priority number.  It is this FMECA, then, that becomes the reporting structure intended to 
influence a design reaction.   
 
Having identified where reliability improvements can add the most value, the decision 
reaction is defined.  These reactions are considered either as system reconfigurations or 
component reliability growth.  Improvements at the component level observe the first 
feedback loop, whereby the fault tree analysis is performed in order to identify how reliability 
growth might be achieved.  The potential value FMECA is updated to capture the change in 
cash flow as a result of the reliability growth design reaction.  Subsequently the RVI 
breakdown structure is resolved to determine if the design reaction adds value or to allocate a 
budget for the reliability achievement.  The second feedback loop occurs when the design 
reaction is system reconfiguration.  In this case either the system reliability logic (and hence 
RBD) is changed and or the FMEA is updated to reflect that the base case has changed in 
terms of the technology deployed. 
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This process is unavoidably data intensive and data sensitive.  However, with a decentralised 
reliability function data is collected across the project organization and no one division is 
solely responsible for the data collection or analysis; more importantly all divisions are 
involved in the process and acceptance of a decision reaction could be further supported by 
qualitative discussion of the effects of the design reaction just as much as quantitative 
assessment.   
 
9.4. The potential value FMECA 
Reliability value analysis is intended to facilitate proactive value addition through reliability 
improvement.  This is achieved through conducting sensitivity analysis to identify the major 
potential value drivers.  Figure 9-2 indicates this process in terms of the interaction of the 
existing reliability analysis toolkit and suggests the use of a FMEA style worksheet to collect 
and present the data.  The FMEA technique is widely used throughout all industries and is 
perhaps the most accessible component of the design for reliability toolkit.  As the 
organizational structure for decentralised reliability management suggests, many project 
functions should be involved in the FMEA process.  Using a modified FMEA approach to 
drive the reliability value process facilitates its implementation and increases awareness of 
the implications of reliability and cost.  Appendix C suggests the format for a potential value 
FMECA worksheet. 
 
While the modified FMEA worksheet can present the component parts of the RVI, without 
graphical representation, the decision maker can be rendered insensitive to the scale of the 
investment.  To compensate, a value decision matrix (Figure 9-3), is proposes as a 
replacement for the criticality matrix of the traditional FMECA.  The potential value matrix, 
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rather than prioritising high criticality equipment or failure modes, is used to prioritise design 
reactions. 
 
∆
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Figure 9-3: Potential value criticality matrix. 
 
The potential value matrix plots the cost of the reliability investment against the change in 
operational cash flow as a result of the reliability improvement.  The best available 
technology (BAT) is centred in the matrix as a point of reference.  The diagonal ∆cashflow = 
Q represents the iso-value line of BAT, which indicates the required cash flow performance 
given any cost to return the same reliability value as that observed by the best available 
technology (RVI = 1).  There are three broad areas covered by the potential value matrix, 
which have been labelled; ‘value depletion’, ‘value creation’ and ‘cost cutting’.  ‘Value 
depletion’ occupies all those instances where the design reaction does not satisfy the RVI 
acceptance criterion (i.e. all instances where RVI < 1).  ‘Value creation’ represents those 
instances where the reliability value index decision making criterion is satisfied (RVI > 1).  
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The final area, ‘cost cutting’ indicates where the reliability value has been improved, but the 
performance has dropped, relative to BAT, as a result.  This is viewed as the wrong objective 
of the potential reliability value process.  Application of the matrix should plot the design 
alternatives assessed during the second phase of the potential reliability value process to 
prioritise the reliability improvement activities. 
 
9.5. Concluding Remarks and Future Research Opportunities 
Since first stepping offshore in the 1800s, the oil and gas industry has increasingly moved to 
more remote locations in an attempt to exploit the World’s hydrocarbon reserves.  As these 
reserves are discovered in deeper offshore locations, so the use of traditional technologies for 
offshore production (i.e. fixed platforms) becomes uneconomical and technically infeasible.  
The solution is to deploy subsea technology which vastly reduces the capital expenditure 
compared with the original technology.  Trading off the reduction in CAPEX is the risk of 
high operational expenditures associated with subsea failure.  This has spurred the 
development of reliability strategies aimed at reducing the risk of operational failure through 
front loading effort and resources to assure that the required or target reliability is observed in 
service.  The implementation of such a strategy is counter to the conventional wisdom of 
achieving economic feasibility through CAPEX minimisation and as such requires a decision 
framework to demonstrate how investing in reliability and technical risk management can 
enhance project value. 
 
The combination of financial appraisal and reliability analysis is not novel; the life cycle 
costing methodology emphasises the relationship between system reliability and life cycle 
cost to drive design decisions.  However, there is no evidence in the literature of 
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implementing life cycle costing to justify the application of reliability analyses.  In response, 
this research proposes a potential reliability value framework, which offers the following 
contribution to knowledge. 
 
The primary contribution is the reliability value index and its associated RVI breakdown 
structure.  Central to the potential reliability value framework, the RVI breakdown structure 
is an advanced life cycle costing application that explicitly considers how reliability analysis 
affects the remaining project life cycle cash flow as a means to justify reliability analyses 
based on its potential value addition.  Conventional life cycle costing does include reliability 
analyses, but only as a cost consuming activity.  The RVI breakdown structure focuses 
explicitly on a decision scenario, which commences with reliability analysis and propagates 
its effects through the remaining project life cycle.  The structure is value, rather than cost, 
based, which avoids the preoccupation with cost.  This decision making framework targets 
improving project value through enhanced reliability. 
 
The RVI breakdown structure identifies that reliability and technical risk management is 
dependent on the ability with which an organization can locate and mitigate system 
weakness.  That is the potential value generated from reliability analyses is dependent on the 
cost efficiency with which an organization can both identify potential system weaknesses and 
improve reliability.  The limiting capability, which influences if an organization can improve 
project value, is defined as the reliability management efficiency frontier.    The research has 
proposed that in order to expand the reliability management efficiency frontier, an 
organization should adopt a decentralised approach to reliability and technical risk 
management.  Decentralising the reliability management function both reduces the cost of 
retaining reliability expertise but also exposes the remaining project functions to the field of 
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design for reliability.  In doing so, the project organization gains greater awareness of the 
causes of failure and is potentially more capable of improving the reliability. 
 
Decentralised reliability management is not without its flaws.  Without central guidance, 
decentralised decision making can lead to conflicts of interest and option selection that does 
not represent the optimum solution for the organization.  The final contribution of the 
potential value framework is its application as common guidance for design for reliability 
decisions.  Specifying the application of reliability analysis, as defined by the decision 
scenario in the RVI breakdown structure, becomes the central guidance for decentralised 
reliability and technical risk management.  This reduces the effort needed to plan for 
reliability analyses as the approach taken to assess the value of the initial analyses (as defined 
by the decision scenario) incorporates all the necessary components of the reliability 
engineers’ toolkit. 
 
The application of the potential reliability value index to specify a budget for reliability 
improvement and the implementation of a decentralised reliability and technical risk 
management function introduces some interesting opportunities for further research.  Of note 
is the use of specifying a reliability improvement budget as a tool to provide financial 
incentives to suppliers to improve the reliability of their hardware based on a rank order 
tournament game theory model. Lazear and Rosen (1981) introduced the tournament model 
as a compensation scheme, which pays out based on rank order rather than output level and 
has been used to influence supplier selection based on quality (Deng and Elmaghraby, 2005).  
The game theory model classifications (Wang and Parlar, 1989) are briefly addressed below 
as a starting point for research in reliability based supplier selection tournaments. 
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• Number of players: There are four players in a tournament model; two suppliers of 
subsea hardware and two operators.  The operators represent an oil major and a 
smaller operator (or collection of smaller operators).  Expansion of the supply base 
provides further scope for the possible development of the model. 
• Nature of the payoff function: The tournament is a nonzero-sum game, all 
participants are assumed to realise a profit.  However, this application is interested in 
level of incentive required to generate a suitable improvement in product reliability 
for the oil major.  
• Pre-play negotiation: It is assumed that the suppliers are not colluding; therefore, 
this is a non-cooperative model.   
• State of information available: Each supplier knows the (historical) industry MTTF 
as per the ORDEA database; that this is the base case reliability offered by supplier. 
• Involvement in time: In practice, the tournament should be repetitious but in the first 
instance, this should be treated as a static game.  This would provide significant scope 
for further development of the model should the proof of concept be successful. 
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